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Abstract
This dissertation can be thematically grouped into two categories: monetary theory
in the so called New Monetarist search models where money and credit are essential
in terms of improving social welfare, and optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal
policy in New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models when
the government cannot commit. Arguably, the methodology and conceptual frame-
works adopted in these two lines of work are quite different. However, they share a
common goal in helping us understand how and why monetary factors can affect the
real economy, and how monetary and fiscal policy should respond to developments in
the economy to improve social welfare. There are two chapters in each part. In the
first chapter, recent advances based on the pre-eminent Lagos-Wright (LW) monetary
search model are reviewed. Against this background, chapter two introduces collateral-
ized credit inspired by a communal responsibility system into the creditless LW model,
in order to study the role of money and credit as alternative means of payment. In
contrast, the third chapter revisits the classic inflation bias problem associated with
optimal time-consistent monetary policy in the cashless New Keynesian framework.
In this chapter, fiscal policy is trivial, due to the assumption of lump-sum tax. As a
follow-up work, chapter four studies optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy
mix as well as debt maturity choice in an environment with only distortionary taxes,
endogenous government spending and government debt of various maturities.
Chapter 1 introduces the tractable and influential Lagos-Wright (LW) search-theoretic
framework and reviews the latest developments in extending it to study issues concern-
ing the role of money, credit, asset pricing, monetary policy and economic growth. In
addition, potential research topics are discussed. Our main message from this review
is that the LW monetary model is flexible enough to deal with numerous issues where
fiat money plays an essential role as a medium of exchange.
Chapter 2, based on the LW framework, develops a search model of money and credit
motivated by a historical medieval institution - the community responsibility system.
The aim is to examine the role of credit collateralized by the community responsibility
system as a supplementary medium of exchange in long-distance trade, assuming that
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entry cost and the cost of using credit are proportional to distance, due to factors
like direct verification and settlement cost and indirect transportation cost. We find
that both money and credit are useful in the sense of improving welfare. In addition,
the Friedman rule can be sub-optimal in this economy, due to the interaction between
the extensive margin (that is, the range of outside villages which the representative
household has trade with) and the intensive margin (that is, the scope of villages
where credit is used as a supplementary medium of exchange). Finally, higher entry
cost narrows down the extensive margin, and similarly, higher cost of using credit,
ceteris paribus, reduces the usage of credit and hence lowers social welfare.
Chapter 3 reconsiders the inflation bias problem associated with the renowned rules
versus discretion debate in a fully nonlinear version of the benchmark New Keynesian
DSGE model. We ask whether the inflation bias problem related to discretionary
monetary policy differs quantitatively under two dominant forms of nominal rigidities -
Calvo pricing and Rotemberg pricing, if the inherent nonlinearities are taken seriously.
We find that the inflation bias problem under Calvo contracts is significantly greater
than under Rotemberg pricing, despite the fact that the former typically exhibits far
greater welfare costs of inflation. In addition, the rates of inflation observed under
the discretionary policy are non-trivial and suggest that the model can comfortably
generate the rates of inflation at which the problematic issues highlighted in the trend
inflation literature. Finally, we consider the response to cost push shocks across both
models and find these can also be significantly different. Thus, we conclude that the
nonlinearities inherent in the New Keynesian DSGE model are empirically relevant and
the form of nominal inertia adopted is not innocuous.
Chapter 4 studies the optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy when sur-
prise inflation (or deflation) is costly, taxation is distortionary, and non-state-contingent
nominal debt of various maturities exists. In particular, we study whether and how
the change in nominal government debt maturity affects optimal policy mix and equi-
librium outcomes, in the presence of distortionary taxes and sticky prices. We solve
the fully nonlinear model using global solution techniques, and find that debt maturity
has drastic effects on optimal time-consistent policies in New Keynesian models. In
particular, some interesting nonlinear effects are uncovered. Firstly, the equilibrium
value for debt is negative and close to zero, which implies a slight undershooting of the
inflation target in steady state. Secondly, starting from high level of debt-GDP ratio,
the optimal policy will gradually reduce the level of debt, but with radical changes in
the policy mix along the transition path. At high debt levels, there is a reliance on a
relaxation of monetary policy to reduce debt through an expansion in the tax base and
reduced debt service costs, while tax rates are used to moderate the increases in infla-
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tion. However, as debt levels fall, the use of monetary policy in this way is diminished
and the policy maker turns to fiscal policy to continue the reduction in debt. This is
akin to a switch from an active to passive fiscal policy in rule based descriptions of pol-
icy, which occurs endogenously under the optimal policy as debt levels fall. It can also
be accompanied by a switch from passive to active monetary policy. This switch in the
policy mix occurs at higher debt levels, the longer the average maturity of government
debt. This is largely because high debt levels induce an inflationary bias problem, as
policy makers face the temptation to use surprise inflation to erode the real value of
that debt. This temptation is then more acute when debt is of shorter maturity, since
the inflationary effects of raising taxes to reduce debt become increasingly costly as
debt levels rise. Finally, in contrast to the Ramsey literature with real bonds, in the
current setting we find no extreme portfolios of short and long-term debt. In addition,
optimal debt maturity, implicitly, lengthens with the level of debt.
v

Table of Contents
Abstract iii
List of Tables xiii
List of Figures xv
Acknowledgements xvii
Declaration xxi
Preface xxiii
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxix
1 Search Models of Money: Recent Advances 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Underlying Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 The Basic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 Decisions and Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Equilibrium with Money Being Essential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.1 Essentiality of Money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.2 Properties of Monetary Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4 Models with Competing Media of Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.4.1 Money and Real Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4.2 Money and Nominal Assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
vii
1.4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.5 Models with Money and Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.5.1 Money and Credit as Means of Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.5.2 Credit, Banking and Liquidity Reallocation . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.5.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.6 Liquidity, Asset Prices and Monetary Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6.1 Asset Prices with Liquidity Premia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.6.2 Monetary Policy and Asset Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.7 Monetary Propagation and Business Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.7.1 Monetary Transmission Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.7.2 Optimal Monetary Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.7.3 Welfare Costs of Inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.7.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.8 Money in Economic Growth Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.8.1 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.9 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Appendices 53
1.A Shi (1997) in Detail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2 A Spatial Search Model with Money and Credit 71
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.1.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.2 The Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.2.1 Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.2.2 Preferences and technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.2.3 Money Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.2.4 Market Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
viii
2.2.5 Communal Responsibility System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.2.6 First Best . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.3 The Representative Household’s Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.3.1 The Problem in Day Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.3.2 The Problem in Night Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.3.3 The Envelope Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.3.4 Market Clearing Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.3.5 The Value of Defection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.4 Symmetric Stationary Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.4.1 Steady State Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.4.2 Welfare Without Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.5 Numerical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Appendices 99
2.A Technical Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.A.1 The Problem in Day Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3 The Inflation Bias under Calvo and Rotemberg Pricing 103
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.2.2 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.2.3 Aggregate Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.3 Optimal Policy Problem Under Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.3.1 Rotemberg Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.3.2 Calvo Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.4 Numerical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
ix
3.4.1 Solution Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.4.2 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.5 The Effects of Cost-push Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Appendices 137
3.A Technical Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.A.1 Summary of Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.A.2 The Chebyshev Collocation Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.A.3 Welfare Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.A.4 Trend Inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
3.A.5 The Model With Time-Varying Tax Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
4 Optimal Time-Consistent Monetary, Fiscal and Debt Maturity Policy167
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.2.2 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
4.2.3 Government Budget Constraint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
4.3 First-Best Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.4 Optimal Policy Under Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.5 Numerical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4.5.1 Solution Method and Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4.5.2 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
4.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
x
Appendices 201
4.A Technical Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
4.A.1 Derivation of Household’s FOCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
4.A.2 Summary of Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
4.A.3 Numerical Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
4.A.4 Optimal Policy Under Discretion With Endogenous Short-Term
Debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
xi

List of Tables
2.1 Benchmark parameterization of the spatial search model . . . . . . . . 93
2.2 Comparative static analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.1 Parameterization of the benchmark New Keynesian model . . . . . . . 119
3.2 Sensitivity analysis for Calvo pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.3 Sensitivity analysis for Rotemberg pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.4 The inflation volatility and persistence under Calvo and Rotemberg pricing134
4.1 Parameterization of the New Keynesian model with long-term debt . . 189
4.2 The steady state under the benchmark parameterization . . . . . . . . 191
4.3 The steady states under alternative maturities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
xiii

List of Figures
1.1 The timing of events during period t in the Lagos-Wright model. . . . . 5
1.2 The timing of events during period t in the Rochetau-Wright model. . . 11
1.3 The timing of events during period t in a modified Lagos-Wright model
with banking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.1 The village economy of a spatial search model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.2 The timing of events during period t in the village economy . . . . . . 78
2.3 The effect of inflation on social welfare under alternative combinations
of costs of entry and using credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
2.4 The effect of inflation on the extensive and intensive margins under al-
ternative combinations of costs of entry and using credit . . . . . . . . 96
3.1 The convergence of the relative price dispersion to its steady state . . . 120
3.2 The effect of monopolistic distortion under Rotemberg pricing . . . . . 121
3.3 The effect of monopolistic distortion under Calvo pricing . . . . . . . . 122
3.4 The threshhold of inflation rate for indeterminacy under Calvo pricing . 129
3.5 The threshhold of inflation rate for indeterminacy under Rotemberg pricing129
3.6 The impulse response functions to cost-push shock under Calvo and
Rotemberg pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.7 The impulse response functions to cost-push shock under Calvo and
Rotemberg pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.8 The asymmetric effects of cost-push shock on the impulse response func-
tions under high and low price dispersion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.1 The debt and cyclically adjusted deficit in advanced economies . . . . . 169
4.2 Size and maturity composition of debt in OECD countries . . . . . . . 171
xv
4.3 The policy rules under the benchmark case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
4.4 The transition paths of policy variables under the benchmark case . . . 195
4.5 The relationship of policy mix and debt-GDP ratio under alternative
maturities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
4.6 Transition paths under different maturities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
4.7 Transition paths under the benchmark case, with and without short-
term debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
4.8 Transition paths under the case with debt maturity of two years, with
and without short-term debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
xvi
Acknowledgements
First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Prof.
Campbell Leith and Prof. Charles Nolan, for their great patience, considerable encour-
agement and firm guidance throughout my doctoral study. Their enormous support
over the years has contributed substantially to my dissertation and research.
Likewise, I would like to thank my examiners, Prof. Tatiana Damjanovic and Prof.
Tatiana Kirsanova, for their helpful comments and suggestions.
I am also grateful to the discussants and participants from various conferences
and workshops, including, but not limited to, PhD workshops of Adam Smith Business
School, University of Glasgow, the 46th Money, Macro and Finance Annual Conference
at Durham University, PhD Macroeconomic Workshop at the University of York, the
21st Annual Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance at Taipei, and the
30th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association at the University of
Mannheim, for their helpful comments and discussions.
In addition, I am indebted to the Department of Economics of Glasgow and all its
faculty members for providing me a pleasant research environment. Moreover, I thank
my colleagues and friends - Alfred Duncan, Huichou Huang, Ioannis Tsafos, Marco
Lorusso, Shuo Cao, Sisir Ramanan, Xiao Zhang, and Yang Zhao - for their company
and stimulating discussions.
I always owe my parents, Zushun Liu and Dongying Huang, a debt of gratitude for
their unconditional love and faith from the very beginning of my life. Furthermore,
I would like to thank my elder brother, Ping Liu, for his wholehearted support and
encouragement over these years. He has always been willing to shoulder the responsi-
bility of financially supporting the whole family. I do not think I can express enough
gratitude to him.
Last but not least, I am extremely thankful to my former supervisor, Prof. Zongyi
Zhang at Chongqing University, for his guidance and considerable support in furthering
my study abroad. Meanwhile, I would like to show my gratitude to Prof. Shiqing Zhang
at Sichuan University, for recommending economics to me.
xvii
Finally, I would like to thank the joint financial support for my PhD study from
the China Scholarship Council (CSC) and the University of Glasgow. Conference
grants from the University of Glasgow, the Scottish Institute for Research in Economics
(SIRE) and Royal Economic Society are gratefully acknowledged.
xviii
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Zushun Liu and Dongying Huang.
“There is only one difference between a bad economist and a good one: the bad
economist confines himself to the visible effect; the good economist takes into account
both the effect that can be seen and those effects that must be foreseen."
Frederic Bastiat, Selected Essays on Political Economy
“The fact that economics is not physics does not mean that we should not aim to
apply the same fundamental standards for what constitutes legitimate argument; we can
insist that the ultimate criterion for judging economic ideas is the degree to which they
help us order and summarize data, that it is not legitimate to try to protect attractive
theories from the data."
Christopher A. Sims, 1996. “Macroeconomics and Methodology", Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 10(1), p. 111.
“The era of closed-form solutions for their own sake should be over. Newer gen-
erations get similar intuitions from computer-generated examples than from functional
expressions."
Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, JME (2008)
Declaration
I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others,
that this dissertation is the result of my own work and has not been submitted for any
other degree at the University of Glasgow or any other institution.
I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. How-
ever, the copyright of this thesis belongs to the author. Any materials used or derived
from this thesis should be acknowledged appropriately.
Printed name: Ding Liu
Signature:
xxi

Preface
The four chapters in this thesis employ two distinct theoretical frameworks to study a
pure theory of money and credit, and optimal monetary and fiscal policy, respectively.
The first two chapters - more qualitative and with strong micro-foundations for money
and credit- delve into the so-called New Monetarist economics, while the remaining
two chapters - closer to policy practices - contribute to the optimal policy literature
in the mainstream New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models. Admittedly, these two lines of work advocate quite different methodologies
and conceptual frameworks. However, both are helpful for us to understand the role
of money and credit in the real economy, and how monetary and fiscal policy should
stabilize business cycles in order to improve social welfare.
There has been a quest to understand aggregate economic phenomena in terms of
the behaviour of individual economic entities and their interactions, since the 1970s
onwards, and in particular, following the publication of the "Lucas critique" (Lucas,
1976). As a response to this criticism, building macroeconomic models with solid
micro-foundations has become the dominant research program, which involves formu-
lating, solving and estimating models with parameters that are independent of the
policy regime, so that they can be used for evaluating alternative policies. Against this
background, there also has been a continuing effort to seek sound micro-foundations
for money and credit, for instance, see the prominent conference volume in Kareken
and Wallace (1980). Why would intrinsically worthless fiat money have value? How
can fiat money and credit improve the efficiency of resource allocations? Why is money
dominated in the rate of return by other assets and, in particular, by government issued
nominal bonds? Classic questions like these can not be answered via ad hoc monetary
models like putting money in the utility function or arbitrarily assuming a "cash in ad-
vance" constraint, since money in these models is not essential. Essentiality of money
means that it improves the efficiency of resource allocations relative to an economy
without money, see Kocherlakota (1998) and Wallace (2001). Search models of money,
initiated by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), provide such micro-foundations for monetary
economics that endogenizes the value and essentiality of fiat money by explicitly spec-
ifying the frictions that impede the functioning of markets. Recently, this distinctive
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and extensive literature on monetary theory and policy, on banking, financial interme-
diation, payments, and on asset markets has been termed New Monetarist Economics,
see Williamson and Wright (2010a) and Williamson and Wright (2010b) for surveys,
and Nosal and Rocheteau (2011) for a textbook exposition.
Chapter 1, as a complement to the above-mentioned surveys, highlights the influ-
ential Lagos and Wright (2005) (LW) framework and reviews the latest developments
in extending it to study issues concerning the role of money, credit, asset pricing,
monetary policy and economic growth. Two useful assumptions - an alternating fric-
tional decentralized market and a frictionless Walrasian centralized market within each
period, and quasi-linear preferences - make the LW model tractable. This desirable
feature renders it amenable to policy analysis. Along with an overview of the litera-
ture, we also provide detailed discussions about possible future research topics. Our
main message from this comprehensive review is that the LW search-theoretic model is
flexible enough to deal with numerous issues where fiat money plays an essential role
as a medium of exchange.
The hallmark of New Monetarist models is to explicitly deal with frictions in the
exchange process. Random search and bilateral matching is a natural way to gener-
ate a double coincidence problem, and to motivate incomplete record keeping, limited
commitment and other frictions that make monetary exchange socially useful. Unfortu-
nately, it is these frictions which render money essential that make credit arrangements
impossible in standard search-theoretic models. As a result, a growing number of stud-
ies aim to solve this dilemma, and in general to clarify the relationship among money,
credit and banking.
Chapter 2 makes a theoretical contribution in this direction. Inspired by the his-
torical narrative of an interesting medieval institution - the community responsibility
system in Greif (2006), we develop a search model of money and credit based on the
LW framework. Under such a scheme, a local, community court held all members of
a different commune legally liable for default by any one involved in contracts with a
member of the local community. If the defaulter’s communal court refused to com-
pensate the injured party, the local court confiscated the property of any member of
the defaulter’s commune present in its jurisdiction as compensation. This institutional
innovation is a credible commitment technology, if trade links between two communes
are sufficiently strong. A commune could avoid compensating for the default of one of
its members only by ceasing to trade with the other commune. When this cost was
too high, a commune court’s best response was to dispense impartial justice to non-
members who had been cheated by a member of the commune. With this historical
story in mind, we aim to examine the role of credit collateralized by the community
responsibility system as a supplementary medium of exchange in long-distance trade,
assuming that entry cost and the cost of using credit are proportional to distance, due
to factors like direct verification and settlement cost and indirect transportation cost.
We find that both money and credit are useful in the sense of improving welfare, and
that the Friedman rule can be sub-optimal. In addition, higher entry cost narrows
down the range of villages which have trade with the representative household. Simi-
larly, higher cost of using credit, ceteris paribus, reduces the usage of credit and hence
lowers social welfare.
Chapter 3 revisits the inflation bias problem associated with the renowned rules ver-
sus discretion debate initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983) in a fully nonlinear New Keynesian DSGE model. We ask whether the infla-
tion bias problem related to discretionary monetary policy differs quantitatively under
two workhorse models of sticky prices due to Calvo (1983) and Rotemberg (1982),
respectively, if the inherent nonlinearities are taken seriously. This is an important
consideration, since these two forms of nominal inertia are commonly used to give
monetary policy a meaningful role in New Keynesian DSGE models. Moreover, recent
empirical work suggests the discretion offers more data coherent description of policy-
making than commitment. Given the literature on trend inflation shows that there are
potentially significant nonlinearities in New Keynesian DSGE models, especially when
steady state inflation rate is nonzero, it is necessary to assess the extent to which the
inflationary bias problem affects the equilibrium and properties of a New Keynesian
economy that is not subject to a linearized approximation.
The underlying reason for the inflation bias and time consistency problem in gen-
eral is that policymakers are unable to make credible commitments regarding future
policies. As an example, assume that the objective of the monetary authority is low
inflation and that it announces such a policy. If households and firms believe this
policy announcement, then inflationary expectations are low and therefore small wage
increases will be demanded. In retrospect, however, the monetary authority may be
tempted to conduct a more inflationary monetary policy via setting low interest rates,
as this would reduce unemployment in the short run. If workers understand the poli-
cymakers’ motives, the announcement of low inflation loses its credibility, and rational
employees will ask a positive growth rate of wages to avoid losses from inflation. In
equilibrium the monetary authority is not able to affect unemployment, but there is a
positive rate of inflation. This outcome is inefficient since by convincingly committing
not to inflate in advance the monetary authority could achieve the same level of unem-
ployment but with zero inflation. Therefore, the lack of commitment by the monetary
authority will lead to an inefficiently high level of inflation.
In this chapter, we assume the monetary authority makes discretionary decisions
sequentially, and hence can not commit to a plan in the hope of influencing economic
agents’ expectations. The steady state output is inefficient, due to monopolistic dis-
tortion. Hence, the discretionary government has incentive to engineer some (ex ante)
unexpected inflation to make output closer to the efficient level, even though (ex post)
realized inflation is costly. Unexpected inflation raises output because of sticky prices,
and it reduces the monopoly distortion. In a fully micro-founded model, we then nu-
merically solve for the resulting fully nonlinear time consistent optimal policy using
powerful projection methods, as in Anderson et al. (2010). This is the point of depar-
ture from the extant linear quadratic (LQ) literature where nonlinearities are either
not adequately captured, or even ignored. We find that the inflation bias problem
under Calvo contracts is significantly greater than under Rotemberg pricing, despite
the fact that the former typically exhibits far greater welfare costs of inflation. The
rates of inflation observed under the discretionary policy are non-trivial and suggest
that the model can comfortably generate the rates of inflation at which the problematic
issues highlighted in the trend inflation literature emerge, as well as the movements
in trend inflation emphasized in empirical studies of the evolution of inflation, see As-
cari and Sbordone (2014) for a survey. Finally, we consider the response to cost push
shocks across both models and find these can also be significantly different. Thus,
we conclude that the nonlinearities inherent in the New Keynesian DSGE model are
empirically relevant and the form of nominal inertia adopted is not innocuous.
Chapter 4 makes a contribution to the literature which combines the New Keyne-
sian paradigm of optimal monetary policy with the Neoclassical paradigm of optimal
fiscal policy. It studies the optimal time-consistent policy problem when surprise infla-
tion (or deflation) is costly, taxation is distortionary, and non-state-contingent nominal
debt of various maturities exists. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) show that in a
New Keynesian model with one-period government debt, even a mild degree of price
stickiness implies nearly constant inflation and near random walk behaviour in govern-
ment debt and tax rates, in response to government spending disturbances. In other
words, monetary policy should not be used to stabilize debt. However, Sims (2013)
questions the robustness of this result when government can issue long-term nominal
bonds. When government debt is short term, inflation or deflation is the only way to
change its market value in cushioning fiscal shocks. In contrast, if debt is long term,
large changes in the value of debt can be produced by sustained changes in the nominal
interest rate (or bond price), with much smaller changes in current inflation. Based on
these considerations, Sims sketches out a theoretical argument for using nominal debt
- of which the real value can be altered with surprise changes in inflation and interest
rates - as a cushion against fiscal disturbances to substitute for large movements in dis-
torting taxes. Both papers assume commitment, that is, the social planner’s promises
are credible.
We develop a New Keynesian DSGE model augmented with fiscal policy and a port-
folio of mixed maturity bonds and solve the optimal time-consistent policy problem
using global non-linear solution techniques. In particular, we study how the change in
nominal government debt maturity affects optimal monetary and fiscal policy decisions
in stabilizing business cycles and equilibrium outcomes in the presence of distortionary
taxes and sticky prices. Leeper and Zhou (2013) ask some similar questions and they
solve the optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a LQ model from the timeless per-
spective. In addition, Bhattarai et al. (2014), and Burgert and Schmidt (2014) study
optimal time consistent monetary and fiscal policies as well, but the former employ
the LQ method and the latter examine only one-period debt. In contrast, we consider
government debt of various durations and apply global solution methods to accurately
deal with the inherent nonlinearities in New Keynesian models.
In the model, both fiscal and monetary policy are useful stabilization tools, thanks
to the combination of incomplete insurance and price stickiness. Consider a negative
productivity shock. Lack of complete markets (and lump-sum tax) implies that lowering
the current tax rate necessarily results in a primary deficit that has to be financed by
an increase in public debt and thus an increase in future taxes which is distortionary.
The government thus finds it optimal to decrease the tax rate by less than what it
would have done under complete markets to offset the negative shock. That is, fiscal
policy alone can not fully deal with the shock. As a result, it becomes optimal to also
use monetary policy for the purpose of output stabilization. In fact, an unexpected
increase in inflation not only stimulates aggregate demand but also lowers the real value
of nominal debt and thus minimizes the need to vary distortionary income taxes over
the business cycle. However, monetary policy cannot do it all either, since inflation
surprises are costly, due to nominal rigidities. That is, it is optimal for the government
to raise inflation by an amount less than what would be necessary to fully stabilize
output and cover the primary deficit as with flexible prices. In addition, we argue that
the average maturity of government debt affects how the government optimally makes
this tradeoff of choosing the inflation path.
We find the following key results. Firstly, the steady-state balances an inflation and
debt stabilization bias to generate a small negative long-run optimal value for debt,
which implies a slight undershooting of the inflation target in steady state. Secondly,
starting from levels of debt consistent with currently observed debt-GDP ratios, the
optimal policy will gradually reduce that debt, but with radical changes in the policy
mix along the transition path. At high debt levels, there is a reliance on a relaxation of
monetary policy to reduce debt through an expansion in the tax base and reduced debt
service costs, while tax rates are used to moderate the increases in inflation. However,
as debt levels fall, the use of monetary policy in this way is diminished and the policy
maker turns to fiscal policy to continue the reduction in debt. This is akin to a switch
from an active to passive fiscal policy in rule based descriptions of policy, which occurs
endogenously under the optimal policy as debt levels fall. It can also be accompanied
by a switch from passive to active monetary policy. This switch in the policy mix
occurs at higher debt levels, the longer the average maturity of government debt. This
is largely because high debt levels induce an inflationary bias problem as policy makers
face the temptation to use surprise inflation to erode the real value of that debt. This
temptation is then more acute when debt is of shorter maturity since the inflationary
effects of raising taxes to reduce debt become increasingly costly as debt levels rise.
Finally, in contrast to the Ramsey literature with real bonds, in current setting we find
no extreme portfolios of short and long-term debt. In addition, optimal debt maturity,
implicitly, lengthens with the level of debt.
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1 | Search Models of Money: Recent Advances
In this chapter, we focus on the Lagos and Wright (2005) monetary search
model - a workhorse in the so-called New Monetarist Economics. After
describing this microfounded yet tractable framework, we review recent
developments in extending it to study a variety of issues from monetary
theory to policy analysis. The topics include the role of money, credit
and financial intermediation in facilitating the exchange process in decen-
tralized economies which are impeded by explicitly specified frictions, the
implication of liquidity for asset pricing in monetary environments, mone-
tary policy analysis when money is essential, the welfare costs of inflation,
and the interaction between money and capital accumulation in economic
growth models. Besides mapping out the literature, we also provide some
suggestions on how to apply the benchmark model in possible ways to gen-
erate new insights about classic topics or deal with new issues in the light
of the recent financial crisis.
1.1 Introduction
As a microfoundation of money, the search theory of money gained its momentum in
1980s (e.g., Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989), and has been moving forward rapidly since
then. Recently, this distinctive and extensive literature on monetary theory and policy,
on banking, financial intermediation, payments, and on asset markets has been termed
New Monetarist Economics (Lagos et al., 2014; Williamson and Wright, 2010a,b). Here
we do not attempt to review this voluminous literature. Instead, we will focus on the
work based on the Lagos and Wright (2005) model. Hence, this chapter serves as a
complement to the above-mentioned surveys which are more about methodology and
the evolution of the whole literature. The influential Lagos-Wright framework high-
lights two defining features, that is, alternating frictional decentralized market and
frictionless Walrasian centralized market within each period, and quasi-linear prefer-
ences. The competitive market in the second sub-period allows agents to readjust their
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money holdings, while quasi-linear utility function eliminates wealth effects so that
the choice of money holdings of an agent is independent of his idiosyncratic trading
history. This ingenious modelling strategy makes the distribution of money holdings
at the beginning of each period degenerate, and hence keeps the model tractable and
user-friendly for policy analysis.
Hence, the Lagos-Wright framework has emerged as a workhorse in modern mone-
tary economics, given its ability to address the divisibility of money and goods simul-
taneously. In the first generation search models of money, represented by Kiyotaki and
Wright (1993, 1989), both money and goods are indivisible for tractability. In addition,
it is typically assumed that agents can only hold one object at a time, and only agents
without money are willing to produce. The terms of trade are exogenously determined,
that is, one unit of money buys one unit of commodity. Hence monetary policy cannot
be meaningfully discussed under these restrictive assumptions. Shi (1995) and Trejos
and Wright (1995) in the second generation models endogenize prices by allowing di-
visible goods, though indivisible money is still necessary for analytic results. It is the
endogenous distribution of money holdings complicates the analysis in previous gen-
erations of monetary search models. Since there is random matching in these models,
this generates idiosyncratic uncertainty concerning consumption and production op-
portunities, and therefore the equilibrium distribution of money holdings across agents
is typically non-degenerate. Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2005), as two seminal
third generation models, directly tackle the troublesome non-degenerate distribution
of money holdings.1 As pointed above, the latter use quasi-linear preferences and peri-
odic access to a centralized market. In contrast, the former employs a large household
structure. More specifically, each household consists of a continuum of members who
follow the family’s instruction to trade at decentralized markets, share consumption,
and aim to maximize household utility rather than individual utility. At the end of
each period, the members of the same family pool their money holdings. By the law of
large numbers, this eliminates match-specific risks within each household. As a result,
the distribution of money holdings is degenerate across households in the symmetric
monetary equilibrium.2
After describing the benchmark setup in section 2, we then arrange this chapter
by various topics and issues. Hence, we divide the papers reviewed into six categories,
with reference to the review work by Shi (2006), Williamson and Wright (2010a,b),
Lagos et al. (2014), and the recent book by Nosal and Rocheteau (2011). However,
1Alternatively, we can also use advanced numerical methods to deal with the non-degenerate
distribution of money, as Molico (2006), Chiua and Molico (2014) and Rocheteau et al. (2015) do.
2Berentsen and Rocheteau (2002) and Lagos and Wright (2004) have detailed discussions about
these two distinct methods.
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the distinctions among these categories are not always so clear. After all, they are
all intellectual fruits growing from the same tree, that is, the Lagos-Wright model.
For simplicity, hereafter LW refers to Lagos-Wright when appropriate. In section 3, we
review papers studying the existence and robustness of monetary equilibrium in variants
of the LW model. In Section 4, we survey models where fiat money is valued even
though other real or nominal assets are available as well. A key theme is the so-called
rate-of-return dominance puzzle. Section 5 evaluates work aiming to introduce various
forms of credit into modified LW monetary models. The common goal is build models
with both money and credit as observed in real economies so that we can deal with
issues where monetary and financial frictions matter. The recent financial crisis reminds
us that this is a worthwhile intellectual investment. Section 6 scrutinizes contributions
which investigate the role of liquidity in determining asset prices within the context
of monetary economies and how monetary policy affects asset prices. Extended LW
models are used to study business cycle issues like monetary transmission mechanism in
section 7. The shared objective is to take monetary search models to data and conduct
quantitative analysis like the typical practice in real business cycle (RBC) models or
New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. In section 8,
we report progress in integrating the LW monetary search model with neoclassical or
endogenous growth models. This line of work is still quite thin. We conclude in section
9.
1.2 The Underlying Model
The following environment description is in large part based on Lagos and Wright
(2005). In particular, we follow the convention of notation implemented in this paper,
given the fact that most papers more or less keep the same symbols.
1.2.1 The Basic Environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t ≥ 1. There is a [0, 1] continuum of ex ante identical
and infinitely lived agents. Each period is divided into two sub-periods, called day and
night, during which different activities happen. Agents discount between periods with
the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), but not between the two sub-periods within a period.
During the day, agents search and trade in a decentralized market or DM for short
according to time-consuming and anonymous bilateral matching. The probability of
a meeting is α. Each agent specializes in production and can turn labour one-for-
one into goods, which are produced in many varieties and henceforth are called DM
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goods or special goods. To motivate trade, we require agents do not consume goods
made by themselves. Clearly, for any two randomly drawn agents i and j, there are
four possible events. With probability δ, a double-coincidence of wants happens, that
is, both consume what the other can produce. With probability σ, i desires what j
produces but not vice versa, which corresponds to the case of a single coincidence of
wants. Symmetrically, with probability σ agent j wants what i produces but not vice
versa. The remaining case that neither desires what the other produces takes place
with probability1− 2σ − δ. For convenience, we will label i the buyer and j the seller
in a single coincidence meeting, if the former wants the DM good the latter produces.
At night agents interact in aWalrasian centralized market or CM, where the problem
of double-coincidence of wants does not arise. As a result, we can reasonably assume
that at night all agents produce and consume a general good or CM good. Similarly,
the technology of producing the CM good is linear. By implication, the real wage
in the CM is w = 1. Both the CM goods and the DM goods are perfectly divisible
and non-storable.3 The non-storability of both types of goods precludes the emergence
of commodity money. There is another intrinsically useless, perfectly divisible and
storable object, called money, which is supplied by the government. The two main
frictions in the DM, double-coincidence problem and anonymity, make money as a
medium of exchange essential, since credit is infeasible.4 Here money is essential in the
sense that it can support desirable allocations which are unattainable in its absence
(see Kocherlakota, 1998; Wallace, 2001, for detailed discussions).
Agents make decisions in consuming and supplying labour in both sub-periods. Let
(x, h) and (X, H) represent consumption and labour pairs during the day and night,
respectively. Then the period utility function is
U(x, h,X,H) = u(x)− c(h) + U(X)−H, (1.1)
where u, c and U are twice continuously differentiable with u′ > 0, c′ > 0, U ′ > 0,
u′′ < 0, c′′ > 0, and U ′′ ≤ 0. In addition, u(0) = c(0) = 0, u′(q∗) = c′(q∗) for some q∗ ∈
(0,∞), and for some X∗ such that U ′(X∗) = 1 with U ′(X∗) > X∗. Note that U is linear
in H.5 Also note that q∗ is the optimal amount of output per trade chosen by a central
planner. This modelling strategy renders the distribution of money holdings degenerate
and allows us to characterize equilibrium tractably. The government controls the money
3Non-storable means that the goods cannot be stored from one sub-period to the next.
4The presence of search friction α ∈ [0, 1] has nothing to do with the essentiality of fiat money.
Limited commitment and anonymity or imperfect record keeping are the key frictions to make money
have exchange value.
5Wong (2014) shows that degenerate distribution of money can be obtained for a larger class of
preference specifications, with quasi-linear utility as a special case.
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Figure 1.1: The timing of events during period t in the Lagos-Wright model.
supply so that Mt+1 = (1 + τ)Mt, with τ constant, via lump-sum monetary transfers
at the end of the CM sub-period. The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
1.2.2 Decisions and Equilibrium
Agents in the CM and DMmaximize their expected discounted utility net of production
costs. Let Ft(m) denote the distribution of money holdings across agents, then we have∫
mt dFt(m) = Mt, which is the total amount of money at time t. In addition, let Vt(m)
be the value function or discounted life time utility for an agent with m dollars when
entering the DM, and Wt(m) the value function entering the CM. Note that m is an
individual state variable, while the distribution F is an aggregate state variable. In
a single-coincidence meeting, let qt(m, m˜) denote the amount of goods and dt(m, m˜)
be the amount of money exchanged, where m and m˜ are the money holdings of the
buyer and the seller, respectively. In a double-coincidence meeting, Bt(m, m˜) denotes
the payoff for an agent holding m who meets another agent with m˜. Then the Bellman
equation for an ex ante identical agent satisfies
Vt(m) = ασ
∫
{u[qt(m, m˜)] +Wt[m− dt(m, m˜)]}dFt(m˜)
+ ασ
∫
{−c[qt(m˜,m)] +Wt[m+ dt(m˜,m)]}dFt(m˜)
+ αδ
∫
Bt(m, m˜)dFt(m˜) + (1− 2ασ − αδ)Wt(m),
(1.2)
where the first term is the expected payoff from buying in a single-coincidence match;
the second is the expected gain from selling in a single-coincidence meeting; the third is
the expected payoff from a double-coincidence match; and the last term is the expected
value of not trading in the day market and going to the CM with m. In the CM, an
agent solves
Wt(m) = max
X,H,m′
{U(X)−H + βVt+1(m′ + τM)} (1.3)
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subject to
X = H + φtm− φtm′,
X ≥ 0, 0 ≤ H ≤ H¯, and m′ ≥ 0,
where φt is the price of money in the CM, H¯ is an upper bound on labour hours, and
m′ is money left over after trading. Note that mt+1 = m′t + τMt dollars are taken into
the next period by the agent.
In bilateral trading, the generalized Nash bargaining is a natural solution concept
to characterize the terms of trade in the decentralized market. For double-coincidence
transactions, it can be shown that no money is swapped for goods (see Lagos and
Wright, 2004), and matched pairs give each other q∗ with u′(q∗) = c′(q∗). Therefore,
Bt(m, m˜) = u(q
∗)− c(q∗) +Wt(m). In single-coincidence meetings, the terms of trade
(q, d) solves
max
q,d
[u(q) +Wt(m− d)−Wt(m)]θ[−c(q) +Wt(m˜− d)−Wt(m˜)]1−θ (1.4)
subject to
d ≤ m and q ≥ 0,
where θ ∈ (0, 1] is the bargaining power of the buyer, m and m˜ the buyer’s and the
seller’s money holdings.
In the following, we outline the four key steps to solve for the monetary equilibrium
(see Nosal and Rocheteau, 2011, for a textbook treatment). First, characterize some
desirable properties of the optimization problem in the CM. Note that (1.3) can be
written as
Wt(m) = φtm+ max
X,m′
{U(X)−X − φtm′ + βVt+1(m′ + τM)}, (1.5)
Hence, Xt(m) = X∗ with U ′(X∗) = 1, the decision variable m′(m) is independent of
m, and the continuation value Wt(m) is linear in m with slope φt. This implies that
the distribution of money Ft(m) is degenerate. In addition, the lump-sum monetary
transfer is evenly distributed to every agent. Hence, each agent takes the same amount
of money out of the CM and enters with that money into the next round of transactions.
The second step is to determine the terms of trade in the DM. Given the linearity
of Wt in m, the Nash bargaining problem (1.4) simplifies to
max
q,d
[u(q)− φtd]θ[−c(q) + φtd]1−θ (1.6)
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subject to
d ≤ m and q ≥ 0.
It is easy to show that the solution to (1.6) is
qt(m, m˜) =
{
qˆt(m) if m < m∗t
q∗ if m ≥ m∗t ,
dt(m, m˜) =
{
m if m < m∗t
m∗ if m ≥ m∗t ,
(1.7)
where qˆt(m) is the solution to φtm = z(qt, θ), with
z(q, θ) ≡ θc(q)u
′(q) + (1− θ)u(q)c′(q)
θu′(q) + (1− θ)c′(q) , (1.8)
and m∗t = z(q∗, θ)/φt. Notice that the terms of trade is independent of the seller’s
money balances. Hence, we can simply denote qt(m, m˜) = qt(m), and dt(m, m˜) = dt(m)
in the following. It should point out that in equilibrium d = m is the only rational
choice, since, intuitively, no one is willing to hold more money than is needed for
transactions, given the access to the CM where all agents can adjust their money
holdings by producing the general good. Technical details on this point can be found
in the original paper. In the following, we will use this result to derive a difference
equation which summarizes the monetary equilibrium.
Now the third step characterizes the DM value function. Given the desirable prop-
erties associated with the CM value function, the value function (1.2) can be simplified
to
Vt(m) = vt(m) + φtm+ max
m′
{−φtm′ + βVt+1(m′ + τM)}
= vt(m) + φtm
+
∞∑
j=t
βj−t max
mj+1
{−φjmj+1 + β[vj+1(mj+1) + φj+1mj+1]},
where
vt(m) = ασ{u[qt(m)]− φt[dt(m)]}+ ασ
∫
{−c[qt(m˜)] + φtdt(m˜)]}dFt(m˜)
+αδ[u(q∗)− c(q∗)] + U(X∗)−X∗.
In the final step, we decide the optimal choice of money holdings in the CM. That is,
the choice of the sequence mt+1 is determined by solving the following optimization
problem
max
mt+1
{−φtmt+1 + β[vt+1(mt+1) + φt+1mt+1]}.
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Also note that a necessary condition for the existence of monetary equilibrium is
φt ≥ βφt+1. Otherwise, the buyer would demand an infinite amount of money bal-
ances, since the rate of return on money is less than the discount rate. Now we are
ready to derive the aforementioned difference equation. For mt+1, the first order con-
dition is φt = β[φt+1 + v′t+1(mt+1)]. In addition, from the definition of vt(m) we have
v′t+1(mt+1) = ασ[u
′(qt+1)q′(mt+1) − φt+1], and remember z(qt, θ) = φtmt = φtMt in
stationary equilibrium. Thus, we have a difference equation in q
z(qt, θ)
Mt
= β
z(qt+1, θ)
Mt+1
[ασ
u′(qt+1)
zq(qt+1, θ)
+ 1− ασ], (1.9)
which defines a monetary equilibrium if qt ≥ 0 for all t. Again, rigorous discussions
about the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium are presented in Lagos and Wright
(2004) and Lagos and Wright (2005)6. Since Mt+1 = (1 + τ)Mt, the equilibrium condi-
tion (1.9) for stationary monetary equilibrium with φtMt = φt+1Mt+1 is
u′(q)
zq(q, θ)
= 1 +
1 + τ − β
ασβ
= 1 +
i
ασ
, (1.10)
where 1 + i = (1 + r)(1 + pi), pi = τ , and r = (1− β)/β.
Up to now, we have reviewed the key elements of the LW model. Some basic results
are highlighted. First, the Friedman rule is always optimal in this model, though not
always efficient. The reason is that there is a holdup problem on money holdings when
buyers do not have full bargaining power. Second, this novel source of inefficiency
makes the estimated welfare cost of inflation considerably higher than conventional
models. In the following sections, there will be more discussion of these points in
reviewing recent contributions, which build on the basic framework just outlined.
1.3 Equilibrium with Money Being Essential
It is a classic and foundational question to ask why intrinsically useless fiat money is
valued, and why money is essential in modern economic systems. Money is essential
when it expands the set of incentive-feasible allocations or improves the efficiency of
resource allocations relative to an economy without money (see Kocherlakota (1998)
and Wallace (2001)). Modelling money in an essential rather than ad hoc way is one of
6Wright (2010) shows that the steady state is always unique in the LW model, while Hiraguchi
and Kobayashi (2015) prove that multiple monetary steady states can exist in modified model where
the centralized market opens once, but the decentralized markets open twice in each period.
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the guiding principles to build microfounded monetary economics. Shi (2006) explains
the need for a microfoundation of monetary economics and discusses the limitations of
earlier efforts to integrate money into general equilibrium theory, while Williamson and
Wright (2010b) emphasizes the methodological distinctions of search-based monetary
theory from Monetarist and Keynesian approaches. Previous generations of New Mon-
etarist models show that trading frictions such as a lack of double-coincidence of wants,
an environment with anonymous agents and imperfect record-keeping are responsible
for the emergence of a medium of exchange, which overcomes the double-coincidence
problem (e.g.,Kiyotaki and Wright (1989)), plays the role of record-keeping (e.g.,Ostroy
(1973), Townsend (1987) and Dong and Jiang (2010)), and serves as a public memory
device (Kocherlakota, 1998). Unlike its predecessors, the LW framework is tractable
with both perfectly divisible money and goods. These long desired qualities have stim-
ulated numerous papers to explain why fiat money has value in equilibrium and how
this intrinsically worthless token improves the efficiency of resource allocations, and to
study the properties of monetary equilibria under different trading protocols.
1.3.1 Essentiality of Money
Anonymous trading and random pairwise matching are used to guarantee the essen-
tiality of money in Lagos and Wright (2005). Aliprantis et al. (2007a,b) challenge this
assertion and show that anonymity and random pairings are not per se sufficient to
ensure money being essential, since informal enforcement schemes like trigger strate-
gies or social norms can be used to support an efficient nonmonetary equilibrium if
individual actions are observable in the centralized market and trading partners are
patient enough. Lagos and Wright reply to this allegation that centralized trading is
neither necessary nor sufficient for individual actions being observable, and the original
LW environment never assumes the observability of actions except prices (Lagos and
Wright, 2008). In addition, the disturbing results in Aliprantis et al. (2007a,b) are
not robust, in the sense that a small amount of noise in the observation of individual
behaviour can make money essential. However, Araujo et al. (2012) strike back, and
argue that the specification of exchange process in the CM is nontrivial. Using a mod-
ified LW setup where the CM is modelled as a strategic market game along the lines
of Shapley and Shubik (1977), and finite agents can only observe prices in this market,
they show that if agents are patient enough, an efficient non-monetary equilibrium can
be supported, even when prices are noisy. Intuitively, as long as individual behaviour
has a measurable impact on prices, then market prices can convey relevant information
about individual actions and this mechanism can be used to sustain cooperative be-
haviour. Indeed, when there are infinite agents in the economy, hence agents have no
9
Equilibrium with Money Being Essential
market power, the essentiality of money in LW can be restored as the case in Aliprantis
et al. (2007a). Recently, there is a new strand of literature using experiments to test
the predictions from the LW model. For example, Duffy and Puzzello (2014) test the
LW model using laboratory experiments. They find that money - as an coordination
device - improves social welfare, relative to the gift exchange equilibria.7
Other studies aim to clarify how fiat money enhances economic efficiency. Reed
and Waller (2006) explicate money as a self-insurance device to share idiosyncratic
consumption risk, when intertemporal credit contracts are not feasible due to private in-
formation over identity, endowment and trading history and the lack of record-keeping.
More specifically, in their LW type model with only one perishable good, all markets
are competitive rather than bilateral bargaining as in Berentsen et al. (2005), and
in place of random matching, ex ante identical agents are partitioned into buyers or
sellers by randomly receiving an endowment of the good at the beginning of the first
sub-period, then they trade and consume, while in the second sub-period, anonymous
agents also can produce the common good. To motivate aggregate risk, the amount of
endowments received by agents is also stochastic with two states, high and low. Under
the Friedman rule, when holding money is costless, agents will take as much cash as
is needed to efficiently smooth consumption across both time and aggregate states. In
a series of papers, Andolfatto and Martin (2013) and Andolfatto et al. (2014) show
that fiat money is an “informationally insensitive” means of payment relative to risky
durable assets represented as Lucas trees, whose payoffs are responsive to bad or good
news. In contrast, the return on fiat money is not news-driven. By implication, there
is a trade-off in disclosing payoff-related information which can be privately valuable
but socially undesirable, when these risky assets serve as a payment instrument or as
collateral for credit.
In general, both theoretical and empirical papers articulating the essentiality of
money belong to the body of literature that aims to answer whether money per se
is essential for modern mainstream macroeconomics. We will return to this matter
later, but at first it is helpful to look into papers on the properties of equilibrium in
search-theoretic monetary models.
1.3.2 Properties of Monetary Equilibrium
In Lagos andWright (2005), the steady-state equilibrium is characterized under random
bilateral matching and Nash bargaining. It is natural to ask whether existence and
7Anbarci et al. (2015) provide an experimental implementation of the competitive search monetary
equilibrium in Rocheteau and Wright (2005). See Duffy (2014) for a survey on related topics.
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the Day Market the Night Market
bilateral bargaining;Walrasian trademoney
injection price taking;
and competitive search.
Figure 1.2: The timing of events during period t in the Rochetau-Wright model.
uniqueness of equilibrium, the optimal monetary policy and other results depend on
specific characteristics of the environment such as preferences, information structure,
and alternative trading protocols.
Rocheteau and Wright (2005) extend the standard model by introducing a general
matching technology and endogenizing sellers’ entry decision into the decentralized
market to compare how three market structures affect equilibrium and efficiency. We
would like to sketch the details of this model, since it is modified from the LW model
and is itself an often-cited benchmark. A frictionless Walrasian market operates in the
day, and at night there is a more decentralized and frictional market, in which three
alternative pricing mechanisms will be compared. A continuum of agents is ex ante
divided into buyers and sellers to motivate sellers’ entry decision and hence to capture
the extensive margin effect (the number of trades). More precisely, during the day
all agents produce and consume, while at night buyers want to consume but cannot
produce, and sellers are able to produce but do not want to consume. There is only one
perishable good. Let B and S denote the sets of buyers and sellers, respectively. To
focus on sellers’ entry, the measure of B is normalized to 1 and all buyers have costless
access to the night market, whereas only a subset St ⊆ S with measure nt of sellers
enter the night market at cost χ at time t. New money is injected, or withdrawn by
lump-sum transfers at the beginning of each period, such thatMt+1 = (1+τ)Mt ≡ γMt.
Without loss of generality, we also assume only buyers receive these monetary transfers.
F bt and F
s
t denote the distributions of money holdings across buyers and sellers at t,
respectively. The timeline is illustrated in Figure 1.2. The period utility of a buyer at
t is
U bt = U(Xt)−Ht + βdu(xt), (1.11)
where Xt the quantity consumed and Ht is labour (also the quantity produced due to
a linear production technology) during the day, xt is consumption at night, and βd is
a discount factor between the two sub-periods. The aforementioned discount factor
β = βdβn, where βn is discount factor between night and the next day. Similarly, the
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instantaneous utility of a seller is
U st = U(Xt)−Ht − βdc(xt). (1.12)
The functions U and c have the same properties as in the canonical LW model, though
here we normalize U(X∗) = X∗. In the frictional night market, only a subset B˜t ⊆ B
of buyers and a subset S˜t ⊆ St ⊆ S of sellers participate and trade in this market in
each period t. The measure of B˜t is αb(nt) and the measure of S˜t is ntαs(nt). Agents
in B˜t ∪ S˜t are chosen randomly. Therefore, the probabilities of trading for buyers and
sellers at night are αb(nt) and αs(nt), respectively. Note that the trading probabilities
are supposed to depend on the ratio of sellers to buyers, nt. Typically, αb(n) = α(n)
and αs(n) = α(n)/n are assumed. Intuitively, the number of buyers and that of sellers
trade in the night market is equal. In addition, the matching function α(n) is required
to satisfy α′(n) > 0, α′′(n) < 0, α(n) ≤ min{1, n}, α(0) = 0, α′(0) = 1 and α(∞) = 1.
We will characterize the equilibrium under alternative pricing protocols in the fol-
lowing. Under Nash bargaining, let V b(zb) and W b(zb) denote the value functions for a
buyer with real balance zb in the night market and day market, respectively, and simi-
larly, V s(zs) and W s(zs) for a seller. Recall that real balance z is defined as φtm. In a
meeting involving a buyer with real balances zb and a seller with zs, let d = d(zb, zs) and
q = q(zb, zs) represent the real money and units of the good exchanged, respectively.
Then, we have
V b(zb) = α(n)
∫
{u[q(zb, zs)] + βnW b[zb − d(zb, zs)
γ
]}dF s(zs) (1.13)
+[1− α(n)]βnW b(zb
γ
).
That is, with probability α(n) a buyer meets a seller who holds zs, in which case he
consumes q(zb, zs), and enter into the next day with real balances [zb−d(zb, zs)]/γ; and
with probability 1−α(n) he has no trade opportunity and enter into the next day with
zb/γ. Note that for a buyer holds zt = mtφt at the end of period t, his real balances
at the beginning of period t + 1 are zt+1 = mtφt+1 = ztφt+1/φt = zb/γ. Similarly, for
sellers we have
V s(zs) =
α(n)
n
∫
{−c[q(zb, zs)] + βnW s[zs + d(zb, zs)
γ
]}dF b(zb) (1.14)
+[1− α(n)
n
]βnW
s(
zs
γ
)− χ.
Intuitively, a seller first pays χ for participation, then with probability α(n)/n he trades
with a buyer who holds zb, in which case he produces q(zb, zs), and enters into the next
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day with real balances [zs + d(zb, zs)]/γ; and with probability 1− α(n)/n he does not
trade and enters into the next day with zs/γ. In the day market, a buyer solves
W b(zb) = max
zˆ,X,H
U(X)−H + βdV b(zˆ) (1.15)
subject to
zˆ +X = zb + T +H,
X ≥ 0, 0 ≤ H ≤ H¯, and zˆ ≥ 0,
where Tt = φt(γ − 1)Mt−1 is a monetary transfer in real terms, and zˆ is money taken
into the second sub-period. Likewise, for sellers,
W s(zs) = max
zˆ,X,H
U(X)−H + βd max[V s(zˆ), βdW s(zs
γ
)] (1.16)
subject to
zˆ +X = zs +H,
X ≥ 0, 0 ≤ H ≤ H¯, and zˆ ≥ 0.
As in the benchmark case, it is quite straightforward to show that zˆ does not depend on
zb or zs, and that W b(zb) and W s(zs) are linear in zb and zs, respectively. Now d(zb, zs)
and q(zb, zs) are determined by the following generalized Nash bargaining problem
max
q,d
[u(q)− βn
γ
d]θ[−c(q) + βn
γ
d], (1.17)
where q ≥ 0 and d ≤ zb. We can see that (1.17) is basically the same problem as (1.6).
Without proof, we simply write out the stationary equilibrium conditions
βn
γ
zb = z(q, θ),
and
γ − β
βα(n)
+ 1 =
u′(q)
zq(q, θ)
,
where z(q, θ) is defined in (1.8). The equilibrium condition for seller’s entry is
α(n)
n
[−c(q) + βn
γ
d] = χ. (1.18)
Intuitively, the participation cost is equal to a seller’s expected surplus which is the
probability of trading multiplied by the seller’s surplus per trade in the night market.
As in the LW, the key results with bargaining are that the intensive margin(q) and
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extensive margin(n) are both socially inefficient, that is, q < q∗ and n < n∗, where q∗
and n∗ satisfy u′(q∗) = c′(q∗) and α′(n∗)[u(q∗) − c(q∗)] = χ, and that the Friedman
rule(i.e.,γ = β) is optimal but it cannot generally correct the inefficiencies on the
intensive or the extensive margins. However, an efficient intensive margin is obtained
at the Friedman rule if buyers have full bargaining power, since the holdup problem on
money is eliminated in this case.
Under price taking, the night market is a Walrasian market with some search fric-
tions. More precisely, not all agents can enter and trade in this competitive market.
For successful entrants, after observing the price p, each seller and each buyer supplies
qs and demands qb units of the good, respectively. The double coincidence problem and
anonymity make money essential, as in the case of bargaining. The previously defined
αb(n) and αs(n) can be interpreted as the probability of getting into the night market.
For a buyer, the value function is
V b(zb) = αb(n) max
qb
{u(qb) + βnW b(zb − pq
b
γ
)} (1.19)
+[1− αb(n)]βnW b(zb
γ
),
subject to
pqb ≤ zb, and W b(zb) satisfies (1.15).
Similarly, for a seller, we have
V s(zs) = αs(n) max
qs
{−c(qs) + βnW s(zs + pq
s
γ
)} (1.20)
+[1− αs(n)]βnW s(zs
γ
)− χ,
where W s(zs) is defined by (1.16). The equilibrium conditions in steady state are
nαs(n)q
s = αb(n)q
b, (market clearing)
βn
γ
zb = q
bc′(qs),
γ − β
βαb(n)
+ 1 =
u′(qb)
c′(qs)
,
and the free entry condition analogous to (1.18) is
αs(n)[q
sc′(qs)− c(qs)] = χ. (1.21)
In this case, the Friedman rule restores efficiency along the intensive margin but not
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the extensive margin. Consequently, inflation has ambiguous effects, and in particular
positive inflation may be welfare-improving.
In competitive search (price posting with directed search), there are agents acting
as market makers,8 who set up sub-markets and post the terms of trade (q, d).Within
any sub-market, random bilateral matching prevails. Search is directed in the sense
that buyers and sellers have full knowledge of (q, d) across sub-markets, and they can
go to any sub-market freely. Clearly, it is rational for an agent to consider other agents’
choice of sub-markets. In equilibrium, the set of sub-markets is complete in the sense
that extra sub-markets are redundant in improving buyers and sellers’ welfare. The
timing of events in a period goes as follows: at the beginning of each day, market
makers announce the set of sub-markets Ω to open at night; agents then trade and
hence readjust their real balances in the day market, and travel to their selected sub-
markets represented by triplet ω = (q, d, n) ∈ Ω, where n is the ratio of the expected
number of sellers to the anticipated number of buyers at each sub-markets; in the sub-
markets at night agents trade goods and money in pairs, simply following the posted
terms of trade (q, d). For a buyer, the value function is
V b(zb) = max
ω
{α(n)1(zb ≥ d)[u(q) + βnW b(zb − d
γ
)]} (1.22)
+[1− α(n)]1(zb ≥ d)βnW b(zb
γ
),
where 1(zb ≥ d) is the indicating function. Intuitively, a buyer chooses ω ∈ Ω, and then
he decides to trade if he meets a seller and has enough money to meet the posted price
zd ≥ d. As in the benchmark, the buyer rationally carries just enough money to meet
the posted price in his chosen sub-market, that is, zb = d in equilibrium. Similarly, for
a seller we have
V s(zs) = max
ω
{α(n)
n
[−c(q) + βnW s(zs + d
γ
)]} (1.23)
+[1− α(n)
n
]βnW
s(
zs
γ
)− χ.
W b(zb) and W s(zs) satisfy (1.15) and (1.16), respectively. Again, for comparison we
just give the equilibrium conditions without technical details. In steady state,
γ − β
βα(n)
=
u′(q)
c′(q)
, (1.24)
8One can imagine that the market makers can charge buyers and sellers fees for entering their
sub-market and seek to maximize profits, but competition among market makers drives their profits
to zero and hence entry costs are zero in equilibrium.
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βn
γ
zb = z[q, 1− η(n)], (1.25)
α(n)
n
z[q, 1− η(n)]− c(q) = χ, (1.26)
where z is given in (1.8), and η(n) = nα′(n)/α(n) measures sellers’ contribution to
buyers’ probability of trading. Note that (1.25) is the first-order condition for a gener-
alized Nash problem where the seller’s bargaining power is η(n). (1.24) indicates that
the Friedman rule achieves the first best along the intensive margin. In addition, we
have z[q∗, 1− η(n)]− c(q∗) = η(n)[u(q∗)− c(q∗)], hence the free entry condition (1.26)
at the Friedman rule is α′(n)[u(q∗) − c(q∗)] = χ, which delivers an efficient extensive
margin. Summing up, market structure specifications indeed matter for equilibrium
and efficiency, whereas they per se do not alter the essentiality of money. In this sense,
the properties of monetary equilibrium in the LW framework are robust.
As a caveat, Faig and Huangfu (2007) elaborate the role of market makers in Ro-
cheteau and Wright (2005). More specifically, market makers play an active role in
transferring payments from buyers to sellers, and they can charge buyers a positive
entry fee and use the collected revenue to remunerate sellers in their sub-markets.
They show that the introduction of market makers is nontrivial and should be used
with caution, since it could induce counterfactual results like perfect predictability of
payments. In fact, there is a general tendency in competitive search models which
make payments predictable and allow buyers to avoid idle money balances, since the
search is not purely random, but directed. Two related studies extend the Rocheteau
and Wright (2005) model by introducing private information over preferences into the
common LW environment. One is Faig and Jerez (2006), which uses preference shocks
to capture precautionary money demand under uncertain expenditure needs and the
use of non-linear price schedules in screening out buyers with heterogeneous valua-
tions for the same products in retail markets, find that inflation impedes the role of
prices in achieving efficient allocations. Mathematically, U bt = U(Xt) −Ht + εtu(xt),
and U st = U(Xt) −Ht − c(xt), where εt is the idiosyncratic match-specific preference
shock and is uniformly distributed in [1, ε¯]. Quantitatively, the proposed competitive
search monetary model with private information fits historical US data on velocity and
interest rates well. The other is Dong and Jiang (2014) with price posting and undi-
rected search9. Private information about εt prevents the seller from extracting all the
trading surplus and ensure a unique monetary equilibrium, though the Friedman rule
is optimal but inefficient in this model. Similarly, Ennis (2008) introduces imperfect
information into the LW environment. Buyers have private information over tastes,
9Prior to a bilateral meeting, the seller posts the terms of trade (q, d), and the buyer does not
observe the posted price-quantity pairs until they are matched.
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that is, U bt = U(Xt)−Ht + εu(xt), where ε ∈ {εH , εL}. Sellers make take-it-or-leave-it
(i.e.,θ = 0) price–quantity pairs {(qH , dH), (qL, dL)} to buyers. The steady-state mon-
etary equilibrium in their model is robust in the sense that agents with heterogeneous
unobservable tastes are more likely to use money for transactions. In addition, only a
proportion of the agents hold money in equilibrium, that is, an endogenous extensive
margin arises, even though there are no fixed costs imposed on the participation decision
into the decentralized market. Note that sellers have all the bargaining power, which
worsens the hold-up problem10 on money holdings. However, the presence of private
information limits the ability of sellers to exercise their hold-up power. In comparison,
Shao (2009) investigates how private information about the quality of goods affects the
role of money, efficiency and optimality of monetary policy in a modified version of the
LW model. He finds that in alternative environments with adverse selection and moral
hazard respectively, the Friedman rule is always optimal, and efficient if sellers have
some mechanism to signal their products’ quality. However, the effectiveness of money
differs considerably in ameliorating the two types of informational frictions.11
Recently, Aruoba et al. (2007) compare Nash bargaining and egalitarian bargaining
and find that they have a quite different impact on the efficiency of the monetary equi-
librium, the optimality of the Friedman rule and the welfare cost of inflation, especially
in models with endogenous participation. In particular, they point out that the ineffi-
ciency identified by Lagos and Wright (2005) at the Friedman rule does not result from
a holdup problem on real balances. Rather, it is a consequence of non-monotonicity12
of the Nash bargaining solution. Notably, proportional bargaining meets the mono-
tonic property, which makes the Friedman rule efficient. Using the notation in the
benchmark model, the buyer in a bilateral match solves the following problem under
egalitarian bargaining,
max
q,d
[u(q)− φtd] (1.27)
such that u(q) − φtd = φtd − c(q), d ≤ m, and q ≥ 0. Intuitively, the buyer choose
an offer to maximize his own surplus from trading subject to the constraint that the
match surplus is shared equally between the buyer and the seller. In contrast, Hu
et al. (2009) use a mechanism design approach to determine the terms of trade in
10A holdup problem occurs when an agent makes an ex-ante, costly and irreversible investment
decision, and the ex-post return can be appropriated by other agents. In a bilateral trade, two types
of holdup problem can arise. One is that a seller can holdup buyers’ money holdings for trade surplus.
The other is that a buyer can holdup sellers’ capital investment.
11As a related study, Shao (2014) considers the LW environment with competitive search, and shows
that under sufficiently low counterfeiting cost, there is no monetary equilibrium. The reason is that
the possibility of counterfeiting can destroy sellers’ confidence in using money, and hence discourage
them from entering the DM market so that this market may shut down.
12Monotonicity means agents’ shares of match surplus are monotonically increasing as the bargain-
ing set expands. Note that money is essential when it enlarges the set of incentive-feasible allocations.
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the LW economy, and find that the first-best allocation is implementable if agents
are sufficiently patient (i.e., β is close to 1.), even though lump-sum tax schemes are
absent to finance interest payments on money. This result is important, since all the
previous studies which assumed trading protocols and other LW features conclude that
the first-best allocation is not achievable without the use of lump-sum taxes.
Quasi-linear preferences are emphasized by Lagos and Wright (2005) as being neces-
sary to keep the model tractable. However, Faig (2008) argues that the quasi-linearity
of preferences is not necessary to generate degenerate distributions of money holdings
when ex ante identical agents make endogenous decisions to participate in the decen-
tralized market as buyers or as sellers. This binary buyer–seller choice is motivated as
follows. At the beginning of each period, agents can gamble their money holdings via
atemporal fair lotteries; if they win the gamble, they go to the decentralized market as
buyers; if they lose, they go to the search market as penniless sellers. As in Rocheteau
and Wright (2005), the probabilities of trading for buyers and sellers dependent on
the ratio of buyers over sellers. Thanks to the nonconvex participation choice, under
general preferences the value function Wt(m) has a linear segment where agents be-
have as if their preferences were quasi-linear. Rocheteau et al. (2008) provide another
way to relax the somewhat strong quasi-linear preference assumption. In a nonconvex
version of the LW economy with indivisible labour and general preferences, they show
that agents act as if they have quasi-linear preferences in the case of interior solutions.
Interestingly, these studies suggest that the setup in Lagos and Wright (2005) is quite
robust.
All the papers we have reviewed focus on steady-state equilibria. There is an-
other strand of work which goes beyond stationary analysis and examines dynamics in
monetary equilibrium in search-based models. Lagos and Wright (2003) characterize
dynamic equilibria including cycles and chaos, and sunspot equilibria in their famous
framework, which abstracts from capital accumulation. Ferraris and Watanabe (2011)
move a step forward. Based on the collateralized credit model of Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and the LW model, they provide sufficient conditions for endogenous fluctu-
ations in both consumption and capital in an economy where capital serves both as
productive input and collateral for monetary loans. Collateral constraints or borrow-
ing limits play a crucial role in generating interesting cycles, chaotic trajectories and
sunspot equilibria.
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1.3.3 Discussion
In this section, we reviewed the work which is concerned with the robustness of the
LW framework in particular, and the search theory of money in general. Basically,
the existence of efficient monetary equilibrium or essentiality of money has not been
fundamentally challenged, though the choice of trading protocols has substantial impli-
cations for the effects of monetary policy, efficiency and the optimality or otherwise of
the Friedman rule. Still, the paper by Araujo et al. (2012) reminds us that more work
is required to settle the issue of whether money is essential in the LW model. This is
worth pursuing for at least two reasons. First of all, a unified monetary framework with
solid microfoundations and essential money is highly desired for both theoretical and
policy analysis. Second, the alternating centralized market and decentralized market
structure stimulates our imagination to introduce labour, capital and other markets, as
well as Neoclassical ingredients like asymmetric information, and New Keynesian ele-
ments like nominal rigidities into the model. Ultimately, money is brought into general
equilibrium theory in an essential way rather than via ad hoc assumptions, and this
microfounded theory of money is fully integrated with modern macroeconomics.
An interesting topic for future research is to study the robustness of monetary equi-
librium in the presence of heterogeneous expectations and learning. There are always,
at least, two steady states in monetary search models: one is monetary and the other is
non-monetary. The monetary equilibrium under rational expectation is tenuous in the
LW model, since even a small perturbation can push the model economy away from the
monetary stationary equilibrium and towards the non-monetary steady state. Bara-
nowski (2015) shows that when agents use adaptive learning to form expectations about
the value of money, the monetary equilibrium is locally stable and agents never learn
the non-monetary equilibrium. In this sense, the monetary steady state is robust.13
Before considering policy analysis, we want to explore papers concerned with the
coexistence of money and other media of exchange.
1.4 Models with Competing Media of Exchange
In this section, we review models which aim to rationalize the coexistence of fiat money
and other real or nominal assets. In the presence of competing media of exchange or
rather interest-bearing assets, why is fiat money valued? This has been a central issue
in pure monetary theory. In general, we are interested in the interaction between
13Also see Branch (2014), Branch and McGough (2014) and Branch et al. (2014).
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money and other assets in facilitating exchange either as a payment instrument or as
collateral.
1.4.1 Money and Real Assets
Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) assume that the general goods in the LW environment
are storable and in this way examine the essentiality of money when physical capital
can be used directly as an alternative medium of exchange. They show that money is
essential if there is a lack of capital to be used as means of payment. In fact, agents are
induced to overaccumulate capital in the case of liquidity shortage, and the introduction
of fiat money helps to eliminate this inefficiency. The Friedman Rule is optimal and
efficient. The model is briefly outlined below. For an ex ante identical agent, let qbt , qst ,
and yt denote the quantity of special goods consumed, the quantity of special goods
produced and the net consumption of general goods in period t, respectively. Then, the
instantaneous utility is u(qbt )−c(qst )+yt. Note that y = X−H by assuming U(X) = X
in our basic model. Agents have two storage technologies. By storing xlt units of
general goods at time t, an agent reaps klt+1 = fl(xlt) units of general goods before
entering the DM of the following period. Alternatively, by storing xit at time t, an agent
gets kit+1 = fi(xit) units of general goods after leaving the DM of the following period.
This timing of storage implies that the goods stored using the fi technology cannot be
brought into the DM as a medium of exchange. fl and fi are assumed to be strictly
concave, with f ′l (0) = f ′i(0) = +∞, fl(0) = fi(0) = 0, limxl→∞ f ′l (xl) < β−1, and
limxi→∞ f
′
i(xi) < β
−1. Clearly, (z, kl, ki) is the individual state vector, where z = φm
are the real money balances. The value functions Vt(z, kl, ki) and Wt(z, kl, ki) are quite
similar to the Vt(m) and Wt(m) in our benchmark case. In addition, the terms of trade
is determined by Nash bargaining. Aruoba and Schorfheide (2010) extends Lagos and
Rocheteau (2008) by allowing capital also as a factor of production in the decentralized
market(see also Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011)). They find that money and capital
claims can coexist as competing media of exchange in the decentralized market if liquid
capital is only a small fraction of the overall capital stock.
The so-called rate-of-return dominance puzzle—why is money held when higher-
return assets exist—is not solved in Lagos and Rocheteau (2008), since in their model
liquid capital (kl) and real balances (z) earn an equal rate of return in monetary equi-
librium. Hu and Rocheteau (2013) adopts a mechanism design approach to attack this
puzzle in a LW style economy where fiat money and risk-free capital compete as means
of payment. He shows that a positive equilibrium return differential between money
and capital is both socially optimal and individually rational even if capital goods are
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perfectly divisible and recognizable. More specifically, the nondegenerate core in pair-
wise meetings accommodates a pricing mechanism which can align agents’ incentives
with the social optimal, since an agent who deviates from collectively agreed alloca-
tions can be punished by triggering his least-preferred trade in the core. Andolfatto
and Martin (2009) introduce uncertainty into the Lagos and Rocheteau (2008) model
where the short-term return to capital is subject to aggregate risk. Fiat money, on the
contrary, is “informationally insensitive”, or rather its expected return is relatively less
news-driven. Hence, money improves welfare by mitigating the excess volatility associ-
ated with liquid asset as alternative medium of exchange. Naturally, capital dominates
money in long-run expected return, since capital or claims against capital are more
responsive to news shocks.14
1.4.2 Money and Nominal Assets
Lagos (2013) builds on Lagos and Wright (2005) to study the coexistence of money
and nominal risk-free interest-bearing bonds (i.e., each bond represents a certain claim
to fiat money). Based on a realistic observation that fiat money is heterogeneous in
some extraneous attribute like a serial number (dubbed as a moneyspot by analogy
with sunspots), he shows that, without the typical exogenous imposition that agents
can only use money as means of payment to buy goods or securities, there exist equi-
libria in which money coexists with interest-bearing bonds. The basic logic is that
moneyspots can be treated differently by agents’ beliefs, and hence money may be
valued asymmetrically in equilibrium. These asymmetric and expectation-drive valua-
tions of extraneous attributes then can be used to construct monetary equilibria with
the declared property. In addition, the model also can rationalize the liquidity effects
of open-market operations, and even the possibility of negative nominal interest rates.
Intuitively, agents’ self-fulfilling expectations can affect the proportion of the money
supply that agents are willing to use for bond purchases. In some cases, there may
be too much, and in other cases too little cash to be traded for bonds. When the
size of open-market operation is relatively small, agents are willing to buy bonds at
a premium, since some type of money is expected to be inferiorly valued in particu-
lar moneyspot equilibria. Note that the coexistence puzzle is rationalized purely from
the self-fulfilling beliefs of agents, without assuming any intrinsic difference between
money and bonds. In contrast, Ferraris and Mattesini (2014) approach the rate of
return puzzle by assuming that bonds are subject to a minimum purchase requirement
and untrustworthy intermediaries. These intermediaries issue private notes to pool the
cash of the agents who face a binding minimum purchase constraint, and then use the
14Also see Andolfatto et al. (2015) for an application to the practice of rehypothecation.
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revenue to acquire the interest-bearing bonds. In equilibrium, a positive interest rate
motivates the intermediaries to redeem their private notes. In both models, money and
bonds are equally liquid, that is, can be freely chosen as means of payment.
A related literature is about the social benefits of illiquid nominal bonds. Illiq-
uidity here means that bonds cannot be directly used to purchase goods at no cost.
In order to reconcile the coexistence of positive nominal interest rates and illiquid
government bonds, Boel and Camera (2006) introduce heterogeneous discounting and
idiosyncratic consumption risk into the LW model, where spatial separation in spirit
of Townsend (1980), anonymity, limited commitment and enforcement make money
essential. Heterogeneity in discounting and idiosyncratic shocks render the Friedman
rule sub-optimal, and the constrained-efficient allocation has to be supported by illiq-
uid bonds and hence positive nominal interest rates. In a version of the LW setup with
price taking, Marchesiani and Senesi (2009) study the welfare-enhancing role of illiquid
one-period nominal bonds as a mechanism to reallocate idle money balances toward
liquidity-constrained agents, as the banking sector does in Berentsen et al. (2007). For
tractability and robustness, Andolfatto (2011) recasts the Kocherlakota (2003) model
in the LW environment with competitive markets, and reconsiders the idea that illiquid
bonds smooth marginal utility across heterogeneous agents with different intertempo-
ral marginal rates of substitution. He shows that this welfare-improving role of illiquid
bonds holds in the steady state rather than just in one period, when household types are
private information (that is, liquidity needs or desired consumption needs are private
information).
Berentsen and Waller (2011a) compare the allocative effects of nominal outside
(government bonds) and inside bonds. They adopt a version of the LW model with
three perfectly competitive markets, the first being a bond market. Money is essential
in the second market, where agents trade money for goods. The main result is that
allocations with inside bonds which relax liquidity constraints can be replicated by those
with outside bonds, while the converse is not true, when neither private households and
nor the government have any enforcement power. Interestingly, the allocations in the
two cases are equivalent if participation in bond markets is costly. As above, illiquid
bonds are socially beneficial whenever the inflation rate is positive.
As for formal modelling issues, the key point is that (m,B) now acts as the state
variables, where B denotes agents’ bond holdings. Then, Vt(m,B) and Wt(m,B) can
be formulated in a way similar to the benchmark case. Rather than going into details,
we recommend interested readers refer to Nosal and Rocheteau (2011) for a textbook
exposition.
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1.4.3 Discussion
It is still an ongoing project to explain why money is dominated in the rate of return
by other assets like government issued nominal bonds. For example, Li et al. (2012)
introduce the threat of fraud to endogenize asset-specific liquidity properties. This
study sheds new light on the distribution and time-variation of liquidity premia across
assets, and in turn offers fresh insight on rate-of-return differentials. In particular, a
satisfactory rationalization of money remaining essential even when capital goods can
be used as medium of exchange provides us a solid microfoundation to examine the
relationship between inflation and capital accumulation, like the famous Tobin (1965)
effect. We will discuss money and growth further in the following.
The determination of the exchange rate between two fiat currencies in an economy
can be framed as a special case of rate-of-return dominance question. For example,
Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2013b) use a two-country version of the LW model to account
for exchange rate determination and its dynamics, while Kannan (2009) quantifies wel-
fare benefits of an international currency in an open-economy variant of the LW setup.15
Zhang (2014) extends the LW model into open-economy context and aims to answer
three classic questions in international monetary economics: (i) the conditions under
which a currency can emerge as an international money, (ii) how monetary authorities
should set inflation when there is no restrictions on which currencies can be used as
medium of exchange, and (iii) how big the welfare gains from currency international-
ization are. In the two-country, two-currency model, She finds that strategic comple-
mentarities between currency portfolio choices and information acquisition decisions
lead to multiple equilibria where zero, one, or two international monies can emerge.
The Friedman rule is generally suboptimal, due to the trade-off between the seignior-
age benefit from inflation and the threat of losing international status. In addition,
the welfare gains from internationalization can be quantitatively sizeable. Similarly,
issues associated with monetary unions or currency areas need more attention, though
Li and Matsui (2009) have shed some light on issues like the welfare costs and benefits
of a monetary union in a simple two-country two-currency search-theoretic model with
indivisible goods.
We next move to the closely related section which deal with the coexistence of
money and credit, and as we will see, this issue deserves extra attention.
15Also see Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2014b).
23
Models with Money and Credit
1.5 Models with Money and Credit
The hallmark of New Monetarist models is to explicitly deal with frictions in the
exchange process. Random bilateral matching in the search theory of money is a
natural way to generate a double coincidence problem, and to motivate incomplete
record keeping, limited commitment and other frictions that make monetary exchange
socially useful. Unfortunately, it is these frictions which render money essential that
make credit arrangements impossible in standard search-theoretic models. As a result,
an increasing number of studies are aiming to solve this dilemma, and in general to
clarify the relationship among money and credit arrangements.
1.5.1 Money and Credit as Means of Payment
There is no role for credit in the original LW model. Credit is impossible in the de-
centralized market because of the assumption that agents are anonymous. Meanwhile,
credit is not necessary in the centralized market due to the assumption that all agents
can work and have linear utility in hours. Telyukova and Wright (2008) introduce a
third sub-period where a centralized market with no anonymity assumption operates.
In addition, some agents want to consume but cannot produce, hence bilateral credit
is feasible and useful in this market. They show that agents choose to use interest-
bearing credit even when they have money at hand, due to idiosyncratic uncertainty
about liquidity need. This prediction provides an explanation to the “credit card debt
puzzle” in their paper. By construction, there is a dichotomy in the sense that the out-
put traded through money is independent of those via credit, since money and credit
are not used simultaneously within the same market. Hence, monetary policy does not
affect the composition of monetary and credit transactions. Another simplification is
that enforcement problems with credit arrangements are assumed away. See Telyukova
(2013) for a quantitative analysis of the role of liquidity demand in accounting for
this puzzle. Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2014a) quantify the size of the shadow economy
in a slightly modified LW model. Costless record-keeping technology is available and
hence credit exchange can be supported. However, money is still useful since monetary
transactions are not reported to the government, which allows agents to evade income
taxes. The trade-off of paying the inflation tax or the income tax determines the scale
of the informal sector.
In order to introduce credit into the LW environment with imperfect record-keeping
and lack of commitment, Sanches and Williamson (2010) resort to the threat of theft
associated with money holding. They show that money and credit can coexist as
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competing media of exchange under different record-keeping technologies and ways of
money injections, as long as the cost of theft is sufficiently small. In general, following
the Friedman rule is not optimal. It is useful to note that in a bilateral meeting, the
buyer can only use credit in transactions when the seller monitors the transaction with
some exogenous probability, hence the choice of using credit is essentially exogenous
in this model. In addition, other types of costs of operating a monetary system, such
as counterfeiting, the costs of deterring counterfeiting, or the costs of replacing worn
currency can be considered as well.16 In fact, Fung and Shao (2011) extend Nosal and
Wallace (2007) to study counterfeiting in the LW framework with divisible money and
competitive search. They show counterfeiting can exist in a monetary equilibrium if
the cost of producing counterfeits is sufficiently low. Also assuming imperfect record-
keeping, Bethune et al. (2015) integrate the LW with a frictional Mortensen-Pissarides
labour market in order to study the relationship between household unsecured debt,
liquid assets, and aggregate unemployment.17 Households can not commit and are
heterogeneous in terms of their access to unsecured credit. Due to imperfect record-
keeping technology, some households can be monitored and hence firms are willing to
extend credit to them. Defaulted households are excluded from credit arrangements
permanently. They show that when the rate of return of liquid assets are neither
too high nor too low, liquid assets including money and unsecured pairwise credit
- as alternative means of payment - can coexist in equilibrium. Meanwhile, there
is an virtuous cycle between credit markets and labour markets: higher aggregate
employment leads to looser endogenous debt limits for households, and vice versa.
However, a bad equilibrium with high unemployment and credit crunch is possible as
well, due to the households’ choice of liquid assets and firms’ participation decisions.
Full enforcement is a strong assumption. Boerner and Ritschl (2011) adopt a village
economy version of the LW model and analyze communal responsibility as a collater-
alizing device to overcome enforcement problems associated with bilateral exchange.18
Communal responsibility is a medieval institution of merchants, by which merchants
from a given city would be held collectively liable for each other’s debts when trading
abroad. They show that fiat money and interest-bearing bills of exchange issued by
16In a similar environment without money, Carapella and Williamson (2015) study the role of
government debt as collateral in private credit contracts and hence facilitating decentralized exchange.
In the model, limited memory softens the punishment for default. Government debt can be easily
recognized and seized, which helps to discourage default on private or public debts. This improves
social welfare. Notably, default can occur in equilibrium.
17See Dong and Xiao (2015) and Rocheteau and Rodriguez-Lopez (2014) for related models.
18In the DM, agents from different villages trade village-specific goods bilaterally. Agents are
anonymous but with verifiable citizenship. So agents may use money and (or) credit as a medium of
payment in the inter-village market during the day. The CM in this economy is an Walrasian intra-
village market, where only the inhabitants of each village participate, and all claims can be enforced
costlessly. See also Faig (2004) and Liu (2015).
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agents may coexist in equilibrium if there is a fixed but sufficiently low cost of using
credit. In contrast, Dong (2011b) develops a three-sub-period version of the LW model
where competitive financial intermediaries exist and have access to a costly record-
keeping technology to identify agents. Bilateral credit is feasible in this environment
when the buyer pays a fixed cost in order to make the seller and herself identified to a
financial intermediary which enforce the settlement of IOUs via money. She shows that
inflation and credit exhibit an inverse U-shaped relationship, while the use of credit
has inflation-dependent effect on money demand. A innovative feature of this model
is that money and credit can simultaneously serve as means of payment. In addition,
the choice of using means of payment, money or credit, is endogenous.
So far, we have exclusively focused on the coexistence of fiat money and bilateral
credit (i.e., personal IOUs), and their implications. Again, here we would like to omit
the technical details, since instructive textbook exposition can be found in Nosal and
Rocheteau (2011). In the next subsection, we are going to discuss papers concerning
credit issued by financial intermediaries, like bank loans.
1.5.2 Credit, Banking and Liquidity Reallocation
There are models where money and banking are substitutes, since currency and bank
liabilities are alternative payment instruments. He et al. (2005) examine the safekeeping
function of banking in the LWmodel with indivisible money. Money in their model faces
the risk of endogenous or exogenous theft, while checks on deposit accounts in banks are
safe. In this way, money and banking arise endogenously, and interestingly the presence
of banks enhances the essential role of money in exchange process, though money and
checks can compete as means of payment in equilibrium. As a natural extension,
He et al. (2008) introduce divisible money and study the relationship between money
and banking further. Similarly, they show that money and bank liabilities (check on
deposit accounts) can circulate as media of exchange simultaneously. Notably, negative
nominal interest rates are feasible and optimal under certain conditions. This unusual
result is due to the assumption that holding money is risky. Similarly, Li (2011) adds a
preference shock into the LW model with both currency and checking deposits as means
of payment. He shows that in equilibrium checks are used only in sizeable transactions
while cash is used in all transactions, since there is a record keeping cost to use checks.
Money and banking can be complements as well, since a bank is where one goes to
get cash. Berentsen et al. (2007) use a competitive pricing version of the LW framework
to explore the liquidity reallocation of banks, which can record financial transaction
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Figure 1.3: The timing of events during period t in a modified Lagos-Wright model with banking.
histories at no cost, but they cannot record goods trade histories.19 In this case,
uncollateralized credit is available as bank loans in the form of money, when buyers
are cash constrained.20 Briefly, the model has the following elements. There is one
perishable good and the DM in the LW is replaced by a perfectly competitive market,
as in the price taking case in Rocheteau and Wright (2005). At the beginning of the
day market, there is a preference shock such that with probability 1 − N an agent
can consume but cannot produce while with probability N the agent can produce but
cannot consume. Following the convention, consumers and produces are called buyers
and sellers, respectively. In contrast, all agents consume and produce in the night
market. We still have Mt+1 = (1 + τ)Mt, but with τ = τ1 + τ2, where τ1Mt denotes the
lump-sum monetary transfers in the day market and τ2Mt the transfers in the night
market. In addition, τ1 = (1−N)τb +Nτs, where τb and τs represent the shares of DM
transfer going to buyers and sellers, respectively. The timing of events is depicted in
Figure 1.3. Let Vt(m) be the value function for an agent with m dollars when entering
the day market, and Wt(m,L,D) the value function for an agent entering the night
market with m dollars,L loans, and D deposits at time t. Using the notation above,
then we have
Wt(m,L,D) = max
X,H,m′
[U(X)−H + βVt+1(m′)] (1.28)
such that
X + φtm
′ = H + φt(m+ τ2Mt−1) + φt(1 + id)D − φt(1 + il)L,
where il is the nominal loan rate, and id the nominal deposit rate. Notably,Wt(m,L,D)
19In addition, banks can commit. In a model where banks suffer from limited commitment, Monnet
and Sanches (2014), show that banking regulation is necessary for the optimal provision of private
money.
20Bank loans are one-period contracts. The quasi-linear preference (due to linear disutility in labour
hours in the night market) implies one-period debt contracts are optimal in the LW framework.
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is linear in m, L and D. Likewise,
Vt(m) = (1−N)[u(qb) +Wt(m+ τbMt−1 + L− pqb, L, 0)]
+N [−c(qs) +Wt(m+ τsMt−1 −D + pqs, 0, D)], (1.29)
where p is nominal price of goods in the day market, qb and qs the corresponding
quantities consumed by a buyer and produced by a seller. Note that buyers will never
deposit money in the bank and sellers will never take out loans, and that sellers cannot
deposit receipts of cash pqs, since the bank closes before the onset of goods trading in
the day market. Buyers solve
max
qb,L
[u(qb) +Wt(m+ τbMt−1 + L− pqb, L, 0)]
s.t. pqb ≤ m+ τbMt−1 + L− pqb, L ≤ L,
where L is buyers’ borrowing constraint. A seller faces the problem
max
qs,D
[−c(qs) +Wt(m+ τsMt−1 −D + pqs, 0, D)]
s.t. D ≤ m+ τsMt−1.
The banking sector is perfectly competitive with free entry and there is no operating
costs or reserve requirements, so a representative bank solves
max
L
(il − id)L
s.t. L ≤ L, u(qb)− (1 + il)Lφt ≥ Γ,
where Γ is a borrower’s surplus by accepting a loan from another bank. The main
result is that consumption loans extended by banks are welfare-improving since they
can reallocate money across agents who have heterogeneous preferences for consumption
and production.
Similarly, Bencivenga and Camera (2011) assume that ex ante identical agents are
hit by an idiosyncratic preference shock and divided into sellers and buyers in the
beginning of the CM. Each buyer has either high (θHu(x)) or low (θLu(x)) marginal
utility of consuming the specialized goods, with θH > θL. In this way, there is an
ex post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash
constrained. Hence, they introduce costly banking into a model of money and capi-
tal based on Lagos and Wright (2005) and Aruoba and Wright (2003), and they find
that banks can reallocate liquidity, eliminate idle balances and hence improve welfare
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by providing agents with demand deposit contracts. Note that banks in their model
cannot make loans or create private money due to enforcement problems. That is,
money is the only means of payment as in Berentsen et al. (2007). Chiu and Meh
(2011) study how money and banking interact to affect allocation and welfare in an
environment based on Lagos and Wright (2005) and Silveira and Wright (2010). The
competitive banking system operates like the one in Berentsen et al. (2007), though
with two modifications, enforcement at a finite fixed cost and endogenous fractions of
borrowers and lenders. They find that banking makes inflation less welfare-damaging,
and in turn inflation has a nonlinear impact on the welfare effects of banking. In terms
of welfare effects of banking, Rojas Breu (2013) analyzes the welfare implications of lim-
ited access to costless bank credit with full enforcement. In her model, the intra-period
credit can be used simultaneously with money, but access to credit is determined by
an exogenous technology, so the use of credit is exogenous like the case in Sanches and
Williamson (2010). She finds that broadening the use of credit has an ambiguous effect
on welfare, but when access to credit is broadened sufficiently, the cost of inflation is
more likely to be effectively reduced. Similarly, Chiu et al. (2012) differentiate nom-
inal credit arrangement (supported by record-keeping technology for financial history
and facilitating inter-temporal trade of money balances) from real credit arrangement
(supported by record-keeping technology for goods transaction history and facilitating
inter-temporal trade of goods) and then compare welfare among real loan, nominal loan
and monetary economy. They find that increasing credit usage may not necessarily in-
crease welfare. Note that nominal bank credit complements the use of money, while
real bank credit substitutes the use of money.
In an environment similar to Berentsen et al. (2007) but with some modifications,
Ferraris and Watanabe (2008) consider the collateralizing role of productive capital in
a competitive pricing version of the LW model with banks which do not have record-
keeping or enforcement technologies. That is, agents are anonymous in both the goods
and credit markets. Nevertheless, agents can obtain one-period consumption loans
in the form of money from the private competitive banks, by pledging their capital
asset as collateral. To allow capital accumulation, the night good is durable, while
the day good is perishable. In addition, capital can be used to produce the night
good, whereas capital per se or promises backed by capital cannot be used as media of
exchange, hence fiat money is the only means of payment. They show that money and
bank credit can coexist in a steady state monetary equilibrium, where the efficiency of
capital accumulation and the effect of inflation on capital investment decision depend
on whether the borrowing constraint is binding. As a follow-up work, Ferraris and
Watanabe (2011) explicitly explore how fluctuations in the value of collateralizing assets
generate cyclical movement in consumption and capital accumulation. Similarly, in a
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model with money loans collateralized by assets, Li and Li (2013) show that inflation
may reduce asset prices when enforcement is sufficiently efficient. The reason is that
higher inflation raises the borrowing cost, which dampens the demand for the asset as
collateral.
1.5.3 Discussion
In this section, we have reviewed the papers concerned with the coexistence of money
and credit, and its implications in different settings. As indicated above, we have to
modify the standard LW framework in order to develop a microfounded model of money
and credit. Record-keeping technology, collateral, specialized banking sector are useful
elements to introduce credit into monetary models. Credit trades are intertemporal
and involve a delayed settlement, so enforcement is an inherent issue for models with
credit. Basically, the credit contracts in the models we mentioned are static, in the
sense that they do not roll over across periods. This is due to the quasi-linear preference
assumption21. As an example of dynamic credit model, Sanches (2011) use dynamic
contracting to study the terms of long-term unsecured credit arrangements in the LW
environment.
Money and credit are typically substitutes in making transactions in reality. Hence,
it is natural and interesting to ask what determines the composition of payment sys-
tem and how to price the payment service. Monnet and Roberds (2008) extend the
LW framework to analyze the existence of relatively costly card-based payment and its
pricing when fiat money is available, while Koeppl et al. (2008) introduce private in-
formation into the same underlying framework and find that settlement, the discharge
of past obligations through the transfer of an asset, is an essential part of an optimal
payment system.22 Models with endogenous choice of the use of money and credit are
promising tools with which to analyze the structure and evolution of payments systems.
An interesting direction for further research is to explore the price of durable assets
which serve as collateral in explaining the persistence and amplification of monetary
shocks (see Ferraris and Watanabe (2011) for an example). In addition, investment
loans rather than consumption loans deserve more attention in microfounded monetary
models. Ferraris and Watanabe (2012) allow an entrepreneur to pledge a part of the
returns of a project as collateral to buy investment goods from an investor, and then
study liquidity constraints and under-investment in a three-sub-period competitive LW
21The quasi-linear preferences also make the insurance function of banks disappear. See Williamson
and Wright (2010b) for an example which incorporates the Diamond-Dybvig risk-sharing role of banks.
22Additionally, see Lee (2014) on the effect of a uniform pricing constraint for cash and debit card
as alternative payment methods.
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model.23 For a related paper, Venkateswaran and Wright (2013) reinterpret the DM as
a Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) market where money competes with collateralized credit
as medium of exchanges. Due to limited commitment, unsecured credit is not feasible.
Different assets have different pledgability - the extent to which they are useful to secure
loans - which in turn implies various degrees of liquidity. This macroeconomic model is
flexible enough to encompass money, capital, and other assets, and hence can be used
to study the effects of monetary policy on asset prices and financial innovation like
home-equity loans. For example, in He et al. (2015), housing bears a liquidity premium
because it collateralizes consumption loans. Due to the self-fulfilling nature of liquidity,
house prices can display boom-bust cycles even in a stationary environment without
any shocks. Mechanisms like this would be helpful in understanding what happened in
the housing market during the recent financial crisis.
Another potentially fruitful direction is to study international banking issues. For
instance, Bignon et al. (2015) develop a two-country version of the banking model in
Berentsen et al. (2007) and evaluate the welfare gains from a currency union when
credit markets are imperfectly integrated in the sense that the cost for banks to grant
credit is higher for cross-border purchases. They show that a currency union without
a banking union is welfare decreasing, since monetary integration in this case may
strengthen default incentives and worsen credit rationing.
1.6 Liquidity, Asset Prices and Monetary Policy
In this section, liquidity refers to an asset’s usefulness to directly facilitate exchange
as means of payment or indirectly as collateral to secure credit. Many factors affect
the liquidity of assets. For example, the intrinsic properties such as portability, stora-
bility, divisibility and recognizability, and the extrinsic determinants like informational
frictions and even subjective beliefs. In a frictional economy, liquidity is a valuable
property. As a special case, fiat money can have positive value, though it is intrinsi-
cally valueless, i.e., the discounted sum of its dividends is zero. Clearly, money and
other intrinsically valued assets of varying liquidity are supposed to compete as media
of exchange. In the following, we will investigate the role of liquidity in determining
asset prices within the context of monetary economies, and how monetary policy and
asset prices interact via the liquidity channel. From the modelling perspective, we
23In this paper, money is the medium used to transfer resources on the spot, while liquidity refers
to the availability of a medium to transfer resources over time. Apparently, money can be used as a
medium of spot trade and a medium of trade over time. With this fact in mind, the authors develop a
liquidity constraint model with the notion of limited pledgeability of returns of a project.(e.g., Kiyotaki
and Moore (2002)).
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generalize the search theory of money to become a search theory of liquidity.
1.6.1 Asset Prices with Liquidity Premia
Many asset pricing anomalies in finance can be satisfactorily explained when we take
into account the transaction role of assets. Lagos (2010a) develops a liquidity-based
asset-pricing model by recasting the Lucas (1978) consumption-based asset pricing
model into the LW environment. In the model, there are three divisible and non-
storable consumption goods: general goods, apples as dividends from Lucas trees and
endowed coconuts. There is no fiat money, but two perfectly divisible real financial as-
sets exist, durable equity shares against the trees and one-period risk-free government-
issued real bonds. Each tree backs up one equity share which proves the holder’s
ownership of a tree and gives her the right to collect the stochastic apple dividends,
while each of the bonds pays off an apple at maturity. In the DM, agents trade coconuts
and financial assets and the terms of trade are determined by bargaining, while in the
CM, agents trade apples, labour services, general goods and financial assets. He then
shows that this model is well-suited to rationalize the equity-premium puzzle and the
risk-free rate puzzle both qualitatively and quantitatively. Nosal and Rocheteau (2013)
extend the trading mechanism in Zhu and Wallace (2007) and show a LW style mone-
tary model can generate rate-of-return-differences between fiat money and a real asset
in fixed supply, without imposing any exogenous trading restrictions and without vio-
lating Pareto-efficiency in pairwise trades. In order to characterize the generation and
bursting of bubbles, Rocheteau and Wright (2013) modify the LW framework by using
liquid real assets rather than unbacked fiat money as a means of payment. They show
that strategic complementarity between buyers’ asset holdings and sellers’ participation
decisions is a mechanism to generate multiple steady-state equilibria.
In addition, the decentralized market in the highlighted monetary model is ideal
to model OTC asset markets. Li et al. (2012) develop a search-theoretic model of
over-the-counter markets by combining useful elements in Lagos and Wright (2005),
and Duffie et al. (2005). They feature the vulnerability of the asset to fraud as a
fundamental determinant of assets’ liquidity and show that this friction can contribute
to the endogenous cross-sectional differences in liquidity premia.24
24Relatedly, Li and Lin (2014) study how the threat of payments fraud affects the liquidity of
deposits and banks’ capacity in providing credit in the form of overdraft.
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1.6.2 Monetary Policy and Asset Prices
The effects of money on asset returns is another issue that recently has attracted much
attention in the search-theoretic models of money. Geromichalos et al. (2007) exploit a
multiple-asset version of the LW framework with real assets (Lucas trees) and money
as media of exchange to study the relationship between asset prices and monetary
policy. The durable real assets exogenously fixed in supply deliver the general good
as dividends to their shareholders, who can trade the shares in the CM. They find a
negative relationship between inflation and asset returns, given money and the real
asset have similar liquidity properties. Intuitively, inflation increases and the return on
money decreases when the money supply grows. Since there are no prior differences in
the liquidity properties between fiat money and real assets, the rate of return on both
assets has to be equal in equilibrium.
Lagos (2011) moves a step further by assuming exogenous differences in the accept-
ability of assets and explores interaction between monetary policy and asset prices.
More specifically, a set of infinitely lived Lucas trees measured at the number of agents
is introduced into the standard model. Each tree yields an equal and random amount
of fruit et in the CM of every period t, and each tree backs up one durable and divisible
equity share which proves the holder’s ownership of a tree and gives her the right to
collect the stochastic fruits. Therefore, et can be considered as an aggregate shock and
exogenously determined. The underlying et process is assumed to be Markovian with
appropriate properties. Agents know the actual realization of et at the onset of the
DM. As usual, the three consumption goods, general goods, special goods and fruit,
are non-storable and perfectly divisible. Note that fruit and general goods are homo-
geneous goods, while special goods come in many varieties. Let st = (et,Mt) be the
aggregate state vector at time t. a = (as, am) denotes the portfolio of an agent who
holds as equity shares and am dollars. Now V (a, s) and W (a, s) are the value function
for an agent entering the DM and CM, respectively. Then, we have
W (at, st) = max
yt,Xt,Ht,at+1
{U(yt) +Xt −Ht + βEtV (at+1, st+1)}
s.t. yt + ζtXt + φtat+1 = (φst + et)a
s
t + φ
m
t (a
m
t + τMt) + ζtHt
and 0 ≤ yt, 0 ≤ Ht ≤ H, 0 ≤ at+1, where φt ≡ (φst , φmt ). In words, an representative
agent consumes yt units of fruit and Xt general goods, works Ht hours, and chooses
to hold an end-of-period asset portfolio at+1. Note that here the numeraire is fruit,
ζt is the relative price of the general good, φst is the ex-dividend price of an equity
share, and φmt is the price of fiat money. We just point out that W (at, st) satisfies the
desired properties as Wt(m) in the benchmark model. In a bilateral meeting between
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a buyer with portfolio at and a seller with a˜t, the terms of trade are determined by
Nash bargaining where the buyer has all the bargaining power (θ = 1). Let (qt,dt)
with dt = (dst , dmt ) denote the quantity of special good, equity share and money traded.
Then we have
max
qt,dt≤at
[u(qt) +W (at − dt, st)−W (at, st)]
s.t. W (a˜t + dt, st)− qt ≥ W (a˜t, st).
Note that c(q) = q here. Then using the procedure applied in LW, the value function
in the DM is
V (at, st) = σu[q(λtat)]− q(λtat) +W (at, st),
where λt = (λst , λmt ) with λst ≡ 1ζt (φst + et) and λmt ≡
φmt
ζt
. Note that α = 1 and δ = 0,
in comparison with the basic model. Also note that money and equity shares coexist
as means of payment in the model, while the latter are subject to price fluctuations,
since they are claims to the Lucas trees with risky returns. After characterizing the
equilibrium, Lagos shows that equity prices do not depend on shares’ liquidity property
at the Friedman rule, while there are liquidity premia in assets prices under a set of
monetary policies that target a constant and positive nominal interest rate. In partic-
ular, this liquidity channel can support persistent deviations between the real prices of
assets and their fundamental values, when monetary policy persistently deviates from
the Friedman rule.
Even further, Lester et al. (2012) adopt a multiple-asset version of the LW model
with proportional bargaining to study how asymmetric information associated with
recognizability generates endogenous liquidity differentials, and the implications for
monetary policy. They show that multiple equilibria can exist, with different transac-
tion patterns, which are not invariant to monetary policy. In particular, small changes
in information structure may generate large responses in asset prices, allocations and
welfare. In comparison, the liquidity in Jacquet and Tan (2012) is endogenous as well,
that is, different hedging properties lead to different liquidity properties across assets.
But they focus on how monetary policy influences the market liquidity25of assets and
ultimately asset price dynamics. Another notable difference is that the model is an
overlapping generations version of the LW framework with infinitely-lived households
and finitely-lived entrepreneurs. Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck (2013) extend the
LW framework with three assets: a real asset, a risky financial asset and fiat money,
and correspondingly with three markets to study the role of money in over-the-counter
markets. An interesting innovation is that they explicitly consider the securitization
25See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) for the distinction between market liquidity and funding
liquidity. Basically, market liquidity refers to the re-saleability of assets, while funding liquidity
concerns borrowing constraints of agents.
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process whereby agents transform a safe real asset into a risky financial asset.
Turning to international issues, Rose and Spiegel (2012a,b) make the assumption
that unrecognized assets are not accepted in a bilateral match, and then develop an
international version of the LW model to account for the surprising dollar appreciation
during the recent global financial crisis. For comparison, Geromichalos and Simonovska
(2014) develop a two-country version of the LW setup with real financial assets and
without fiat money to study how liquidity properties of domestic and foreign assets can
account for the “home bias” phenomenon in international portfolio choice.
Furthermore, the liquidity properties of assets also have crucial implications for un-
conventional monetary policy. Williamson (2012a) integrates financial intermediation
theory a la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) into monetary search framework a la Lagos
and Wright (2005) to model explicitly public and private liquidity, and study uncon-
ventional monetary policy like quantitative easing.26 He finds that money can have
persistent nonneutral effect, and a liquidity trap can exist in equilibrium away from
the Friedman rule.
1.6.3 Discussion
The literature surveyed in this section demonstrates that the unified framework is quite
useful to examine questions like how frictions and policy affect the liquidity of assets,
their prices, and the trading volume in these markets. As a result, finance theory and
monetary theory bond even more closely.27 Of course, this integration is an ongoing
agenda. Unresolved questions and new issues are analyzed in variants of the workhorse
model. The recent global financial turmoil provides us a good opportunity to scrutinize
issues related to liquidity and credit with the help of search-based monetary models.
Berentsen et al. (2014a) provide a new example, which shows that restricting access
to financial markets - in order to reduce the frequency of trading - can be welfare
improving, due to a pecuniary externality of portfolio choices between money and
nominal government bonds.28 In the following section, we will deal with a traditional
but central topic in monetary economics.
26Also see Williamson (2012b),Williamson (2014a), Williamson (2014b), and Herrenbrueck (2014).
27For some recent examples, see Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), Mattesini and Nosal (2013), Lagos
and Zhang (2014), and Lester et al. (2014).
28In a similar environment, Geromichalos et al. (2014) shows that a liquidity premium exists in the
primary bonds market and rationalize the term premium by the idea that short maturity bonds are
inherently more liquid.
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1.7 Monetary Propagation and Business Cycles
How are policy-induced changes in the nominal money stock or the short-term nominal
interest rate propagated to affect nominal variables like the price level and real vari-
ables such as aggregate output and employment over business cycles? This question
about the monetary transmission mechanism is one of our focuses in this section. Spe-
cific channels of monetary propagation including interest rates, exchange rates, equity
and real estate prices, bank lending, and firm balance sheets have been identified in
traditional monetary business cycle models. As we will see, the search theory of money
provides us a new way with microfoundations to construct general equilibrium models
in order to analyze how monetary shocks affect output, prices, and interest rates. On
the normative side, we will review papers concerning optimal monetary policy and the
welfare costs of inflation.
1.7.1 Monetary Transmission Mechanism
The search theory of money has been used to examine the relationship between inflation
and output. Rocheteau et al. (2007) adopt the LW framework with nonseparable pref-
erences and indivisible labour (i.e., h,H ∈ {0, 1}) to derive the inflation-unemployment
trade-off, without positing any permanent nominal rigidities, any departure from ra-
tional expectations or any form of money illusion. The implied Phillips curve can be
upward or downward sloping, depending on cross-derivatives of the utility function.
Intuitively, since inflation is a tax on economic activity in the DM, inflation reduces
unemployment when either CM goods are substitutes for DM goods or leisure is com-
plementary with DM activity, and vice versa. In addition, the optimal policy is the
Friedman rule, even though the Phillips curve provides a long-run, stable, trade-off
for monetary policy. We want to mention that agents act as if they have quasi-linear
utility, due to the assumption of indivisible labour. Dong (2011a) uses competitive
search in place of Nash bargaining, and incorporates free entry decisions by sellers into
Rocheteau et al. (2007) model. However, the results are similar.
In contrast, Berentsen et al. (2011) integrate the Mortensen-Pissarides (MP) model
of unemployment rather than the indivisible labour model into the LW model with
separable and quasi-linear utility, and obtain an unambiguous upward-sloping long-run
Phillips curve. In their model, each period is divided into three sub-periods, during
which a MP labour market, the DM and the CM operate sequentially. A [0, 1] con-
tinuum of households, indexed by h, and a arbitrarily large number of firms, indexed
by f , interact in these three markets, where the former work, consume and the latter
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maximize profits and pay dividends. Let e represents employment status, with e = 1
if h and f is matched, and e = 0 otherwise. U je (z), V je (z) and W je (z) denote the value
function for the MP, DM and CM markets, where j ∈ {h, f}, e ∈ {0, 1} and z ∈ [0,∞)
are real balances. A household h entering the CM with m dollars solves
W he (z) = max
X,zˆ
{X + (1− e)L+ βUhe (zˆ)}
subject to
X = ew + (1− e)b+ ∆− T + z − zˆ,
where X is consumption of a general good, L is the utility of leisure, w the wage, b
unemployment insurance benefits, ∆ dividend income, T a lump-sum tax. z = m/p,
zˆ = mˆ/p, where p is the current price level, and mˆ is the money taken out of the CM
and into the next period. Note that the utility in CM is linear, and that w is received
in AD, even though matching occurs in MP. As in LW, W he (z) is linear in z, and zˆ
is independent of z. In the DM, households buy search goods q from firms, yielding
utility v(q) with v(0) = 0, v′ > 0, and v′′ < 0, and the value function
V he (z) = αhv(q) + αhW
h
e [ρ(z − d)] + (1− αh)W he (ρz),
where is αh the probability of trade, (q, d) the terms of trade, ρ = pt/pt+1. αh is
endogenously determined by constant-return-to-scale matching functionM(B, S), that
is, αh = M(B, S)/B = M(Q, 1)/Q, where Q = B/S, B and S are the measures of
buyers and sellers in the DM, respectively. Standardly, M(Q, 1) is strictly increasing
in Q, withM(0, 1) = 0 andM(∞, 1) = 1, andM(Q, 1)/Q is strictly decreasing with
M(0, 1)/0 = 1 and M(0, 1)/∞ = 0. Note that B = 1 in equilibrium, since every h
participates in the DM. In contrast, only matched firms can participate in the DM,
since unmatched firm has nothing to sell, given inventories are liquidated in the CM.
Let u denote unemployment entering the DM, then αh =M(1, 1− u). For households
in the MP market,
Uh1 (z) = V
h
1 (z) + pi[V
h
0 (z)− V h1 (z)]
Uh0 (z) = V
h
0 (z) + λh[V
h
1 (z)− V h0 (z)],
where pi is the job destruction rate and λh the job creation rate. Job destruction is
exogenous, but job creation is given by a matching function N (u, ν), that is, λh =
N (u, ν)/u = N (1, ξ), where ξ = ν/u is labour market tightness, u unemployment and
ν vacancies. N has similar properties to those ofM. Firms, like sellers in LW, do not
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carry money out of the CM. In the MP market, we have
U f1 = piV
f
0 + (1− pi)V f1
U f0 = λfV
f
1 + (1− λf )V f0 ,
where λf = N (u, ν)/ν = N (1, ξ)/ξ. Let y denote output in a match and be measured
in units of the CM good. Firms takes it to the DM and search trading opportunity with
households. q units traded incur a transformation cost c(q), with c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0.
Hence, y − c(q) is left over to bring to the CM. In the DM, the value function is
V f1 = αfW
f
1 (y − c(q), ρd) + (1− αf )W f1 (y, 0),
where αf =M(B, S)/S. In the CM,
W f1 (x, z) = x+ z − w + βU f1 ,
where x is inventory, z real balances, and w wage commitment. As is standard, un-
matched firms can pay χ in units of the general good in the CM to enter the next MP
market with a vacancy. Hence, the value function for free entry is
W f0 = max{0,−χ+ βλfV f1 + β(1− λf )V f0 },
with V f0 = W
f
0 = 0. To close the model, the government faces the budget constraint
G+bu = T+τM/p, whereG is government consumption, b the unemployment insurance
benefit, T the lump-sum tax, and τ money growth rate. As in LW, agents take the
price as given in the CM, and bargain over the terms of trade in MP and the DM. For
completeness, We list the key conditions for steady state equilibrium below, but skip
all the technical details. The equilibrium in the DM is characterized by
i
M(1, 1− u) =
v′(q)
g′(q, θ)
− 1, (1.30)
where i = (1 + τ)/β − 1 is nominal interest rate, g(q, θ) equal to z(q, θ) in (1.8) with u
and u′ replaced by v and v′, respectively. The (u, q) relationship in (1.30) is called the
LW curve by the authors. The labour market equilibrium is given by
χ =
ηN (u,ν(u))
ν(u)
{y − b− L+ M(1,1−u)
1−u [g(q, θ)− c(q)]}
r + pi + (1− η)N (u,ν(u))
u
, (1.31)
where η is the bargaining power of firms, r real interest rate, and ν(u) implicitly
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determined by steady-state condition (1 − u)pi = N (u, ν). The (u, q) relationship in
(1.31) is termed the MP curve in the paper. The intersection of the LW curve and
the MP curve delivers a general equilibrium. It can be shown that ∂u/∂i > 0, that is,
there is an upward-sloping long-run Phillips curve. Intuitively, a higher i increases the
opportunity cost of holding money, leading households to economize on real balances,
which worsens firms’ profitability, and ultimately reduces employment.
However, in a similar environment, Liu (2009) shows that the long-run Phillips curve
relationship can be either positive or negative, if the observation that inflation affects
unemployed agents more heavily than employed ones is considered. The basic logic is
like this. On the one hand, increasing inflation reduces the value of outside options
for the employed, which lowers the reservation wage, thereby holding back unemploy-
ment. On the other hand, inflation as a tax on the cash-intensive activities, reduces
firms’ return to job creation and hence raises unemployment. The equilibrium inflation-
unemployment relationship can be either positive or negative, depending the relative
strength of these two opposing effects. About the short-run relationship between unan-
ticipated inflation and output, Huangfu (2009) considers the effect of asymmetric infor-
mation over monetary shocks in a competitive search environment based on Rocheteau
and Wright (2005). She finds that uninformed sellers have to produce more in order
to extract information from buyers when positive monetary shocks hit the economy.
Taking stock, the nature of Phillips curve, particularly in the long-run, is a debatable
issue once again. A potentially productive direction for further research is to combine
features of monetary search theory with reasonable elements of the mainstream New
Keynesian macroeconomics. In this spirit, Aruoba and Schorfheide (2011) provides an
illuminating example. They introduce price rigidities into the centralized market and
construct an estimable search-based DSGE model for business cycle analysis.
There are other researches using search-theoretic models in order to shed new light
on other issues about monetary transmission mechanism. Guerrieri and Lorenzoni
(2009) employ a three-sub-period version of the LW model to examine how liquidity
constraints resulting from limited credit access and a low value of real money balances
affects the response of an economy to aggregate shocks. More specifically, the economy
is populated by a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely lived households composed of a con-
sumer and a producer. In the first two sub-periods, consumers and producers travel
to spatially separated markets, or islands, where competitive goods markets exist. In
addition, the consumer and the producer from the same household do not communi-
cate or share resources while travelling during these two sub-periods, but convene at
the end of each sub-period. In the last sub-period, all consumers and producers trade
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in a single centralized market. In this way, they find a coordination motive29 which
can amplify the effect of aggregate shocks on output and induce greater comovement
across different sectors of the economy. Focusing on the quantitative implications of a
precautionary demand for money in explaining the business cycle behaviour of nomi-
nal aggregates including velocity, Telyukova and Visschers (2013) develop a combined
model with the features of the Lucas and Stokey (1987) cash-credit good models and the
Lagos and Wright (2005) model. In standard New Keynesian models, price stickiness
plays a prominent role in analyzing the transmission of nominal and real shocks. Head
et al. (2012) embed the Burdett and Judd (1983) pricing mechanism into a version of
the LW model, where sticky prices are an endogenous outcome and can be viewed as a
simple corollary of price dispersion. In particular, they find money is neutral, though
not superneutral in the model. Hence, the logical basis that nominal rigidities imply
nonneutrality is called into question. Aruoba et al. (2014) examine whether household
production is a potentially important channel of monetary transmission in an extended
Aruoba et al. (2011) model, which is also based on the LW framework. They find
inflation unambiguously reduces market consumption and employment.
1.7.2 Optimal Monetary Policy
Several models with microfoundation show that the zero nominal interest rate policy
is optimal. Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) find that under the benchmark LW model
with bargaining, the Friedman rule is always optimal but in general inefficient, while
efficiency is restored with competitive search, by which they also formalize the idea that
agents try to avoid the inflation tax through socially wasteful efforts. That is, they
endogenize the search intensity of buyers. Dutu et al. (2009) embed the competing
auctions framework a la Peters and Severinov (1997) into the LW model with directed
search, and they discover that the Friedman rule is optimal, whether buyers bid prices
or quantities. Using a mechanism design approach in a version of the LW model,
Andolfatto (2013) shows that the Friedman rule, implementable via extracting money
from agents with positive balances in the day market, is desirable but not incentive-
feasible, when agents are sufficiently impatient. More specifically, all agents in the day
can consume or produce, but at night an agent is hit by a private idiosyncratic shock,
which determines whether he has an opportunity to produce or a desire to consume
with equal probability. If agents are sufficiently impatient, then ex-consumers in the
day submarket will find it undesirable to consume less to hold money. In this case,
the monetary authority has to slow down the speed of money withdrawal, since in this
way agents are induced to accumulate money in order to insure themselves against
29That is, agents are less willing to trade (buy and sell) when they expect others to trade less.
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future desire to consume. In the quest for a class of monetary policies that make the
Friedman Rule optimal and robust, Lagos (2010b) augments the LW model to allow
for both risky equity shares on Lucas trees and money as means of payment, just as
in Lagos (2011). In this way, aggregate liquidity shocks are introduced, and he shows
that this kind of monetary policies have two defining characteristics about the level
and the growth rate of money supply. That is, the money supply must be arbitrarily
close to zero for an infinite number of dates, and asymptotically, the averaging growth
rate of the money supply over the dates when money being essential, must be no less
than the rate of time preference. Masters (2013) adds additional realism to study the
welfare effects of inflation in retail markets. Specifically, he develops a model with prior
production and imperfectly directed search30, based on Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
Given free-entry of sellers, the Friedman rule is optimal.
On the other hand, there are models where the Friedman rule is suboptimal. Bhat-
tacharya et al. (2005) provide examples including the LW model with heterogeneous
preferences, a turnpike model of Townsend (1980), and an OLG model with stochastic
relocation in tradition of Schreft and Smith (1997), where the Friedman rule is not the
ex post welfare maximizing monetary policy. They show that a necessary condition
for the Friedman rule to be suboptimal is that changes in the rate of growth of the
money supply have redistributive effects. A type-specific lump-sum transfer is then
required to restore the optimality. Craig and Rocheteau (2008b) introduce menu costs
into a continuous-time version of the LW model. Provided menu costs are small, they
show that the optimal monetary policy requires a deflation, which does not necessar-
ily correspond to the the Friedman rule. Hoerova et al. (2012) argue that deviation
from the zero nominal interest rate policy is a credible way for central banks to trans-
mit their information to private investors in a model based on Berentsen and Monnet
(2008)31.Under the restriction that all trade is voluntary in the sense that the gov-
ernment cannot use coercive lump-sum taxation as a policy instrument, Andolfatto
(2010) demonstrates that the Friedman rule is not incentive-feasible in a variant of the
LW model with two centralized markets. In particular, he shows that a non-negative
inflation rate and a strictly positive nominal interest rate are equilibrium properties of
an array of welfare-improving incentive-feasible policies. However, a nonlinear mone-
30Imperfectly directed search here means that buyers may not know everything about a good
before they go purchasing it. In contrast, the notion of partially directed search refers to the case that
sellers cannot commit to their posted prices but use them to signal the quality of their goods. Due
to imperfect knowledge of goods, buyers’ instantaneous utility of consuming the DM goods is u(q),
where  is a random variable and represents match-specific shocks.
31The model is a variant of the LW model with three perfectly competitive markets. The authors
aim to study the three stylized facts of channel systems, also see Berentsen et al. (2014b) on the
implementation of monetary policy via a channel system or a floor system. In an extension of this
paper, Kahn (2013) examine competition between private and public payment systems.
41
Monetary Propagation and Business Cycles
tary mechanism involving the payment of interest on money holdings can implement
the unconstrained efficient allocation in a pure monetary economy even if lump-sum
taxes cannot be used as an instrument. Gomis-Porqueras and Sanches (2013) impose
an additional restriction that interest payments can be made only to agents whose
trade histories are registered to further examine the same monetary mechanism in an
extended LW model with private credit and fiat money. A positive inflation rate is
necessary to make credit arrangement incentive-feasible.
Another two related papers study optimal monetary policy in models with fiat
money and inside money. Berentsen and Waller (2011b) adopt an extension of the LW
environment in which anonymous agents have access to a credit market.32 Monetary
policy consists of a short-run and a long-run component, the former focused on stabi-
lizing real activity in the presence of short-run shocks and the latter on the long-run
inflation trend. They show that stabilization policy is useful in controlling inflation
expectations under price-level targeting, and the optimal policy involves smoothing
nominal interest rates. Head and Qiu (2011) extend the analysis in Berentsen and
Waller (2011b) by replacing the credit market with a large number of identical private
banks. In their model, aggregate shocks affect households asymmetrically due to ex-
ogenous bank credit constraints. They demonstrate that positive short-term nominal
interest rates are desirable in some aggregate states, since this interest rate policy can
affect inside money creation and the distribution of wealth.
Furthermore, interactions between fiscal and monetary policies have been studied
in models with micro-foundations for money. Aruoba and Chugh (2010) study the
properties of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in business cycles by reframing the
dynamic Ramsey problem(with commitment) in the LW framework with government
bonds and capital assets. Fiscal and monetary instruments are restricted to production
and capital taxes in the centralized market, and to open market operations. Equilib-
rium in their model is not efficient, and the Friedman rule is generically not optimal. In
addition, a subsidy on capital income is desirable to offset capital underaccumulation
due to the holdup problem associated with capital investment and non-optimality of
the Friedman rule. Hagedorn (2010) discusses tax cycles or tax smoothing in Ramsey
taxation problems in several frictional economies. In the Lagos and Wright (2005)
monetary economy, he finds that tax smoothing is not always the optimal policy even
if nondistortionary taxes are infeasible. Without considering government debt, Gomis-
Porqueras and Peralta-Alva (2010) consider the role of optimal monetary and fiscal
policies in restoring efficiency of monetary equilibria in the LW model with general-
32Berentsen and Waller (2015) introduce congestion externality associated with buyers’ entry deci-
sion into Berentsen and Waller (2011b), and show that the optimal policy deviates from the Friedman
rule and optimal stabilization policy is nontrivial.
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ized Nash bargaining. The Friedman rule is always an optimal policy regardless of
the bargaining power of the buyer, while a monetary production subsidy can be used
to increases the return of holding money and hence increase output in the decentral-
ized market. In contrast, when costless coercive lump-sum monetary transfers are not
available, introducing sales taxes into the decentralized market is welfare-improving,
and the optimality of the Friedman rule depends largely on the bargaining power of the
buyer. Similarly, Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2013a) examine the same question in a model
with search frictions in both labour and goods markets as in Berentsen et al. (2011).
Given governments’ limited ability to make intertemporal commitment, Martin (2011)
studies the joint determination of fiscal and monetary policies in a variant of the LW
model with a benevolent government. When net nominal government liabilities are
positive, the tradeoff between the objective of smoothing distortions intertemporally
and the time-consistency problem created by the interaction between debt and mon-
etary policy determines a unique equilibrium with positive taxes and inflation above
the Friedman rule. As an extension, Martin (2013a) introduces aggregate uncertainty
and limited commitment into the model in Martin (2011) and then studies optimal
time-consistent policy in three variants of the underlying monetary economy featuring
different environmental frictions. The long-run response of policy variables to perma-
nent changes in fundamentals is quantitatively different across environments, mainly
due to the idiosyncratic behaviour of the money demand.
The distributional effects of monetary policy cannot be discussed in Lagos and
Wright (2005), due to the degenerate distribution of money holdings in equilibrium.
In fact, random monetary injections in the LW model are neutral regardless of when
they occur. Berentsen et al. (2005) develop a three-Walrasian-market version of the
LW model to study the effects of random money injections by the central bank that
occur in periods when the distribution of money is nondegenerate.33 More specifi-
cally, agents need to trade in two competitive markets (i.e., the price taking case in
Rocheteau and Wright (2005).) before they can readjust their money holdings in the
centralized market. They show that in all equilibria monetary shocks have temporarily
nonneutral effects, which are direct consequences of the nondegenerate distribution of
money holdings. The monetary shocks are introduced through unexpected changes in
the money supply, that is, Mt+1 = γtMt, where γt is a random variable with
γt =
γH = µ(1 + H) with probability P ,γL = µ(1− L) with probability 1− P ,
33See Jiang and Shao (2014) for a similar setup, but with different focus. They study how credit
expansion affects cash velocity, allocation and money demand.
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and µ, L, H > 0, and P = L/(L + H) such that E(γt) = µ. Williamson (2006) stud-
ies the role of limited participation in financial markets in generating distributional
effect of monetary injections or withdrawals. He adapts the LW framework by letting
centralized and decentralized markets open concurrently. Changes in the money supply
have persistent real effects regardless of the shocks being anticipated or unanticipated.
As expected, the Friedman rule is not optimal since redistribution is desirable. In
the presence of private information over productivity, Galenianos and Kircher (2008)
examine the distributional effects of inflation among heterogeneous agents in a multi-
lateral matching version of the LW model with divisible money and indivisible goods.
In particular, a second-price auction is used to determine the terms of trade. The
Friedman rule is desirable since inflation acts as a regressive tax in their model. Xiang
(2013) investigates the trade-off between distribution and production effects of infla-
tion using a model similar to the one in Andolfatto (2011). The Friedman rule is likely
to be suboptimal when both distribution and production efficiencies matter. Sanches
and Williamson (2011) develop a variant of the LW model with segmented centralized
markets and asymmetrically informed agents. Price dispersion exists in equilibrium,
and this nondegeneracy lead to private-information inefficiency in decentralized trade.
The Friedman rule is welfare-improving, since it can correct both the informational
inefficiency and the intertemporal distortion. More recently, Sun (2012) investigates
the distributional effects of monetary and fiscal policies simultaneously in a modified
LW environment with competitive search and non-degenerate money distributions in
equilibrium. The model features a block recursive structure and hence tractably deliv-
ers endogenous dispersions of prices, income and wealth. When heterogeneous agents
suffer from uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, long-run inflation and income taxation have
distinct effects on real activities and welfare. However, an optimal policy mix, that
is, simultaneous determination of monetary and fiscal policies, is required to maximize
social welfare.
Besides all the papers mentioned above, the LW framework has also been used as a
basis to study other issues in monetary policy. Based on a competitive pricing version
of the LW framework with heterogeneous agents, Berentsen and Strub (2009) discuss
the determination of monetary policy under alternative institutional rules including
simple-majority voting, super-majority voting, and bargaining in the central bank’s
decision-making. The efficiency of equilibrium and optimality of the Friedman rule
depend on specific institutional arrangements. Jacquet and Tan (2011) investigate the
closely-related dual role of money, that is, as self-insurance device (store of value) and
means of payment, in an overlapping-generations version of the LW model. They find
atypical results about the effects of inflation when agents face a risk in the centralized
market. More specifically, if idiosyncratic shocks are correlated across agents, that
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is, when there are aggregate shocks, a state-contingent inflation rate(featuring a pro-
cyclical monetary policy) is desirable for agents to better insure themselves against the
shocks. Another very interesting paper is Burdett et al. (2015). They view search and
bargaining frictions, taxation and inflation as transactions costs, and study household
formation by analogy with the Coasian theory of firm formation. A quite straight-
forward result is that inflation stimulates household production and hence household
formation, since inflation is a tax on market activity, which is assumed to be relatively
cash-intensive for single agents. Lastly, Waknis (2014) reformulates the LW economy
into an infinitely repeated game between a utility maximizing central bank and agents.
In this way, the money supply is endogenous and the optimal inflation rate is positive.
So far, we have surveyed the papers which study optimal monetary policy basically
in an analytical and qualitative manner. Logically, quantitative analysis about the
welfare cost of inflation will be discussed in the following subsection.
1.7.3 Welfare Costs of Inflation
Lagos and Wright (2005) quantify the welfare cost of expected inflation under Nash-
ing bargaining using annual U.S. data. They find that the welfare cost of 10 percent
inflation is worth 3%-5% of total consumption in both the centralized and decentral-
ized markets. Subsequent researches extend this benchmark numerical analysis along
various lines. Craig and Rocheteau (2008a) generalize the LW framework by consider-
ing alternative pricing mechanisms, participation decisions, and capital accumulation
decisions to estimate and compare the welfare cost of inflation. Overall, the choice
of pricing mechanisms matters for the estimated results, holdup problems on capital
investment tend to exacerbate the inefficiency of inflation, and endogenous participa-
tion choices and search externalities possibly render the Friedman rule suboptimal.
Instructively, the authors provide a search-based microfoundation for the Bailey-Lucas
“welfare triangle” methodology. Small menu costs in Craig and Rocheteau (2008b)
reduce the welfare cost of inflation, since in this case inflation erodes sellers’ market
power and hence induces them to internalize the congestion externality (too many
sellers). In addition, buyers are more willing to raise real balances, given favourable
bargaining power. Earlier, Reed and Waller (2006) focused on money as a device to
share consumption risk when credit arrangements are not feasible. In this context,
they find that the welfare cost of inefficient risk sharing associated with 10% inflation
is approximately 1%-1.5% of steady-state consumption. Faig and Jerez (2006) estimate
the welfare implications of buyers’ private information over preferences in a competitive
search version of the LW model. Based on historical US data on velocity and interest
rates, their estimation of the welfare cost of inflation is about 0.5% of GDP, which
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matches the area below the predicted money demand curve. More recently, Faig and
Li (2009) simultaneously calculate the welfare loss of expected and unexpected infla-
tion in the LW model with imperfect information about monetary shocks. They find
that the former (around 0.25% of GDP) is far greater than the latter (below 0.0003%
of GDP) for U.S. postwar data. The main reason is that monetary shocks during
1947 − 2007 have been small. It is worth pointing out that monetary shocks may be
welfare enhancing, since they increase price dispersion. Consequently, buyers tend to
hold more precautionary balances and, in doing so, partly offset the inefficiently low
money demand due to the inflation tax. Dong (2010) endogenizes product variety in
the LW framework with Nash bargaining and competitive search as alternative trading
protocols. The total welfare cost of 10% inflation ranges from 4.77% to 8.4% under
bargaining and is 1.52% under competitive search. In particular, the novel welfare cost
of inflation associated with product variety can be substantial (more than half of the
total estimation) in a bargaining equilibrium, while it is very small in price posting
equilibrium. Rojas Breu (2013) finds that broadening credit access is likely to reduce
the costs of inflation. Similarly, Chiu and Meh (2011) consider the impact of banking
on the welfare loss of inflation. Inflation tends to be less damaging when banking is
introduced to facilitate decentralized trading of production projects in an LW economy.
Taking the redistributive effects of inflation into consideration, Chiu and Molico (2011)
estimate the welfare cost of inflation in the LW environment without the simplifying
quasi-linear preferences restriction. Under buyer-take-it-all bargaining, the gains of
decreasing inflation from 10% to 0% are about 0.59% of stationary consumption, sig-
nificantly lower than the Lagos and Wright estimate of 1.3%. Quite intuitively, when
the distribution of money holdings across agents is nondegenerate, relatively rich agents
(with above average money holdings) view inflation as a tax while relatively poor agents
view inflation as a subsidy. Hence, the redistributive effect of increasing inflation has
the potential to be welfare improving and offset some of the detrimental real balance
effects. Indeed, the welfare costs of inflation are 40% to 55% smaller than previous es-
timates which abstract from the redistributive effect. Closely related, Chiu and Molico
(2010) consider uninsurable idiosyncratic uncertainty about trading opportunities and
a fixed cost of entering the centralized liquidity market. This combination generates
a liquidity management problem and in equilibrium a non-degenerate distribution of
money across agents. They find that the distributional effects of inflation lower welfare
costs of inflation substantially. In contrast, Berentsen et al. (2015) assume limited par-
ticipation in a version of Berentsen et al. (2007), calibrate the model to U.S. economy
and show that improved access to money markets makes the allocation of liquidity
more efficient, which decreases the welfare cost of inflation considerably.
Moreover, there are several related papers which focus on the “hot potato” effect
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of inflation. Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) are able to generate the “hot potato” effect,
but this result is not robust, since it depends critically on how prices are determined
in decentralized trade. Hence, Ennis (2009) modifies the LW model by asymmetrically
restricting buyers and sellers’ access to the centralized market in order to rationalize
the classic idea that agents tend to spend their money holdings speedily in response
to inflation. Liu et al. (2011) offer another approach to formalize the “hot potato”
effect of Inflation. More specifically, they highlight the extensive margin rather than
the intensive margin by endogenizing the participation decisions of buyers based on
Rocheteau and Wright (2005). Notably, the model can unambiguously and robustly
predict that a rise in inflation leads to an increase in the speed with which agents spend
their money. Nosal (2011) also builds on Lagos and Rocheteau (2005), and Rocheteau
and Wright (2005), but features a reservation strategy, that is, there is an opportunity
cost associated with the buyer accepting a trade. When inflation rises, the reservation
value falls, and hence the buyer increases the speed at which he trade. Similarly, the
model presented in Dong and Jiang (2014), which is based on Rocheteau and Wright
(2005) with private information, is able to capture the “hot potato” effect of inflation
along both the intensive margin and the extensive margin. Unfortunately, none of the
mentioned studies provide a systematically numerical analysis. In general, however,
positive inflation can be desirable and hence qualitatively the welfare cost of inflation
is possibly smaller when the the “hot potato” effect is considered.
Lastly, several papers deal with the welfare implication of price dispersion. Dutu
et al. (2012) extend the LW model with competitive search and free entry by buyers
to isolate the welfare effect of price dispersion through comparing one economy with
price dispersion and the other without at the same inflation rate. They find a nonlinear
welfare impact of price dispersion. That is, price dispersion improves welfare at low
inflation, while decreases welfare for high inflation. The Friedman rule is efficient.
See also Dutu (2013). In contrast, Wang (2014) integrates Burdett and Judd (1983)
pricing into the LW framework. In this way, price dispersion is endogenous, which then
amplifies the negative real balance effect of inflation.34
1.7.4 Discussion
About business cycle analysis, an integration between micro-founded models of money
and estimatable DSGE models is an emerging direction for future research. Aruoba and
Schorfheide (2011) show us a nice example. In terms of optimal monetary policy, more
studies are needed to clarify the interactions between monetary policy and fiscal policy
34See Liu et al. (2014) for another example.
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when nondistortionary policy is unavailable. Besides Ramsey policy, it is also inter-
esting to study optimal time-consistent monetary policy (Markov-perfect equilibrium),
as demonstrated in Martin (2013b) and Martin (2012). In addition, the limited com-
mitment associated with government’s intertemporal decisions, heterogeneous agents,
asymmetric information and other frictions are being examined intensively. Lastly,
mechanism design, as suggested by Wallace (2001) and Wallace (2010), is a promising
approach to advance monetary theory. For instance, Rocheteau (2012) applies mech-
anism design in the LW environment to quantify the welfare cost of inflation. Using
the annual data for the US over 1900-2006, the estimated welfare cost of 10 percent
inflation is 0. The reason for this “surprising” result is that the trading mechanism in
the decentralized market is constructed to be optimal so that the only frictions in the
environment are the ones that make money essential. Hence, the larger welfare costs
of inflation in previous monetary search models are probably due to the adoption of
inefficient trading mechanisms like the Nash bargaining solution.35
1.8 Money in Economic Growth Models
Compared with monetary policy analysis, integrating monetary search with neoclassical
or endogenous growth models is still largely undone, though a few papers have moved
forward in this potentially fruitful direction. Aruoba and Wright (2003) introduce a
labour market, capital accumulation, and a neoclassical production function into the
centralized market in the LW model. However, the undesirable dichotomy indicates
that this initiation is not very successful. Basically, the limitation is due to the model
structure that money is essential in the decentralized sector but inessential in the
centralized market, and capital is essential in the centralized market for production but
plays no role in the decentralized sector. In order to remedy this problem, Aruoba et al.
(2011) extend Aruoba and Wright (2003) by allowing the sellers in the decentralized
market to have access to capital for production purposes. In this way, monetary policy
affects centralized market investment, because inflation is a tax on decentralized trade.
They show that monetary frictions matter quantitatively for the long-run effects of
anticipated inflation on capital formation.
In order to get a flavour of this line of work, we outline the model below. As in
the LW, the DM and CM markets open sequentially in each period. The general good
in the CM is storable and produced by a [0, 1] continuum of firms with technology
35For more examples, see Araujo and Hu (2014) on unconventional monetary policy, Chiu and Wong
(2014) on payment systems, Gu et al. (2013) on credit cycles, Gu et al. (2014) on the essentiality of
money and credit, and Hu and Rocheteau (2015) on the effects of monetary policy on asset prices.
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F (K,H), where H is labour hired and K capital rented from agents. In the DM, these
neoclassical firms stop operating, while a seller36 can use his effort e and capital k with
technology g(k, e) to produce the non-storable specialized goods. With probability
1 − $, a bilateral meeting is monitored, and hence the buyer can trade with credit
due in the next CM, whereas a meeting is anonymous with probability $. The utility
function is u(x)− e+U(X)−AH with typical monotonicity and curvature properties.
The government controls the money supply so that Mt+1 = (1 + τ)Mt, consumes G,
collects a lump-sum tax T , imposes labour income tax th, capital income tax tk, and
sales tax tx in the CM. Let κ denote the depreciation rate of capital, which is routinely
tax deductible, and p = 1/φ the price level in the CM. Then, the government budget
constraint is G = T + thwH + (ν − κ)tkK + txX + τM/p, where w = FH(K,H) is the
wage rate and ν = FK(K,H) the rental rate of capital. Let W (mt, kt, l) be the value
function for an agent entering the CM with m dollars and k units of capital and owing
l from the previous DM in period t. Similarly, V (mt, kt) is the value function for an
agent entering the DM in period t. In the CM, an agent solves
W (mt, kt, l) = max
X,H,mt+1,kt+1
{U(X)− AH + βV (mt+1, kt+1)} (1.32)
subject to
(1 + tx)X = w(1− th)H + [1 + (ν − κ)(1− tk)]kt − kt+1 − T + mt −mt+1 − l
p
.
Again, as in the baseline model, W (mt, kt, l) is linear in m,k and l, and agents exiting
the CM will choose the same (mt+1, kt+1). The neoclassical firms use the constant-
returns-to-scale technology F (K,H) to produce the general good, yielding w = FH(K,H)
and ν = FK(K,H). In the DM, we have
V (mt, kt) = σV
b(mt, kt) + σV
s(mt, kt)− (1− 2σ)W (mt, kt, 0), (1.33)
where we assume α = 1, δ=0, while V b(mt, kt) and V s(mt, kt), respectively, denote the
value function for a buyer and a seller, with
V b(mt, kt) = $[u(q
b) +W (mt − db, kt, 0)] + (1−$)[u(qˆb) +W (mt, kt, lb)],
V s(mt, kt) = $[−c(qs, kt) +W (mt + ds, kt, 0)] + (1−$)[u(qˆs) +W (mt, kt,−ls)].
In the above expressions, qb and db(qs and ds) represent the quantity of specialized
36To preclude capital used as medium of exchange, the capital of all agents is importable during
the DM and hence buyers have to visit sellers’ locations for trading. In addition, the claims against
capital are counterfeitable. Therefore, money is necessary in the DM.
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goods and money exchanged for being a buyer(a seller), while qˆb and lb(qˆs and −ls)
denote the quantity of DM goods traded and the value of a loan for the buyer(seller) in
a monitored meeting. In addition, c(q, k) ≡ e = g−1(q, k) with q = g(k, e). The terms
of trade(q, d) and (qˆ, l) can be determined by Nash bargaining like Lagos and Wright
(2005) or price taking like Rocheteau and Wright (2005). This completes the sketch
of the model without replicating the details from Aruoba et al. (2011). Recently,
Aruoba (2011) studies the business cycle properties of the model in Aruoba et al.
(2011) and brings it to US data. The calibrated results demonstrate that search-
theoretic models are able to make better predictions about nominal variables than
RBC models with flexible prices. Waller (2011) introduces exogenous labour-enhancing
technological change into Aruoba et al. (2011), that is, F (Kt, ZtHt) = ZtF (Kt/Zt, Ht)
and g(kt, Ztet) = Ztg(kt/Zt, et) with Zt+1 = (1 + ρ)Zt, and then characterizes steady-
states and transitional dynamics under proportional bargaining and competitive price
taking respectively. Inflation lowers the capital intensity along the balanced growth
path for both bargaining and price taking.
The modelling choice of exogenous or endogenous growth models can have distinct
implications. Chu et al. (2014) develop a monetary growth model based on Aruoba
et al. (2011) to analyze the effects of inflation on economic growth and social welfare.
They find that inflation affects the welfare effect nonlinearly in the endogenous growth
model whereas linearly in the exogenous counterpart. Quantitatively, the welfare cost of
inflation under the former is up to four times as large as the welfare cost of inflation un-
der the latter. In addition, the channel through which inflation affects economic growth
in the search-based model is different from the traditional cash-in-advance model.
In comparison, two illuminating papers are worthy of close examination, though
they are not directly based on the LW framework. Berentsen et al. (2012) integrate the
monetary model in Shi (1997) into an endogenous growth model in order to study the
effects of inflation and financial development on economic growth. Money is essential
for the decentralized innovation goods market, and hence financial intermediaries arise
endogenously to provide liquid funds to the innovation sector. They find that inflation
and the efficiency of financial sector matter qualitatively and quantitatively for welfare
and growth. Similarly, Chiu et al. (2013) develop a endogenous growth model with
a market for ideas (see Silveira and Wright (2010)) to examine the roles of liquidity
and financial institutions in overcoming trading and financial frictions in the knowledge
market. Both papers provide a good starting point for further studies along this line.
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1.8.1 Discussion
One interesting research direction is to study the role of monetary expansion in the
development process, as depicted in Gurley and Shaw (1960) and McKinnon (1973).
Is the increasing trend of long-run M2-to-GDP ratio (or the decreasing trend of long-
run velocity) an essential aspect of the growth process, given similar situations across
countries and over time? If so, how can we rationalize it in a monetary growth model?
In particular, can we get a U-shaped income velocity in this model? Intuitively, at
first, increasing monetization causes velocity to fall, while recently increasing financial
sophistication and the growth of money substitutes cause velocity to rise. This is a
pervasive pattern across countries (see Bordo and Jonung (1987)). The search-based
monetary growth model could shed some new lights on these old questions.
1.9 Concluding Remarks
Lagos and Wright (2005) offer a flexible and productive framework to understand the
process of exchange in the presence of various frictions, and how this process might be
facilitated by institutions, including money, but also various forms of credit, financial
intermediation, and the use of different assets as payment instruments or as collateral.
The number of papers we have surveyed forcefully supports this claim. The topics
identified in each section are being actively researched. It is increasingly clear that
micro-founded models of money are more than elaborated money-in-utility or cash-in-
advance monetary models.37 As we have seen, monetary search models based on the
LW framework improve our understanding in questions about the usefulness of money,
the relationship among money, credit and banking, the mechanisms by which policy can
affect allocations and welfare, liquidity and asset pricing, and about economic growth
in monetary economies. However, much work still needs to be done, such as the issues
discussed in previous sections.
37However, Camera and Chien (2013) argue that monetary search models are mathematically equiv-
alent to cash-in-advance models. See Lagos et al. (2014) for a counterargument.
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Appendix
1.A Shi (1997) in Detail
We will closely follow the original paper to describe the environment and characterize
the equilibrium, but with necessary modifications based on Rauch (2000), Shi (1999),
Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003) and Zhu (2008). Time is discrete and β is the rate
of time preference. The economy is populated with a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely
lived households that specialize in consumption and production. Money and goods are
perfectly divisible. Each household has a continuum of members with measure one, and
each member acts like a robot in carrying out different tasks, regarding the household’s
utility as the common objective. This simplifying specification rules out potential
incentive problems. At the beginning of each period, each household divides money
balances evenly among its money holders. Let Njt, exogenously valued at constant
N ∈ [0, 1] or endogenously chosen by household j, denotes the fraction of money holders
from household j in period t. A member without money is a producer endowed with the
capacity to produce his family-specific good, which is perishable and randomly chosen
from a continuum of different types of goods with measure one. Production takes no
time but incurs a utility cost φ(q) to produce the quantity q, with φ(0) = 0, φ′ > 0
and φ′′ > 0. Each member in one household consumes the same subset of goods with
measure z ∈ (0, 1), which is randomly assigned and does not include the good produced
by his family. Goods in the subset are equally preferred, and consuming q units of them
yields utility u(q) = aq with a > 0. After the division of money balance, each member
of a household is randomly matched to one agent from other families. The two matched
agents decide whether to trade. Two types of trade are possible: barter and monetary
trade. In monetary trade, the money holder is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint,
that is, he cannot spend more money than he is carrying. The terms of trade-the
quantities of goods in barter and the quantity of the good and the amount of money in
a monetary exchange-are determined by a Nash bargaining problem. Here it is assumed
that the buyer and seller have the same bargaining power in every match. After goods
are exchanged, members of each family bring their receipts back to the household.
Shi (1997) in Detail
Then the household allocates pooled goods evenly to its members for consumption.
After consumption, the household receives a lump-sum monetary transfer τ such that
the money stock Mt+1 = γMt with γ ≥ β. This implies that τt+1 = (γ − 1)Mt. After
the transfer, time proceeds to the next period and the sequence of events repeats.
Note that the specified large household construct smoothes the matching-specific
risks within a household and hence eliminates aggregate uncertainty for households.
This modeling device makes the distribution of money holdings across households de-
generate and allows us to focus on a representative household. In the following, we
will derive the binding symmetric monetary equilibria, which are defined by the three
conditions below:
1. Every family holds the same amount of money Mt+1 = γMt;
2. In every monetary trade, the same amount of money Lt = Mt/N is traded for
the constant quantity qm of a consumption good;
3. If Njt is endogenously determined, then Njt = N for all j and t.
During period t, in barter the efficient quantities q¯ is given by φ′(q¯) = a. In fact,
consider two producers from household i and −i in a barter match, and they bargain
over the quantities of goods to be produced, (qbit, qb−it). The utility of household i is
increased by [aqb−it − φ(qbit)], and the utility of household −i by [aqbit − φ(qb−it)]. The
terms of trade satisfies
max
(qbit,q
b
−it)
[aqb−it − φ(qbit)]
1
2 [aqbit − φ(qb−it)]
1
2 ,
which yields qbit = qb−it = q¯.
In a monetary trade between a household i money holder with Mit/Nit units of
money, and a producer from household −i, Lit units of money are traded for q−it
units of consumption goods. Let λit denote the value of a marginal relaxation of the
cash-in-advance constraint for the money holder, and ωjt(j = i,−i) the value of a
marginal unit of money for household j. By trade, the household i increase its utility
by [aq−it − ωitLit] ≥ 0, while the household j by [ω−itLit − φ(q−it)] ≥ 0. The Nash
bargaining problem is
max
(Lit,q−it)
[aq−it − ωitLit] 12 [ω−itLit − φ(q−it)] 12
subject to the cash-in-advance constraint Mit
Nit
− Lit ≥ 0. Using Lagrange multiplier
method, we can solve this problem. Denote the Lagrange multiplier by µit,−it, then the
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first order conditions are
ω−it[aq−it − ωitLit]− ωit[ω−itLit − φ(q−it)] = µit,−it,
Lit[aω−it + φ′(q−it)ωit] = a[φ(q−it) + q−itφ′(q−it)].
In symmetric equilibrium, ωit = ω−it = ωt, Lit = Lt, qit = qm, and µit,−it = µt, then we
have
Ltωt =
aqm + φ− µt/ωt
2
,
Ltωt =
a(φ+ qmφ′)
a+ φ′
.
Therefore, qm = q¯ if the cash-in-advance constraint is not binding(µ = 0), and qm < q¯
if it is binding. In a binding monetary equilibrium, Lt = Mt/N,Mt+1 = γMt, N and
M are constant, hence
Mtωt =
Na(φ+ qmφ′)
a+ φ′
,
ωt =
1
γ
ωt−1.
Now we consider the decision of a household j with initial money holding Mj0.
Taking other households’ N,Mt as given, household j chooses Njt to maximize its
utility from consuming Cjt(Njt, N) net of production φjt(Njt, N) and holding money
Mjt. The optimization problem is
max
Njt
∞∑
t=0
βt(aCjt − φjt)
subject to
Cjt(Njt, N) = z
2(1−N)(1−Njt)q¯ + z(1−N)Njtq−jt,
φjt(Njt, N) = z
2(1−N)(1−Njt)φ(q¯) + z(1−Njt)Nφ(qjt),
Mjt+1 −Mjt = τt+1 + z(1−Njt)NL−jt − z(1−N)NjtLjt,
Ljt ≤ Mjt
Njt
,
Mj0 is given.
Technical details and more discussions can be found in Rauch (2000). We skip this
and make some remarks below. Faig (2004, 2008) argue that the LW model and the
large household model in Shi (1997) can be encompassed in a more general setup, while
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Berentsen and Rocheteau (2003) and Ritter (2010) point out the subtle differences in
the implications of formulating bargaining solution between the two alternative frame-
works. See Liu and Shi (2010) on inflation coordination, Head et al. (2010) on price
adjustment and Shi (2015) on financial frictions in business cycles for examples using
the Shi model.
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2 | A Spatial Search Model with Money and Credit
This chapter incorporates credit into a monetary search model with explicit
consideration of spatial frictions. When agents face a liquidity shortage
problem, credit supported by a communal responsibility system supple-
ments fiat money as a medium of exchange at a distance-dependent cost.
In addition, the Friedman rule can be sub-optimal. Money and credit are
essential in the sense of improving welfare. Finally, numerical analysis of
a calibrated example supports these main findings, and also provides some
comparative statics results.
2.1 Introduction
One of the main results from New Monetarist Economics (Williamson and Wright,
2010a,b) is that money or other forms of media of exchange are essential to realize
gains from decentralized trade or centralized trade when agents cannot commit. In
this chapter, we develop a New Monetarist search model with money and costly credit
in order to study the role of these two alternative means of payment, their interactions
and the effect of inflation on social welfare. The model features spatial frictions and
endogenous market entry decision. The motivation comes from Greif (2006a,b) and
Boerner and Ritschl (2011).
Greif (2006a,b) describes an interesting medieval institution, the community re-
sponsibility system, by which credit is supported in long-distance trade. Specifically,
a local, community court held all members of a different commune legally liable for
default by any one involved in contracts with a member of the local community. If the
defaulter’s communal court refused to compensate the injured party, the local court
confiscated the property of any member of the defaulter’s commune present in its ju-
risdiction as compensation. This institutional innovation is a credible commitment
technology, if trade links between two communes is very strong. A commune could
avoid compensating for the default of one of its members only by ceasing to trade with
the other commune. When this cost was too high, a commune court’s best response
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was to dispense impartial justice to non-members who had been cheated by a member
of the commune. With this historical background in mind, we aim to examine the
role of credit collateralized by the community responsibility system in inter-community
exchange by considering a monetary search model with spatial elements.
Having a similar objective, Boerner and Ritschl (2011) use the Lagos and Wright
(2005) model to examine the coexistence of money and credit in the presence of com-
munal responsibility. It is an interesting idea to study this historical issue in monetary
search models. In their model, buyers can use interest-bearing-bond-like credit to pur-
chase goods at a fixed cost, when experiencing favourable preference shocks. In this
way, credit makes precautionary balances unnecessary and hence reduces the opportu-
nity cost of holding money. They do not consider the effects of inflation on allocations
and social welfare.
In comparison, there are two additional things notably different from their model.
First, we view the credit supported by the communal responsibility, of which bill of
exchange is the historical counterpart, as a supplementary medium of exchange in long-
distance trade, rather than a substitute for money. This is a reasonable perspective,
given relevant facts such as currency shortage, safety concerns in carrying a large quan-
tity of money during inter-community trade and actual operation of bills of exchange1.
Second, participation in decentralized markets and credit is costly. In addition, we
assume entry costs and the cost of using credit are proportional to distance, due to
factors like direct verification and settlement cost, and indirect transportation cost. Of
course, new things could be discussed in our model, such as the intensive and extensive
margins of trade, the implications of market expansion and the evolution of monetary
and credit trade.
With these new elements, we aim to make a contribution to the New Monetarist
literature by building a search model with money and credit supported by the multi-
tiered collective responsibility arrangement. As usual, lack of double coincidence of
wants and anonymity keep money essential. Credit can supplement money as medium
of exchange when agents have insufficient money balances. Indeed, this is consistent
with the general lesson that if real assets or outside money are in limited supply,
then adding privately issued, transferable debt to the set of alternatives extends the
economy’s payment capacity, and hence improves welfare by fully exploiting trading
opportunities. In particular, we combine the features from the two influential third-
generation monetary search models, that is, Shi (1997) and Lagos and Wright (2005).
The main result of this chapter is that money and credit can meaningfully coexist as
1In his monograph about mediaeval institutions, Greif (2006b) uses a whole chapter to describe
the communal responsibility system and build a simple repeated game model to endogenize it.
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means of payment under the communal responsibility system with spatial frictions.
2.1.1 Related Literature
On the theoretical side, it is nontrivial to build a microfounded model with both money
and credit being essential in the sense of Kocherlakota (1998) that these media of ex-
change support desirable allocations which are unattainable in their absence, since these
two alternative means of payment require different even opposite frictions. For exam-
ple, the useful existence of money needs imperfect monitoring or record-keeping, while
perfect monitoring ensures a meaningful role for credit. In the burgeoning monetary
search literature, the coexistence of money and different forms of credit are modelled
via various ways. Indivisible money models include Shi (1996), Kocherlakota and Wal-
lace (1998), Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a,b), Aiyagari and Williamson (2000), Corbae
and Ritter (2004), Jin and Temzelides (2004), Mills (2007) and among others, while
Berentsen et al. (2007), Telyukova and Wright (2008), Sanches and Williamson (2010)
and Li (2011) are representative models with divisible money.
More specifically, Shi (1996) introduces a decentralized credit arrangement by as-
suming that a consumption tool like a spoon can be used as collateral. To ensure future
consumption, the debtor must redeem his collateral from the creditor. As long as the
continuation value of future consumption is positive to the debtor, it is in his interest to
repay the debt as soon as possible, since delaying repayments only reduces utility due
to positive discounting. Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998) assume an imperfect public
record-keeping technology with updating lag to model credit when agents can not com-
mit. The main finding is that the set of implementable allocations is weakly larger the
shorter the lag. Similarly, Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999a,b) also use imperfect moni-
toring to accommodate inside money in search models. An exogenous fraction of agents
are perfectly monitored and hence are the potential issuers of private money, whereas
the rest are not monitored at all and therefore needs fiat money for exchange. Mills
(2007) combines this idea with the lagged record-keeping technology in Kocherlakota
and Wallace (1998), and shows that both outside and inside money are essential for lags
that are neither too long nor too short. Relatedly, Jin and Temzelides (2004) suggest a
search model with local and faraway trades. Record-keeping technology is available at
the local level so that local trade can be facilitated with credit. In contrast, agents from
different communities need to trade with money. Aiyagari and Williamson (2000) con-
struct a dynamic risk sharing model where agents can write long-term contracts with
financial intermediaries. Random limited participation in the financial market gives
a transaction role for money. In each period, agents can defect from their long-term
credit arrangements and trade in a competitive money market thereafter. They show
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that the value of the outside option depends on monetary policy. Without a public
record keeping device, Corbae and Ritter (2004) consider an environment with pairwise
meetings where agents can form long-term partnerships to sustain credit arrangements.
Relative to these papers, our contribution is to construct an environment with divisible
money which is essential along with credit.
Microfounded monetary models with divisible money and credit are more desirable,
since they enable us to more realistically study issues like the relationship between
inside and outside money and the effect of monetary policy on their interaction. Some
progresses has been made in this direction. Berentsen et al. (2007) use a competi-
tive pricing version of the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework to explore the liquidity
reallocation of banks, which can record financial transaction history at no cost, but
they cannot record goods trade history. In this way, uncollateralized credit is available
as nominal bank loans, when buyers are cash constrained. Similarly, Li (2011) study
means of payment decisions between money and checking deposits by introducing pref-
erence shocks and record-keeping cost into Lagos and Wright (2005) framework. Banks
have a technology for record keeping on financial histories but not the trading histories
in the goods markets. In this way, agents can write checks against their deposits at
some fixed cost to make payments in the decentralized goods market. There is an
equilibrium where checks are used only in big transactions while cash is used in all
transactions. In a different way, Telyukova and Wright (2008) introduce an additional
centralized market into Lagos and Wright (2005) model to study the card debt puz-
zle. In this market, some agents want to consume but cannot produce, hence bilateral
credit is feasible and useful. They show that agents choose to use interest-bearing
credit even when they have money at hand, due to idiosyncratic uncertainty about
liquidity need. Within the same framework, Sanches and Williamson (2010) explore
the interaction among imperfect record-keeping, limited commitment and theft. They
show that money and credit can coexist as competing media of exchange under certain
assumptions of record-keeping technology and punishment of defection, as long as the
cost of theft is sufficiently small.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, the environment
is given. Then in section 3, we describe the representative household’s optimization
problems. Next, stationary equilibrium is characterized in section 4. Numerical results
are presented in section 5. The model’s limitations are discussed in section 6. Section
7 concludes.
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2.2 The Environment
The underlying environment is a mixture of the large household model of Shi (1997),
and the alternating decentralized and centralized markets model of Lagos and Wright
(2005). For exposition, we use the parable of a village economy.2
2.2.1 Agents
There is a continuum of spatially separated villages with unit mass. We can imagine
that these villages are evenly and clockwise distributed3 on a circle of circumference
1. In each village, there lives a continuum of measure one identical infinitely lived
households. However, households in different villages have different preferences and
production capabilities. Every household consists of a large number of sellers and
buyers (normalized to one) who share consumption and regard the family’s utility
as the common objective. The demographic composition of a representative family is
determined endogenously, which will be discussed later. Within each village, individuals
know each other well, that is, they share common information about their trading
opportunities and their credit histories. However, individuals are anonymous outside
their village, but their village of origin is verifiable. Time is discrete and the horizon
is infinite. Each period is divided into two sub-periods, say day and night, that differ
in terms of economic activity. During the day, buyers travel to another village and
match in pair with local sellers in a decentralized market, where sellers do not want
to consume but they can produce village-specific goods, while buyers want to consume
but they are unable to produce. This generates a temporal double coincidence of wants
problem. Buyers do not consume the goods produced in their own villages, but desire
goods from all the other villages. That is, all households have preference for variety.
These village-specific consumption goods are non-storable and perfectly divisible. In
the night, intra-village centralized markets become active, in which all agents want to
consume and are able to produce one unit of perishable general goods with one unit of
labour. Without loss of generality, we assume both the utility function of consuming
general goods and the disutility function of producing general goods are linear.
2This is inspired by Faig and Jerez (2007).
3Without loss of generality, we will assume buyers travel clockwise as well. In principle, we can
assume buyers search in both directions.
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Figure 2.1: The village economy of a spatial search model
2.2.2 Preferences and technology
Without loss of generality, we can arbitrarily select one of the villages as representative
village 0, and then each village is indexed by j ∈ [0, 1) corresponding to its distance,
moving clockwise around the circle from village 0, as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Since all
the households within a village j are identical, we can also denote households by their
origin. Similarly, we select an arbitrary household as the representative household.
Following the convention, henceforth lower-case variables denote this representative
household’s choices, while upper-case variables denote the corresponding choices of
other households, that is, aggregate variables, which are taken as given by the rep-
resentative household. In a symmetric equilibrium, lower-case variables are equal to
the corresponding capital-case variables. During the day, the representative household
divides its members into two groups: sellers who stay at home, produce and sell goods
to visiting buyers, and buyers who travel to other villages to purchase goods. Each
buyer visits only one village.
Imagine a buyer from the representative household travelling to village j during
the day sub-period. The village j goods can be of two varieties, of high and low
quality. To avoid confusion, we would like to say the village j goods are produced
in different colors, red or white4, since quality differentials usually make us think of
4We borrow this from Shi (2008), who studies the social benefit of illiquid bonds in the large
household framework.
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asymmetric information. However, there is no private information here. Once the
buyer is successfully matched with a seller, the seller receives a shock that determines
he can produce the red good with probability α, and the white good with 1− α. This
product-variety shock is identically and independently distributed across matches and
over time. Since the representative household sends only one buyer to the village j, the
trading outcome for this buyer is uncertain, due to matching and product-variety risk.
In order to collapse this kind of uncertainty, we assume that all the buyers from the
same village will pool their purchases and commit to divide the village j goods equally
on the way back to their home village5. This assumption is consistent with the model,
as agents know their fellow villagers well and contracts among them are enforceable
at no cost. As a result, the law of large numbers is applicable, which implies that the
proportion of village-specific goods of each color is deterministic for each household.
In each trade, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Denote (qr(j), dr(j)) and
(qw(j), aw(j)) as the offer for red goods and white goods, respectively, where q is the
quantity of goods, and d is the payment. The cost of producing village j goods of
two colours is given by the same disutility function, ψ(q), with ψ(0) = 0, ψ′(q) > 0,
and ψ′′(q) ≥ 0 for q > 0. The consumption of red goods yields utility u(qr), and
the consumption of white goods gives utility εu(qw), where 0 < ε < 1. The function
u is strictly concave, increasing and continuously differentiable, with u(0) = 0 and
u′(0) = +∞. All households have the same discount factor across periods, β ∈ (0, 1).
2.2.3 Money Supply
Money is an intrinsically useless, perfectly divisible, and storable object. Suppose that
each household in each village is initially endowed with M units of money. Subse-
quently, the government makes equal lump-sum transfers at the beginning of the night
to all the households in such a way that money holdings per household grow at a con-
stant gross rate µ. When µ < 1, the transfers are negative, that is, money is withdrawn
in the centralized market. Before visiting outside villages, each household decides how
to allocate money among the buyers in the family. However, this decision has to be
made before the realization of matching shocks. As a result, the household allocates
the money holdings evenly among the buyers. In fact, it cannot be optimal to allo-
cate money balances randomly among buyers in the household, as this would reduce
household expected utility.
5As Greif (2006a, p.227) describes, "In general, merchants of the same community travelled to-
gether, lodged together (often in their own special residences), and witnessed each other’s contracts.
Communal identification was facilitated by the fact that members of distinct communities had differ-
ent dialects and customs. Indeed, contracts and court cases reflect the great extent to which medieval
merchants knew of one another’s communal affiliations."
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2.2.4 Market Structure
As in Lagos and Wright (2005), agents trade in two sequential markets in every period,
as demonstrated in Figure 2.2. That is, in the day decentralized market, agents are
randomly and bilaterally matched. In the night centralized market, agents within each
village trade under competitive price.
Day Night
time
Inter-village
decentralized
Intra-village
centralized tradetrade
Money tansfer
Figure 2.2: The timing of events during period t in the village economy
The fundamental difference is that we assume there is a fixed entry cost for buyers
in order to visit outside villages. This transaction cost is independent of the quantity
of goods traded and is increasing in the distance. For a buyer from the representative
household, he will have to pay χ(j) in terms of the general goods (or utility) to enter
into the village j’s decentralized market, with χ′(j) > 0.6 As a result, the representative
household will balance the costs of more distant transactions against the gains from
increased variety. To minimize the heterogeneity, we assume that the representative
household pays this type of entry cost instead, just like buying permits to trade. Let
us denote that the fraction of buyers in the typical household is s1, and the remaining
1− s1 fraction are sellers. s1 will be endogenously determined. Note that village s1 is
also the farthest village to which the household will send a buyer.
In the day decentralized market hosted in village j, j ≤ s1, the measure of buyers
is S1, and the measure of sellers is 1 − S1. Recall that we use upper-case variables
to denote choices of other households. Let θj be the ratio of buyers to sellers in the
6 Chiu and Molico (2010) assume that there is a fixed cost to enter the centralized financial markets
at night, in order to estimate the long-run welfare costs of inflation in Lagos and Wright (2005) model
with uninsurable idiosyncratic trading risk and costly liquidity management.
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village:
θj =
S1
1− S1 . (2.1)
We assume that buyers and sellers perform at most one transaction during the trading
period. Then, the probability that a seller meets a buyer is pis(θj), where pis : [0,∞]→
[0, 1] is continuously differentiable, increasing and concave. Similarly, the probability
that a buyer meets a seller is pib(θj), where pib : [0,∞] → [0, 1] is continuously dif-
ferentiable, decreasing and convex. Intuitively, if θj is high, many buyers seek a few
sellers, then it is easy for a seller to find a buyer and hard for a buyer to find a seller.
Implicitly, we assume a constant returns matching functionM such that
M(S1, 1− S1) = S1pib(θj) = (1− S1)pis(θj), (2.2)
whereM maps the measure of sellers and buyers onto the measure of trading matches
in village j decentralized market. General discussions about matching functions can
be found in Pissarides (2000).
To better understanding matching functions, three interesting cases are briefly ex-
posited. The first case is
pis(θj) = 1− exp(−θj). (2.3)
This case is the so called urn-ball matching function in frictional assignment models
and arises when buyers use identical mixed strategies to select a seller among those
who post equivalent price offers, and when each seller can serve at most one customer
at one period7. Another special case is
pis(θj) =
θj
1 + θj
. (2.4)
This case emerges in directed search where buyers and sellers have full knowledge of
terms of trade across sub-markets, and they can go to any sub-market freely. Intuitively,
pis(θj) is equal to the fraction of buyers over all traders in submarket j. The third case
is
pis(θj) = min {θj, 1} . (2.5)
That is, the short side of the market is always matched, hence there is no search friction.
Since θj is independent of j, we henceforth simply use pib and pis rather than pib(θj) and
pis(θj), respectively. This last case was used in Faig and Jerez (2007).
7Suppose there are u unemployed workers (balls) and v vacancies (urns). If each ball is inde-
pendently placed into each urn with equal probability, then the number of balls per urn is a Poisson
random variable with mean u/v, so a fraction e−
u
v of the urns do not get any balls. Let u and v go to
infinity with q = u/v fixed, then a fraction 1− e−q of firms get a worker. See Burdett et al. (2001).
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For the representative household, it will visit a range (0, s1] of villages during the
day, due to love for variety and entry cost. The household maximizes total utility,
which will be given shortly. Thanks to the assumption of risk sharing among fellow
villagers, each buyer brings home deterministic proportions of red and white goods
from chosen villages. At night, all the buyers return to their home villages, and intra-
village centralized markets open, where all agents consume and produce one unit of
general goods with one unit of effort. For simplicity, one unit of general goods yields
one unit of utility. Let x denote net consumption of each member in the representative
household. x < 0 means net production.
The timing of events is as follows. In the day, after the allocation of money balances,
buyers in each households travel to another village and trade bilaterally with local
sellers in decentralized markets with the terms of trade determined by bargaining.
While buyers shop for goods, sellers remain at home and sell goods to visiting buyers.
When night falls, agents return home, trade the general goods in intra-village markets,
settle debts and adjust money balances.
2.2.5 Communal Responsibility System
We quote a story from Greif (2006a, pp.222-3) to facilitate understanding of this insti-
tutional innovation.
In 1323 the goods of a merchant from London, John de Grantham, were transported
through the important English port of Dover. A local man, William Virgil, captured
John’s goods with authorization from Dover’s court, although no legal claim was ad-
vanced against John. John complained to the court in London about the confiscation
and the mayor, who presided over the court, wrote to Dover requesting restitution.
Otherwise, he threatened, Dover’s merchants’ goods in London will be confiscated in
retaliation. Dover’s mayor, who headed the local court, responded by explaining the
reason for the confiscation. John’s goods were impounded because the mayor of London
didn’t act upon his earlier request to collect a debt that a Londoner, Henry Nasard, had
failed to pay to William Virgil of Dover. London’s mayor replied that he had no record
of this earlier request and asked that it be resubmitted. The evidence suggests that the
dispute ended at this point. London verified the default on the debt and collected the
amount due. Dover released John’s goods. (Reference within omitted.)
Motivated by this episode, we assume that in each village there is a community
court which keeps the records of its citizens’ personal identity, knows their trading
histories8, and can verify the communal identity of agents from other villages. Under
8Hence, agents will not pretend to be victims, since the following assumptions imply that the local
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the communal responsibility system, the community court confiscates defector or his
fellow villagers’ assets for compensation when one of its citizens suffers from default.
Similarly, when one of its villagers defaults, the local court seizes the defector’s assets
and the defaulter is banned from trading inside or outside her village forever9. Note
that this implies that the whole household will be deprived of its asset holdings and of
the opportunity to trade, if any one of its buyers reneges. In order to motivate the local
court to deliver impartial justice, we simply assume that villages have strong trading
relationships such that it is not in their interest to cease partnership. In addition, it is
so costly and lengthy to gain affiliation with a new village that agents have no incentive
to give up their original citizenship. To simplify analysis, we abstract from strategic
behaviour between villages.
With such a intra-community contract enforcement institution, credit in inter-
community exchange could be supported in this village economy, although on the
individual level, neither buyers or sellers can commit to their promises. The use of
credit, however, costs κ(j) > 0 units of general goods for the seller in village i during
the day sub-period. This fixed cost could capture the loss in issues like verifying iden-
tity of origin, resolving potential conflicts or in settlement. Like entry cost, this cost
of using credit is an increasing function of distance, that is, κ′(j) > 0.10 Indeed, Greif
(2006a, p.229) explains the decline of communal responsibility system like this, "the
system became less effective because intercommunity interactions and the growth in
the number and size of communities reduced the cost of falsifying community affiliation
and increased the cost of verification". Again, we assume that the cost of using credit
is paid at the household level for tractability.
2.2.6 First Best
The first best allocations for the village-specific goods, denoted by qr∗ and qw∗ , respec-
tively, are characterized by the first order conditions,
u′ (qr∗) = ψ
′(qr∗)
εu′ (qw∗ ) = ψ
′(qw∗ )
which say that for each pair of matched buyer and seller, at the optimum, the marginal
benefit of consumption of both red and white goods should equal the marginal cost
court cares more about collective reputation.
9This individual autarky punishment is added to simplify analysis.
10Li (2011) studies money and checking deposits as alternative means of payment, with the as-
sumption that there is a fixed cost to use checks in decentralized markets.
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of their production, respectively. The same quantity is assigned to consumption and
production, which implies feasibility. The first best allocation for the general good in
the night only involves the feasibility condition, due to the linearity of the preference
for the general good.
2.3 The Representative Household’s Problems
In this section, we characterize the behaviour of a representative household whose
buyers travels around and sellers stay at home. Recall that lower-case letters denote
the decision variables of the household, while upper-case letters denote the decisions
of other households and hence aggregate quantities, which are taken as given by our
representative household. In a symmetric equilibrium,lower-case letters are equal to
the corresponding upper-case letters. In the following, the subscript ±1 denotes for
t± 1, where t is an arbitrary period.
2.3.1 The Problem in Day Markets
Let m denote the household’s money holdings at the beginning of the day, and let
φ denote the value of money in terms of general goods in a centralized intra-village
market at date t. Recall that all villages are identical, so for the whole economy the
value of money in the night sub-period is also φ at period t.
As Boerner and Ritschl (2011), we are interested in the case where only money is
used for white goods, and credit is used as supplementary means of payment for red
goods, if the cost of using credit is not too high11. In fact, a similar argument is made
in Li (2011). Here, we want to clarify the role of credit in our model. When meeting a
seller with high-marginal-utility goods, the buyer first makes whatever money purchases
of the seller’s goods he can and then attempts to secure a credit to obtain further
quantities. Expecting ex post dispensation of impartial justice, the seller is motivated
to extend credit. In addition, the initial money exchanges reduced the desired loan
and hence the buyer’s incentive to renege. This view has been adopted by Bernhardt
(1989).
To determine the terms of trade in a decentralized exchange, we assume that the
buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. This particular bargaining protocol
11It seems arbitrary to focus on the case where only money is used for white goods, and credit is
used as supplementary means of payment for red goods. However, this objection is not valid, since
we can always adjust the tastes for the two types of goods to ensure this simplifying division, see the
argument in Shi (2008).
82
The Representative Household’s Problems
simplifies the analysis without loss of generality. It is pointed out in Lagos and Wright
(2005) that a holdup problem on money balances arises from the generalized Nash
bargaining. Consequently, the monetary equilibrium is not efficient. We would rather
not tussle with this unnecessary issue.
Now imagine a buyer from the representative household meet a domestic seller in
village j. The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Let us consider white goods first.
In this case, the buyer only use money as means of payment. For another household’s
seller in village j to be indifferent between accepting and rejecting the buyer’s offer
(qw(j), dw(j)) in the random match, the offer must satisfy the seller’s participation
constraint:
φdw(j)− ψ(qw(j)) = 0, (2.6)
where dw(j) ≤ m
s1
. That is, the buyer cannot spend more money than what he has.
Under our assumptions, the representative household are willing to consume more
red goods, hence the buyer will be instructed to use costly credit. Since the cost of using
credit is increasing with respect to distance, we can conjecture that there is a threshold
value s2 ≤ s1 such that buyers from the representative household will use costly credit
only in villages within (0, s2], and they will only use money in villages (s2, s1], even
though encountering red goods. The threshold s2 can be considered as a measure of the
intensive margin in inter-village trade, while s1 as a measure of the extensive margin.
Let (qr(j), dr(j)) denote the buyer’s offer, and l(j), 0 < j ≤ s2 denote the quantity of
monetary loan that the buyer requests from the seller, when his holdings of money is
not enough to make the payment. Then, the seller’s participation constraint is,
φdr(j)− ψ(qr(j)) = 0, (2.7)
where dr(j) ≤ m
s1
+ l(j), and j ≤ s2. Note that the buyer ends up paying the fixed cost
of using credit, since (2.7) is binding at the optimum. The benefit for the buyer is that
credit relaxes his cash constraint.12
For the decentralized market j located within (s2, s1], the participant constraint for
sellers who produce red goods is similar to that of sellers who produce white goods,
φdr(j)− ψ(qr(j)) = 0, (2.8)
12Boerner and Ritschl (2011) view credit supported by communal responsibility as a substitutes for
money as a means of payment. In particular, credit makes precautionary balances unnecessary and
hence reduces the opportunity cost of holding money. See also Faig and Jerez (2007), who examine
precautionary money demand in a search model with continuous idiosyncratic preference shock. In
contrast, we argue here credit supplements money as a medium of exchange. In fact, currency shortages
are recorded during the relevant historical period.
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where dr(j) ≤ m
s1
and j ∈ (s2, s1].
Let V (m) denotes the value function entering the day market with money holdings
m, and similarly W (m) denotes the value function entering the night market with
money holdings m. Taking other households’ decisions as given, the representative
household then instruct its buyers at the day market j to choose dw(j), dr(j), qw(j),
qr(j), l(j), s1, s2 such that
V (m) = max

pibα
∫ s1
0
u (qr(j)) dj − pisα (1− S1)
∫ S1
0
ψ (Qr(j)) dj
+pib (1− α) ∫ s1
0
εu (qw(j)) dj − pis (1− α) (1− S1)
∫ S1
0
ψ (Qw(j)) dj
− ∫ s1
0
χ (j) dj − pibα ∫ s2
0
κ (j) dj +W (m˜)

(2.9)
subject to the constraints (2.6), (2.7), (2.8), and where
m˜ = m− pibαr
∫ s2
0
l(j)dj − pibα
∫ s1
0
dr(j)dj − pib (1− α)
∫ s1
0
dw(j)dj
+pisα (1− S1)
∫ S1
0
Dr(j)dj + pis (1− α) (1− S1)
∫ S1
0
Dw(j)dj
+ pisα (1− S1) r
∫ S2
0
L(j)dj (2.10)
denotes the representative household’s overall balance of money taken to the night
market. That is, (2.10) describes the evolution of the representative household’s money
holdings: the first item is its money holdings before entering the day market, the second
item is the interest rate payment, the third and fourth items represent expenditure in
purchasing village-specific goods, the fifth and sixth items are revenues via selling red
goods and white goods, and the final integral is the interest earnings from lending. Note
that the period utility function is the sum of utility from consuming goods, disutility
from production, and total cost of entering decentralized markets and using credit.
2.3.2 The Problem in Night Markets
At the beginning of the night, household makes choice over net consumption x, money
holdings for the future, m+1, to solve the following problem
W (m˜) = max {x+ βV (m+1)} (2.11)
subject to the budget constraint,
−x+ φm˜+ T − φm+1 = 0
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which says that net production, the real value of current money holdings and govern-
ment lump-sum transfer can be used to acquire money for the future.
The problem for the household problem at night can be rewritten as,
W (m˜) = max {φm˜+ T − φm+1 + βV (m+1)}
and the first-order condition is,
− φ+ βV ′ (m+1) = 0 (2.12)
Intuitively, (2.12) says that the cost of an extra unit of cash at night must equal the
benefit generated in the following period. As typically in the Lagos and Wright (2005)
framework, these decisions over future money are the same for all the agents, and
hence there are no distributional issues. The quasi-linearity of preference is responsible
for the separation between the decisions of future money holdings and current money
holdings, as it can be seen from the first term in (2.12), which depend on the current
price, but not on the current individual holdings of money.
2.3.3 The Envelope Conditions
The envelope condition for money between day and night are, respectively,
W ′ (m˜) =
∂W (m˜)
∂m˜
= φ (2.13)
which says that a unit of cash is worth φ units of the general good at night.
The envelope conditions between night and day are,
V ′ (m) =
∂L
∂m
=
∂W (m˜)
∂m˜
∂m˜
∂m
+
φpib
2
∫ s1
0
λw2 (j)dj +
φpib
2
∫ s1
0
λr2(j)dj
simplifying,
∂V (m)
∂m
= φ+
φpib
2
∫ s1
0
λw2 (j)dj +
φpib
2
∫ s1
0
λr2(j)dj (2.14)
which says that an extra unit of cash will be brought into the night market if not used,
and relaxes the liquidity constraints for buyers of both red goods and white goods if
the buyers have successful matches.
Along with (2.12), we have
φ = βV ′ (m+1) = βφ+1
[
1 + pi
b
2
∫ s1
0
λw2,+1(j)dj +
pib
2
∫ s1
0
λr2,+1(j)dj
]
(2.15)
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which says that the current value of cash (nominal asset) at the household level should
be equal to its future value, which reflects the expected benefit of using money to
purchase red goods and white goods.
2.3.4 Market Clearing Conditions
Besides the village-specific goods, there are three items exchanged and their corre-
sponding market clearing conditions are given below:
1. For monetary loans in each market j during the day, market clearing requires∫ s2
0
l(j)dj =
∫ S2
0
L(j)dj
2. For money at night, market clearing requires
m = M
3. The night market for the general good clears whenever the markets for money
does by Walras Law.
2.3.5 The Value of Defection
As we have assumed, when the representative household reneges on private liabilities,
its assets will be seized and the family will be deprived of access to both inside- and
outside-village markets. This harsh punishment imposed by local courts aims to sustain
trading relationship between communities and support credit arrangements involved.
Therefore, the value function or expected discounted utility upon default should be 0.
2.4 Symmetric Stationary Equilibrium
An symmetric stationary equilibrium consists of the representative household’s choices,
dw, dr, qw, qr, l, s1, s2, m, x, price φ, the value functions, V , W , and other households’
choices satisfying the following properties:
1. Optimality: Given other households’ choices, the representative household’s choices
solve the problems (2.9) and (2.11), and satisfy the market clearing conditions;
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2. Symmetry: The optimal choices and value functions are the same across house-
holds. That is,
dw = Dw, dr = Dr, qw = Qw, qr = Qr, s1 = S1, s2 = S2, and l = L;
3. Stationarity: All real variables and real money balances are constant.
Symmetry implies that m = M , while stationarity suggests that φM = φ+1M+1.
Recall that M+1 = µM . Hence, φ/φ+1 = µ.
Without causing any confusion, the market index j, also the distance measure, is
omitted when appropriate. From the first-order conditions, we have,
λw1 =
εu′ (qw)
ψ′(qw)
, 0 < j ≤ s1 (2.16)
which says that the shadow value of the white goods is given by the ratio between its
marginal utility and its marginal cost;
λr1 =
u′ (qr)
ψ′(qr)
, 0 < j ≤ s1 (2.17)
which says that the shadow value of the red goods is given by the ratio between its
marginal utility and its marginal cost;∫ s1
0
λw2 (j)dj =
1
s1
[∫ s1
0
(
εu′ (qw)
ψ′(qw)
− 1
)
dj
]
(2.18)
which says that the shadow value of liquidity at the household level encountering white
goods is equal to the sum of the shadow value of liquidity (adjusted by extensive margin)
for buyers of white goods, which is given by the marginal utility of consumption of white
goods net of its marginal cost;∫ s1
0
λr2(j)dj =
1
s1
[∫ s1
0
(
u′ (qr)
ψ′(qr)
− 1
)
dj
]
(2.19)
which says that the shadow value of liquidity at the household level encountering red
goods is equal to the sum of the shadow value of liquidity (adjusted by extensive
margin) for buyers of red goods, which is given by the marginal utility of consumption
of red goods net of its marginal cost;∫ s2
0
λr2(j)dj =
s2r
s1
(2.20)
which says that the sum of shadow value of liquidity (adjusted by extensive margin
and intensive margin) for buyers of red goods in the credit region is equal to the cost
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of monetary loans, which, in turn, is simply the nominal interest rate;
u (qr(s1)) + εu (q
w(s1)) = (1 + λ
r
2(s1))ψ(q
r(s1)) + (1 + λ
w
2 (s1))ψ(q
w(s1)) +
2
pib
χ (s1)
(2.21)
which says that the range of decentralized markets participated by the representative
household is determined by the expected trade surplus net of the entry cost, and
by the fact that the further the marginal market (higher s1), less amount of money
(lower m/s1) distributed to each buyer of the household, which tightens the liquidity
constraints of both buyers of red and white goods;
u
(
ψ−1
(
φl(s2) +
φm
s1
))
− u
(
ψ−1
(
φm
s1
))
= φrl(s2) + κ(s2) (2.22)
which says that credit is used as medium of exchange up to the point when its benefit
of relaxing liquidity constraint equals to the cost of using credit.
Finally, the Euler equation gives
µ
β
= 1 + pi
b
2
∫ s1
0
λw2 (j)dj +
pib
2
∫ s1
0
λr2(j)dj (2.23)
since the Lagrange multipliers λw2 and λr2 are non-negative. In other words, it is neces-
sary to have µ ≥ β, in order to ensure the existence of monetary equilibrium. Otherwise,
households will demand an infinite amount of money balances, since the rate of return
on money is less than the discount rate. This is one of the standard results in monetary
search literature, see Lagos and Wright (2005) and Wright (2010).
About the optimality of the Friedman rule in our model, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 The Friedman rule is optimal, and it is feasible when there is no liquid-
ity shortage problem. When there is liquidity shortage problem, however, the Friedman
rule can be sub-optimal.
Proof. Combining (2.19) and (2.20), we have
s1
∫ s1
s2
λr2(j)dj + s2r =
∫ s1
0
(
u′ (qr)
ψ′(qr)
− 1
)
dj (2.24)
which says that the shadow cost of liquidity for red goods at the household level is
equal to the the shadow value of liquidity for red goods at the household level. We
already know that u
′(qr)
ψ′(qr) is equal to 1 when the first best allocations of red goods are
obtained. In other words, the smaller value of the left hand of (2.24), the closer the
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allocations of red goods to the first best. Therefore, the Friedman rule, that is, r = 0,
is optimal in our economy, when the liquidity constraints for red goods in the no-credit
region are unbinding (λr2(j) = 0, s2 < j ≤ s1).
Imagine the government approximately withdraw money at the rate of discount
factor β as typically done in the monetary literature to implement the Friedman rule,
then the Euler equation (3.8) requires that
λw2 = λ
r
2 = 0, 0 < j ≤ s1 (2.25)
which, by the complementarity slackness conditions, implies that the liquidity con-
straints for both red and white goods are not binding in all of the villages where buyers
shop. That is, the Friedman rule is also feasible when there is no liquidity shortage
problem at all.
However, if the condition (2.25) does not meet, that is, some of the Lagrange
multipliers λw2 and λr2 are non-zero, which implies that some of the liquidity constraints
binds, and hence µ > β. As a result, the Friedman rule is not implementable. In
addition, the Friedman rule can be sub-optimal, due to the fact that the growth rate of
money affects the Lagrange multipliers as well. We will see this result in the numerical
analysis.
As indicated before, we are only interested in the case where only money is used for
white goods, and credit is used as supplementary means of payment for red goods, if
the cost of using credit is not too high. We construct an equilibrium with both money
and credit used as media of exchanges as follows: for j ∈ (0, s2], λr2(j) satisfies (2.20);
for j ∈ (s2, s1], λr2(j) satisfies (2.19); while for j ∈ (0, s1], λw2 (j) = 0, which says the
liquidity constraint for white goods is always not binding, and hence credit is not useful.
Note that this type of equilibrium is closely motivated by the historical communal
responsibility arrangement, where buyers borrow from the sellers on some occasions.
Without this background, one could argue that there is some credit arrangement where
buyers of red goods borrow from buyers of white goods and unmatched buyers (ex post),
instead of the sellers. We deal with this potential problem by assuming that only one
buyer (ex ante) from each household is sent to each village, as stated above, which
implies that all of the buyers in a specific village are anonymous and hence there is
enforcement problem in implementing the alternative credit arrangement.
Recall that the entry cost and the cost of using credit are paid at the household level,
and as a result, each buyer from the representative household has the same amount of
money when travelling to outside villages. This implies that at the buyer level, both
λr2(j) at the credit region (0 < j ≤ s2), and λr2(j) at the no-credit region (s2 < j ≤ s1)
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are independent of j. Intuitively, in near villages the buyers will use the same amount
of credit when red goods are traded, while in farway villages the buyers have the same
amount of money to execute trades. In this way, we get rid of the heterogeneities
caused by village-specific bilateral trades at the buyer level. Note that the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the liquidity constraints for red goods at the two regions
have different values.
With the above intuition in mind, we can solve for the allocations affiliated with the
equilibrium of interest from the optimality conditions and constraints, listed as below:
qw = qw∗ , for j ∈ (0, s1]
u′ (qr (s2))
ψ′(qr (s2))
= r + 1 (2.26)
u′ (qr (s1))
ψ′(qr (s1))
= s1λ
r
2 (s1) + 1 (2.27)
φl (s2) = ψ(q
r (s2))− ψ(qr (s1)) (2.28)
φM = s1ψ(q
r (s1)) (2.29)
µ
β
− 1 = pi
b
2
[
s2r
s1
+ (s1 − s2)λr2 (s1)
]
(2.30)
u (qr(s1)) + εu (q
w
∗ ) = ψ(q
w
∗ ) + (1 + λ
r
2(s1))ψ(q
r(s1)) +
2
pib
χ (s1) (2.31)
u (qr(s2))− u (qr(s1)) = φrl(s2) + κ(s2) (2.32)
r + 1 =
µ
β
(2.33)
where (2.33) is the Fisher equation. Note that there are eight variables
{
qrj∈(0,s2], q
r
j∈(s2,s1], r, s1, λ
r
2, φl, s2, φM
}
and eight equations (2.26) - (2.33). Given the well-defined properties of functions u
and ψ, the solution exists. To get further qualitative or quantitative results, we need
to specify the functional forms and parameters. This will be done in the numerical
analysis section.
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2.4.1 Steady State Welfare
Since we focus on a symmetric equilibrium, the standard measure of social welfare is
the steady-state lifetime utility V :
V =
1
1− β

pib
2
∫ s1
0
u (qr(j)) dj + pi
b
2
∫ s1
0
εu (qw(j)) dj
−pis(1−S1)
2
∫ S1
0
ψ (Qr(j)) dj − pis(1−S1)
2
∫ S1
0
ψ (Qw(j)) dj
− ∫ s1
0
χ (j) dj − pib
2
∫ s2
0
κ (j) dj

=
1
1− β

pib
2
∫ s1
0
u (qr(j)) dj + pi
b
2
∫ s1
0
εu (qw(j)) dj
−pis(1−s1)
2
∫ s1
0
ψ (qr(j)) dj − pis(1−s1)
2
∫ s1
0
ψ (qw(j)) dj
− ∫ s1
0
χ (j) dj − pib
2
∫ s2
0
κ (j) dj
 (2.34)
Intuitively, (2.34) says that the steady-state lifetime utility is the discounted expected
trade surplus minus costs of market entry and of using credit in decentralized markets.
Note that the welfare in the night market is not included, due to the assumption of
linear preference for the general good.
2.4.2 Welfare Without Credit
For comparison, we can consider an otherwise identical monetary village economy with-
out credit, derive the value function of the representative household, and then construct
the steady state welfare as we do in the case with credit. This value function can be
considered as a lower bound such that the representative household keeps its promises.
If the resulting social welfare decreases due to lack of credit, then we can claim that
credit is essential in our environment. The unavailability of credit can be thought due
to prohibitively high cost of using credit. Mathematically, we need to impose l(j) = 0,
for any j ∈ (0, s1).
We have the following proposition about the role of money and credit played in this
economy.
Proposition 2 Both money and credit are essential in the sense that they improve
social welfare. Furthermore, social welfare is higher when credit is available and desired
by the buyers of red goods.
Proof. In the day markets, buyers and sellers are anonymous, so bilateral trade be-
tween them is impossible if there is no money or credit. In other words, money and
credit matter as media of exchange. Money is essential, since it is valued in buying
both white and red goods across all of villages visited by the representative household.
91
Numerical Analysis
In addition, credit supported by the communal responsibility system only supplements
money as medium of exchange, since it is only desirable occasionally in a limited region.
By construction, the social welfare associated with the equilibrium of interest is higher
when credit is available. This result will be checked in the numerical analysis as well.
2.5 Numerical Analysis
In the numerical example, following Faig and Jerez (2007), the functional forms for
the utility of consuming village-specific goods and the disutility of producing them are
assumed to be isoelastic and linear, respectively. That is,
u(q) =
q1−σ
1− σ , σ ∈ (0, 1), (2.35)
ψ(q) = zq, z ≥ 1, (2.36)
where z is productivity parameter for village-specific goods production. That is, higher
z implies lower productivity.
For simplicity, we choose the matching function so that
M(S1, 1− S1) = S1 (1− S1)
which then implies that
pib = 1− s1 (2.37)
and hence pis is given by
pis = s1
The cost functions χ(j) and κ(j) are assumed to be linear function of distance j.
That is,
κ(j) = δj, χ(j) = γj,
where δ and γ are positive.
The benchmark parameter values are specified in the Table 2.1. Note that we
choose the values quite freely as long as they make economic sense, since the aim of
this numerical analysis is for illustrative purpose only. For example, the relative risk
aversion parameter (or the inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution) is chosen
for computational convenience. Faig and Jerez (2007) set σ = 0.435. Another reason
we choose σ < 1 is that we need u(0) = 0, that is, the utility of autarky.
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Table 2.1: Benchmark Parameterization
Parameter Value Definition
β 0.96 discount factor
σ 0.5 relative risk aversion coefficient
z 1 productivity of village-specific goods
ε 0.5 scaling paramter of the marginal utility from white goods
µ 1 the growth rate of money
γ 1 scaling paramter associated with entry cost
δ 1 scaling paramter associated with cost of using credit
Given the functional forms, it is quite straightforward to get
ε (qw∗ )
−σ = z
which yields
qw∗ =
(z
ε
)− 1
σ
Similarly, the equilibrium conditions (2.26) - (2.33) give the following results:
r =
µ
β
− 1 (2.38)
qr (s2) = ((r + 1) z)
− 1
σ (2.39)
λr2 (s1) =
(qr (s1))
−σ
zs1
− 1
s1
(2.40)
φl (s2) = zq
r (s2)− zqr (s1) (2.41)
φM = zqr (s1) s1 (2.42)
2
(
µ
β
− 1
)
=
1− s1
s1
[
s2r + (s1 − s2)
(
(qr (s1))
−σ
z
− 1
)]
(2.43)
qr(s1)
1−σ
1− σ +
ε
(
z
ε
)− 1−σ
σ
1− σ = z
(z
ε
)− 1
σ
+
(qr (s1))
1−σ
s1
− z (1− s1) q
r(s1)
s1
+
2γs1
1− s1 (2.44)
qr(s2)
1−σ
1− σ −
qr(s1)
1−σ
1− σ = zr (q
r (s2)− qr (s1)) + δs2 (2.45)
With respect to the key parameters, we have the following comparative statics
results.
Proposition 3 Higher money growth (or higher inflation), µ, increases the nominal
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interest rate paid on monetary loans, which, in turn, lowers the demand for credit and,
as a result, decreases the consumption of red goods in the credit region.
Proof. (2.38) says that credit requires higher interest rate as compensation when the
government increases the growth rate of money supply. As a result, buyers of red goods
demand less amount of credit, other things being equal. This can be seen from (2.41).
Finally, (2.39) supports the claim that higher borrowing cost lowers the consumption
of red goods in the credit region.
Conjecture 4 Higher marginal entry cost, γ, reduces the extensive margin, s1. In
addition, consumption of red goods in the no-credit region is higher, ceteris paribus,
since the amount of money carried by each buyer is higher.
Conjecture 5 Higher marginal cost of using credit, δ, reduces the intensive margin,
s2. In addition, social welfare is smaller.
It is intuitive to understand the two conjectures, but not straightforward to prove
them, since we do not have explicit expressions for the relevant variables. However,
given the benchmark parameter values, we can verify them numerically, as shown in
Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Comparative static analysis
Parameter Values Steady state results
µ γ δ s1 s2 q
r(s1) q
r(s2) φl (s2) welfare V
µ 0.961 1 1 0.2842 0.2812 0.7318 0.9980 0.2662 0.1630
1 1 1 0.3075 0.1569 0.7716 0.9216 0.1500 0.1617
1.005 1 1 0.3036 0.1552 0.7641 0.9125 0.1483 0.1612
1.015 1 1 0.2955 0.1517 0.7497 0.8946 0.1449 0.1601
1.025 1 1 0.2870 0.1478 0.7360 0.8772 0.1412 0.1588
γ 1 1 1 0.3075 0.1569 0.7716 0.9216 0.1500 0.1617
1 1.01 1 0.3052 0.1556 0.7728 0.9216 0.1488 0.1614
1 1.02 1 0.3029 0.1543 0.7740 0.9216 0.1476 0.1611
δ 1 1 1 0.3075 0.1569 0.7716 0.9216 0.1500 0.1617
1 1 1.01 0.3069 0.1565 0.7705 0.9216 0.1511 0.1616
1 1 1.02 0.3063 0.1562 0.7695 0.9216 0.1521 0.1615
When the growth rate of money supply approximates the Friedman rule, the nomi-
nal interest rate is close to zero, which makes credit more desirable, and as a result, the
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range of using credit or intensive margin (s2) follows the extensive margin (s1) quite
closely. Notably, when the monetary policy is slightly away from the Friedman rule
(µ = 1), the range of market participation (s1) is higher and so is the consumption of
red goods in the no-credit region, since a lower degree of deflation relaxes the liquidity
constraints in regions where credit is not used. This suggests that the Friedman rule
may be not optimal under some circumstances. However, in the case of higher inflation,
the consumption of red goods in the no-credit region decreases, since inflation erodes
agents’ real money balances. In addition, a higher nominal interest rate is required to
clear the credit market, which lowers both the demand for credit and the consumption
of red goods in the credit region.
Higher cost of market entry (γ) lowers the extensive margin (s1), but reduces the
consumption of red goods in the no-credit region. The reason is that, ceteris paribus, a
smaller range of market participation implies that more money holdings can be assigned
to each buyer, which relaxes their liquidity constraints, and consequently lowers the
intensive margin (s2) as well as the total amount of credit usage. In comparison, with a
higher cost of using credit, the intensive margin (s2) and the the extensive margin (s1)
decrease slightly, while the total usage of credit even increases marginally. Intuitively,
the representative household desires to sustain the level of the consumption of red goods
in the credit-region, even though the consumption of red goods in the no-credit region
is reduced. Overall, these choices yield relatively higher welfare. Finally, the household
will pay back their debt, since social welfare is always positive, implying repayment is
a better option than default. In other words, there is no default in equilibrium.
As mentioned above, the Friedman rule can be sub-optimal in the presence of
distance-dependent costs. Indeed, Figure 2.3 supports this result. It says that when
the entry cost is not equal to the cost of using credit, a mild deviation from the Fried-
man rule can be welfare improving. There are two reasons for this result. One is that
relatively higher money supply can relax the buyers’ liquidity constraints even if the
value of money is relatively lower. The other is that a lesser degree of deflation affects
the extensive and intensive margins and their interactions. Figure 2.4 shows that a
mild deviation from the Friedman rule lowers the extensive margins in the cases with
unequal costs of entry and using credit, which, in turn, reduces the utility loss of partic-
ipating in faraway inter-village markets. This effect is somewhat similar to the search
externality effect in monetary search models when market entry is endogenous (e.g.,
Shi, 2008). That is, there are too many market entries relative to the socially efficient
level, since the representative household does not internalize the search externality,
which widens the difference between the consumption of red goods in the credit-region
and the consumption of red goods in the no-credit region. However, efficiency requires
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that the consumption of red goods in both regions should be as close as possible. A
minor deviation from the Friedman rule, thus, shifts consumption from the red goods
in the credit region to those in the no-credit region. This smoothes marginal utilities
across regions, which is welfare improving.
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Figure 2.3: The effect of inflation on social welfare under alternative combinations of costs of entry and using credit
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2.6 Discussion
The relationship between money and credit has been examined from different perspec-
tives. Gomis-Porqueras and Sanches (2013) take the view that fiat money complements
the use of credit in exchange. With the introduction of fiat money, agents have an al-
ternative mechanism to trade in the decentralized market. This implies that it is more
difficult to induce buyers to cooperate when the value of money is constant over time.
In order to strengthen the punishment of default, the authors argue that the govern-
ment can engineer a positive inflation rate. Jin and Temzelides (2004), which uses
the Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) model introduce spatial heterogeneity with explicitly
modelling distance, takes the view that monetary trade is a outside option to credit
trade. In nearer villages, agents meet with higher probability. The main finding is
that when there is no direct cross-location informational flow, money is an imperfect
substitute for credit or record-keeping. In fact, Kocherlakota (1998) shows that money
is dominated by memory at least when agents are patient in the second-generation
search models. Intuitively, monetary and credit transactions differ in their scope. If
an agent fails to perform a credit transaction, he loses the opportunity to trade again
with the village of the agent that experienced the deviation. On the other hand, if an
agent fails to produce in exchange for money, he loses the opportunity to trade with
agents from a large number of villages in the near future. Thus, monetary exchange
allows for the possibility of a punishment that is less severe but broader in scope than
denial of future credit.
We view this chapter complementary to existing work, which studies the relationship
between money and credit in monetary search models as well. Given the historical
background, it is arguable that commodity money should be more relevant, and that
the model here is helpful to explain the use of credit during currency shortage. In fact,
this is one of the considerations that shape our view that costly credit complements
fiat money as means of payment in decentralized exchange. Nevertheless, the Lagos
and Wright (2005) framework is also suitable to model commodity money. As Wright
(2010) does, we can think commodity money as the "Lucas tree" bearing fruit (general
goods), and fiat money as fruitless trees. Hence, the main results in this chapter are
valid for both fiat money and commodity money, as long as agents sometimes face a
liquidity shortage problem.
There are several qualifications to our treatment. One limitation of our analysis
is that we simply assume local communities have the incentive to sustain their part-
nership and hence punish defectors. Taking strategic interaction between villages into
consideration, we maybe construct a much richer model with additional economic im-
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plications, but this kind of model is probably more analytically complicated. Hence
in this chapter we do not attempt to explain the communal responsibility system as
an equilibrium phenomenon13. Instead we exclusively ask whether credit can be sup-
ported with this interesting historical institution in place and what the implications
are. Another extension we can pursue is to compare different pricing protocol, as in
Rocheteau and Wright (2005).
2.7 Conclusion
We have taken the view that credit complements fiat money as means of payment in de-
centralized exchange, and have considered whether the communal responsibility system
can support credit with anonymous agents. In our analysis, lack of double coincidence
of wants and anonymity keep money essential, while credit can relax agents’ liquidity
constraints when shocks are favourable. The distance-dependent cost of using credit
sustains money as means of payment in the village economy. In this way, we have
shown that money and credit can meaningfully coexist under the communal responsi-
bility system, in the sense of improving welfare. In addition, the Friedman rule can be
sub-optimal, due to the interaction between the extensive and intensive margins.
13We think that combining the work of Aliprantis et al. (2007) and Deb (2012) could be a good
starting point.
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2.A Technical Appendix
2.A.1 The Problem in Day Markets
Without loss of generality, let α = 1
2
. During the day, the household’s problem can be
summarized by the following Lagrangian function,
L = pi
b
2
∫ s1
0
u (qr(j)) dj − pi
s
2
(1− S1)
∫ S1
0
ψ (Qr(j)) dj
+
pib
2
∫ s1
0
εu (qw(j)) dj−pi
s
2
(1− S1)
∫ S1
0
ψ (Qw(j)) dj−
∫ s1
0
χ (j) dj−pi
b
2
∫ s2
0
κ (j) dj+W (m˜)
+
pib
2
λw1 (j) [φd
w(j)− ψ(qw(j))] + pi
b
2
λw2 (j) [φm− φs1dw(j)]
+
pib
2
λr1(j)I{0<j≤s2} [φd
r(j)− ψ(qr(j))]
+
pib
2
λr2(j)I{0<j≤s2} [φm+ φs1l (j)− φs1dr(j)]
+
pib
2
λr1(j)I{s2<j≤s1} [φd
r(j)− ψ(qr(j))]
+
pib
2
λr2(j)I{s2<j≤s1} [φm− φs1dr(j)]
The first-order conditions are given as follows:
∂L
∂qw(j)
= εu′ (qw(j))− λw1 (j)ψ′(qw(j)) = 0
which says that an extra consumption of the white goods increases utility of buyers,
but tightens the participation constraint of sellers;
∂L
∂qr(j)
= u′ (qr(j))− λr1(j)ψ′(qr(j)) = 0
Technical Appendix
which says that an extra consumption of the red goods increases utility of buyers, but
tightens the participation constraint of sellers;
∂L
∂dw(j)
=
∫ s1
0
λw1 (j)dj − s1
∫ s1
0
λw2 (j)dj −
∫ s1
0
W ′ (m˜)
φ
dj = 0
which says that an extra payment of cash for the white goods relaxes the participation
constraint of sellers, tightens the liquidity constraint, and reduces liquidity for the
following sub-period;
∂L
∂dr(j)
=
∫ s1
0
λr1(j)dj − s1
∫ s1
0
λr2(j)dj −
∫ s1
0
W ′ (m˜)
φ
dj = 0
which says that an extra payment of cash for the red goods relaxes the participation
constraint of sellers, tightens the liquidity constraint, and reduces liquidity for the
following sub-period;
∂L
∂l(j)
= φs1
∫ s2
0
λr2(j)dj −
∫ s2
0
rW ′ (m˜) dj = 0
which says that an extra unit of cash borrowed for buyers of red goods in the credit
region increases the cash available for consumption purposes, and increases the net
repayment in the following sub-period;
∂L
∂s1
=
pib
2
u (qr(s1)) +
pib
2
εu (qw(s1))− χ (s1)
−W ′ (m˜)
(
pib
2
dr(s1) +
pib
2
dw(s1)
)
−pi
b
2
λw2 (s1)φd
w(s1)− pi
b
2
λr2(s1)φd
r(s1) = 0
which says that the range of decentralized markets participated by the representative
household is determined by the expected trade surplus net of the entry cost, and by the
fact that the further the marginal market, less amount of money distributed to each
buyers of the household, which which tightens the liquidity constraints of both buyers
of red and white goods;
∂L
∂s2
= u
(
ψ−1
(
φl(s2) +
φm
s1
))
− u
(
ψ−1
(
φm
s1
))
−κ (s2)−W ′ (m˜) rl(s2) = 0
which says that credit is used as medium of exchange up to the point when its benefit
of relaxing liquidity constraint equals to the cost of using credit.
100
REFERENCES
References
S.R. Aiyagari and S.D. Williamson. Money and dynamic credit arrangements with
private information. Journal of Economic Theory, 91(2):248–279, 2000.
Charalambos D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, and Daniela Puzzello. Contagion Equi-
libria in a Monetary Model. Econometrica, 75(1):277–282, 2007.
Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera, and Christopher Waller. Money, credit and
banking. Journal of Economic Theory, 135(1):171–195, 2007.
D. Bernhardt. Money and loans. The Review of Economic Studies, 56(1):89–100, 1989.
L. Boerner and A. Ritschl. Communal Responsibility and the Coexistence of Money
and Credit Under Anonymous Matching. SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2010-060, 2011.
Kenneth Burdett, Shouyong Shi, and Randall Wright. Pricing and matching with
frictions. Journal of Political Economy, 109(5):1060–1085, 2001.
R.O. Cavalcanti and N. Wallace. A model of private bank-note issue. Review of
Economic Dynamics, 2(1):104–136, 1999a.
R.O. Cavalcanti and N. Wallace. Inside and outside money as alternative media of
exchange. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, pages 443–457, 1999b.
Jonathan Chiu and Miguel Molico. Liquidity, redistribution, and the welfare cost
of inflation. Journal of Monetary Economics, 57(4):428 – 438, 2010. ISSN 0304-
3932. doi: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2010.03.004. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/
science/article/pii/S030439321000036X.
D. Corbae and J. Ritter. Decentralized credit and monetary exchange without public
record keeping. Economic Theory, 24(4):933–951, 2004.
Joyee Deb. Cooperation and Community Responsibility: A Folk Theorem for Repeated
Random Matching Games. Working paper, 2012.
Miquel Faig and B. Jerez. Precautionary Balances and the Velocity of Circulation of
Money. Journal of money, credit and banking, 39(4):843–873, 2007.
Pedro Gomis-Porqueras and Daniel Sanches. Optimal monetary policy in a model of
money and credit. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 45(4):701–730, 2013.
Avner Greif. History Lessons: The Birth of Impersonal Exchange: The Community
Responsibility System and Impartial Justice. The Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 20(2):221–236, 2006a. ISSN 08953309. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/
30033658.
Avner Greif. Institutions and the path to the modern economy: Lessons from medieval
trade. Cambridge University Press, 2006b.
Yi Jin and Ted Temzelides. On the local interaction of money and credit. Review of
Economic Dynamics, 7(1):143–156, 2004.
101
REFERENCES
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki and Randall Wright. On Money as a Medium of Exchange. Journal
of Political Economy, 97(4):927–954, 1989.
N. Kocherlakota and N. Wallace. Incomplete record-keeping and optimal payment
arrangements. Journal of Economic Theory, 81(2):272–289, 1998.
N.R. Kocherlakota. Money is memory. Journal of Economic Theory, 81(2):232–251,
1998.
Ricardo Lagos and Randall Wright. A Unified Framework for Monetary Theory and
Policy Analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 113(3):463–484, 2005.
Yiting Li. Currency and checking deposits as means of payment. Review of Economic
Dynamics, 14(2):403–417, 2011.
D.C. Mills. A model in which outside and inside money are essential. Macroeconomic
Dynamics, 11(03):347–366, 2007.
C.A. Pissarides. Equilibrium unemployment theory. the MIT press, 2ed edition, 2000.
Guillaume Rocheteau and Randall Wright. Money in Search Equilibrium, in Com-
petitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium. Econometrica, 73(1):
175–202, 2005.
Daniel Sanches and Stephen Williamson. Money and credit with limited commitment
and theft. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(4):1525–1549, 2010.
S. Shi. Efficiency improvement from restricting the liquidity of nominal bonds. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 55(6):1025–1037, 2008.
Shouyong Shi. Credit and Money in a Search Model with Divisible Commodities. The
Review of Economic Studies, 63(4):627–652, 1996.
Shouyong Shi. A divisible search model of fiat money. Econometrica, 65(1):75–102,
1997.
Irina A. Telyukova and Randall Wright. A Model of Money and Credit, with Applica-
tion to the Credit Card Debt Puzzle. Review of Economic Studies, 75(2):629–647,
2008.
S. Williamson and R. Wright. New Monetarist economics: Methods. Federal Reserve
Bank of St Louis Review, 92(4):265, 2010a.
S. Williamson and R. Wright. New Monetarist economics: models. Handbook of Mon-
etary Economics, 3:25–96, 2010b.
Randall Wright. A uniqueness proof for monetary steady state. Journal of Economic
Theory, 145(1):382 – 391, 2010. ISSN 0022-0531. doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.004. URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S002205310900146X.
102
3 | The Inflation Bias under Calvo and Rotemberg
Pricing∗
New Keynesian analysis relies heavily on two workhorse models of nomi-
nal inertia - due to (Calvo, 1983) and (Rotemberg, 1982), respectively - to
generate a meaningful role for monetary policy. These are often used inter-
changeably, since they imply an isomorphic linearized Phillips curve and,
if the steady-state is efficient, the same policy conclusions. In this chapter
we compute time-consistent optimal monetary policy in benchmark New
Keynesian models containing each form of price stickiness, using global so-
lution techniques. We find that the inflation bias problem under Calvo
contracts is significantly greater than under Rotemberg pricing, despite the
fact that the former typically exhibits far greater welfare costs of inflation.
The rates of inflation observed under this policy are non-trivial and suggest
that the model can comfortably generate the rates of inflation at which the
problematic issues highlighted in the trend inflation literature emerge, as
well as the movements in trend inflation emphasized in empirical studies of
the evolution of inflation. Finally, we consider the response to cost push
shocks across both models and find these can also be quite different. The
non-linearities inherent in the New Keynesian model are significant and the
form of nominal inertia adopted is not innocuous.
3.1 Introduction
Mainstream macroeconomic analysis of both monetary and fiscal policy relies heavily
on the New Keynesian model. The distinguishing feature of this model, relative to a
more classical approach, is that it contains some form of nominal inertia. This allows
∗There is a working paper version of this chapter, Leith and Liu (2014), which was presented
at the University of Glasgow, the 46th Money, Macro and Finance Annual Conference at Durham
University, and the 2015 PhD Macroeconomic Workshop at University of York. We are grateful for
comments from Guido Ascari, Fabrice Collard, Richard Dennis, Charles Nolan, and the participants
in these seminars and conferences.
Introduction
monetary policy to have real effects, and widens the degree of interaction between
monetary and fiscal policies, since monetary policy affects both the size of the tax
base and real debt service costs in such models. Typically, one of two workhorse
forms of nominal inertia are adopted in the literature - Calvo (1983) price contracts,
and Rotemberg (1982) price adjustment costs. In the former, firms are only able to
adjust their prices after random intervals of time, such that, outside of a zero inflation
steady-state there will be a costly dispersion of prices across firms. While the latter
implies that all firms behave symmetrically in setting the same price, but that they face
quadratic adjustment costs in doing so. Despite this fundamental difference, researchers
have typically treated the two approaches as being equivalent since the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve (NKPC) they imply are, to a first order of approximation, isomorphic
when linearized around a zero inflation steady state. Moreover, when that zero inflation
steady-state is also efficient (that is, it matches the output level that would be chosen
by a benevolent social planner) it can be shown that the second order approximation
to welfare rewritten in terms of inflation and the output gap is also the same across
the two approaches (see Nistico, 2007). Under these conditions, to a first order of
approximation, the two approaches would yield the same policy implications. For
these reasons the two approaches have largely been treated as synonymous within the
New Keynesian literature.
However, despite this broad consensus, there are examples within the literature
where the two approaches do differ. The first is where the steady-state around which
we approximate the New Keynesian economy is not efficient. For example, Lombardo
and Vestin (2008) relax the assumption of Nistico (2007) and consider the second order
approximation to welfare when the steady state is not efficient. They find that the
costs of such inefficiencies are typically larger in the Calvo economy. This mirrors the
results in Damjanovic and Nolan (2011) .
The second assumption underpinning the equivalence result, is that the economy is
approximated around a zero inflation steady state (or that any steady-state inflation is
perfectly indexed and therefore costless, see Yun (1996) ). A literature considering the
importance of trend inflation argues that this is not the case, and that the implications
of failing to account for trend inflation can be dramatic, see Ascari and Sbordone
(2014) for a survey. The presence of even a modest degree of (unindexed) steady-
state inflation can radically overturn determinacy results, undermine the learnability
of rational expectations equilibria, affect the monetary policy transmission mechanism
and change the nature of optimal policy. Moreover, these effects can differ across the
two forms of nominal inertia (Ascari and Rossi, 2012) with the larger impact of trend
inflation being felt under Calvo. The large costs of trend inflation under Calvo is
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also reflected in the analysis of Damjanovic and Nolan (2010a) where the seigniorage
maximizing rate of inflation is at double digit levels under Rotemberg pricing, but only
single digits under Calvo. In short, there appears to be significant non-linearities in the
New Keynesian model which are affected by the size of the steady-state distortion, the
degree of unindexed inflation and the type of nominal inertia adopted. However, this
evidence largely comes from studies which linearize such economies, either to a first or
second order approximation, after allowing for such factors.
In this chapter, we solve the benchmark New Keynesian model non-linearly, using
the two standard approaches to modelling price stickiness. Since we are not impos-
ing any kind of approximation around a steady-state, we can fully explore the non-
linearities inherent in the New Keynesian model and see clearly the extent to which
the two approaches differ. Moreover, rather than consider the Ramsey problem or com-
mitment to a simple monetary rule, we shall consider time-consistent optimal policy
(commonly known as discretion). This in turn, given that we are not using any artificial
devices to ensure the model’s steady-state is efficient, implies that we can measure the
extent of the inflationary bias problem under the two forms of nominal inertia. This
identifies the extent to which a policy maker who is constrained to be time-consistent
would be unable to prevent a costly rise in steady-state or trend inflation. This is an
important measure of the non-linearities across the two descriptions of pricing behavior,
but also serves as a plausibility check on the relevance of the effects highlighted in the
literature on trend inflation. The inflation bias thus measures the maximum level of
unindexed inflation that a policy maker would be forced to tolerate - the policy maker
which allowed inflation to rise above this level is behaving sub-optimally even given the
constraint that they cannot commit. Therefore, if the level of inflation bias is signifi-
cantly below that required to generate the perverse results found in the trend-inflation
literature, then we would need to find a reason why policy makers are not only failing
to commit, but are generating inflation levels well beyond the maximum inflation bias,
before we need worry about these properties of the New Keynesian model. While if
the model implies a sizeable inflation bias, then the issues raised by the trend inflation
literature and, more generally, the non-linearities inherent in the New Keynesian model
need to be taken more seriously.
There is also an empirical literature which focusses on these two distortions in
helping to explain inflation dynamics. Ireland (2007) allows for time variation in the
Fed’s inflation target to explain the evolution of US inflation. Cogley and Sargent
(2002) argue that much of the movement in US inflation reflects movements in an
underlying trend, rather than in fluctuations relative to that trend. Meanwhile, several
authors have sought to identify the level of trend inflation using generalizations of the
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new Keynesian Phillips curve which allow for time varying (unindexed) trend inflation.
As an example of the findings of this literature, Cogley and Sbordone (2008) argue
that trend inflation rather than any kind of backward-looking indexation behavior is
a major component of observed movements in inflation. Again we can ask - can the
benchmark model, using either Rotemberg or Calvo pricing plausibly deliver the size
of unindexed steady state or trend inflation these papers infer to explain the data?
Moving away from the Ramsey description of policy is important, as such a policy
implies that the optimal rate of inflation the policy maker would commit to would be
zero in the benchmark model employing either Calvo or Rotemberg pricing (Woodford,
2003), and in the case of Calvo contracts very close to zero in models with other
distortions due to, for example, fiscal policy (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004) or a desire
to generate seigniorage revenues (Damjanovic and Nolan, 2011). Under Rotemberg, the
example of Damjanovic and Nolan suggests that this may not be a general result across
the two descriptions of nominal inertia, since the welfare costs of nominal inertia do not
rise as sharply as the rate of inflation rises under Calvo. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that Ramsey policy would typically imply that inflation was far lower and stable than
appears to be found in the data.14
There are some recent papers using global solution techniques which also consider
optimal discretionary policy in the New Keynesian model under Calvo contracts - see
Van Zandweghe and Wolman (2011) and Anderson et al. (2010), which is then extended
in Ngo (2014) to allow for discount factor shocks which imply that policy must account
for the zero lower bound (ZLB).15 Other authors also consider issues relating to the ZLB
in models which use Rotemberg pricing, but also introduce extensions such as capital
(see Gavin et al. (2013), Braun and Korber (2011), Johannsen (2014)), consumption
habits (Gust et al. (2012) and Aruoba and Schorfheide (2013)), labor market frictions
(Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2013)) or fiscal policy (Nakata (2013), Niemann et al. (2013) and
Johannsen (2014)).16 Solving non-linear representations of an enriched New Keynesian
model is typically far more computationally intensive than conventional perturbation
methods, and these latter authors have all adopted the Rotemberg description of price
stickiness since this reduces the number of state variables one must consider. Further-
14Chen et al. (2014) assess the relative empirical performance of a New Keynesian model with habits
and inflation inertia with policy described by not only by simple rules, but also optimal policy under
discretion, commitment and quasi-commitment. They find that discretion fits the data far better than
any other description of policy, especially commitment which is simply too effective in stabilising the
economy to be consistent with the data.
15Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2012), Wieland (2013) and Richter et al. (2013) also explore equi-
librium dynamics around the ZLB in variants of the New Keynesian model which adopt Calvo price
contracts, but which adopt a rule-based description of policy.
16Within this group, Shibayama and Sunakawa (2012), Nakata (2013), and Niemann et al. (2013)
explore optimal policy in various New Keynesian models using Rotemberg pricing. The others utilise
a rule-based description of policy.
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more, in calibrating the Rotemberg price adjustment cost parameter almost all these
authors use a conventional parameterization which matches the slope of the linearized
NKPC across the Rotemberg and Calvo variants of the New Keynesian model after
assuming a zero inflation steady-state. In other words, the literature is typically im-
plicitly assuming that the equivalence of the two forms of nominal inertia is retained
in non-linear solutions of the New Keynesian model where the steady-state is distorted
and the rate of inflation will typically not be zero. To our knowledge, the current
chapter is the first to formally compare and contrast time-consistent optimal policy
under the two forms of price-setting using global solution algorithms, and therefore to
assess how innocuous the choice of one form of price-setting over the other actually is.
We find that the inflationary bias problem is non-trivial under both descriptions
of nominal inertia, but is much greater under Calvo. This is despite earlier results
implying that the costs of inflation are much higher under Calvo than Rotemberg.
This essentially arises because of the different average mark-up behavior under the two
models. Under Calvo higher inflation causes those firms who are able to adjust prices
in a particular period to raise that price in anticipation of not being able to readjust
that price for a prolonged period, despite the general rise in the price level. This leads
to an increase in the average mark-up as inflation rises. In contrast, under Rotemberg
all firms set the same price, period by period, but face adjustment costs in doing so.
In discounting future profits, they also discount future price adjustment costs. As a
result, in the face of higher inflation the firms postpone some of the required price
adjustment due to this discounting effect, which serves to reduce the average markup.
Accordingly, for a given degree of monopolistic competition which induces an inflation
bias, this further raises (lowers) the markup under Calvo (Rotemberg) and thereby
worsens (improves) the inflationary bias problem. This effect also tends to imply that
the inflationary impact of a given cost-push shock is greater under Calvo pricing, ceteris
paribus. Meanwhile, the presence of an additional state variable under Calvo price-
setting, namely price dispersion, can also result in a hump-shaped response in output
to cost-push shocks which would not be the case under either Rotemberg pricing or
the benchmark linearized model. The fact that steady-state inflation would ceteris
paribus, and using standard calibration approaches, be significantly higher under Calvo
also has implications for the probability of hitting the ZLB such that studies adopting
Rotemberg pricing are more likely to experience such episodes.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the basic
model under both Calvo and Rotemberg pricing. In section 3, we formulate the opti-
mal discretionary policy problem with Rotemberg and Calvo pricing, respectively. In
section 4, we present numerical results. In section 5, we extend the analysis to allow
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for a tax-driven cost-push shock to assess policy trade-offs. We conclude in section 6.
3.2 The Model
This section describes the basic economic structure in our model.
3.2.1 Households
There are a continuum of households of size one. We shall assume full asset markets,
such that, through risk sharing, they will face the same budget constraint and make
the same consumption plans. As a result, at period 0 the typical household will seek
to maximize the following objective function,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt) (3.1)
where 0 < β < 1 denotes the discount factor, Ct and Nt are a consumption aggregate,
and labour supply at period t, respectively.
The household purchases differentiated goods in a retail market and combines them
into composite goods using a CES aggregator:
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
,  > 1 (3.2)
where Ct(j) is the demand for differentiated goods of type j.
The budget constraint at time t is given by∫ 1
0
Pt(j)Ct(j)dj + Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Ξt +Dt +WtNt − Tt (3.3)
where Pt(j) is the nominal price of type j goods, Dt+1 is the nominal payoff of the
nominal bonds portfolio held at the end of period t, Ξ is the representative household’s
share of profits in the imperfectly competitive firms, W are wages, and T are lump-sum
taxes/transfers.17 Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead payoffs.
The labor market is perfectly competitive and wages are fully flexible.
Households must first decide how to allocate a given level of expenditure across the
various goods that are available. They do so by adjusting the share of a particular good
17In Section 5 we shall analyse cost push shocks driven by fluctuations in a revenue tax which shall
be rebated to households in a lump-sum form.
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in their consumption bundle to exploit any relative price differences—this minimizes
the costs of consumption. The demand curve for each good j is,
Ct(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Ct (3.4)
where the aggregate price level Pt is defined to be
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−dj
) 1
1−
. (3.5)
The dynamic budget constraint at period t can therefore be rewritten as
PtCt + Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Ξt +Dt +WtNt − Tt. (3.6)
Households’ problem
The household’s decision problem can be dealt with in two stages. First, regardless
of the level of Ct the household purchases the combination of individual goods that
minimizes the cost of achieving this level of the composite good. Second, given the cost
of achieving any given level of Ct, the household chooses Ct, Dt+1 and Nt optimally.
We have solved the first stage problem above. For tractability, we assume that (3.1)
takes the specific form
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
. (3.7)
where σ > 0 is a risk aversion parameter and ϕ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply.
We can then maximize utility subject to the budget constraint (3.6) to obtain, after
taking expectations, the optimal allocation of consumption across time,
βRtEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1, (3.8)
where Rt ≡ 1Et(Qt,t+1) is the gross nominal return on a riskless one period bond paying
off a unit of currency in t + 1. This is the familiar consumption Euler equation which
implies that consumers are attempting to smooth consumption over time such that the
marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods (after allowing for tilting due
to interest rates differing from the households’ rate of time preference).
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The second first order condition concerning labour supply decision is given by(
Wt
Pt
)
= Nϕt C
σ
t . (3.9)
3.2.2 Firms
Each firm produces a differentiated good j using a constant returns to scale production
function:
Yt(j) = AtNt(j) (3.10)
where Yt(j) is the output of firm j, and Nt(j) denotes the hours hired by the firm,
At is an exogenous aggregate productivity shock at period t, and at = log(At) is time
varying and stochastic.18
Similar to the household’s problem, we first consider the cost minimization problem
of firm j, which implies that the real marginal costs of production are given by
mct =
Wt
PtAt
, (3.11)
Note that the real marginal cost described in (3.11) does not depend on the output
level of an individual firm, since its production function exhibits constant returns to
scale and prices of inputs (here labor) are fully flexible.
The demand curve the firm j faces is given by
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Yt,
where Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1 .
The intermediate-good sector is monopolistically competitive and the intermediate
good producer therefore has market power. In the following, we consider two alternative
forms of price stickiness - firstly that due to Rotemberg (1982) and then that of Calvo
(1983).
Rotemberg Pricing
The Rotemberg model assumes that a monopolistic firm faces a quadratic cost of ad-
justing nominal prices, which can be measured in terms of the final good and given
18Typically, the logarithm of At is assumed to follow an AR(1) process: at = ρaat−1 + eat, 0 ≤
ρa < 1 where technology shock eat is an i.i.d. random variable, which has a zero mean and a finite
standard deviation σa.
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by
φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
Yt (3.12)
where φ ≥ 0 measures the degree of nominal price rigidity. The adjustment cost, which
accounts for the negative effects of price changes on the customer–firm relationship,
increases in magnitude with the size of the price change and with the overall scale of
economic activity Yt.
The problem for firm j is then to maximize the discounted value of nominal profits,
max
{Pt(j)}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
s=0
Qt,t+sΞt+s
where nominal profits are defined as
Ξt = Pt(j)Yt(j)−mctYt(j)Pt − φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
YtPt (3.13)
Firms can change their price in each period, subject to their demand curve and
payment of the adjustment cost. Hence, all the firms face the same problem, and thus
will choose the same price, and produce the same quantity such that, Pt(j) = Pt and
Yt(j) = Yt for any j. Hence, the first-order condition for a symmetric equilibrium is
(1− ) + mct − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0. (3.14)
This is the Rotemberg version of the non-linear Phillips curve that relates current
inflation to future expected inflation and to the level of output.
Calvo Pricing
Each period, the firms that adjust their price are randomly selected, and a fraction
1 − θ of all firms adjust while the remaining θ fraction do not adjust. Those firms
that do adjust their price at time t do so to maximize the expected discounted value of
current and future profits. Profits at some future date t+s are affected by the choice of
price at time t only if the firm has not received another opportunity to adjust between
t and t+ s. The probability of this is θs.
The firm’s pricing decision problem then involves picking Pt(j) to maximize dis-
counted nominal profits Using the demand curve for the firm’s product, this objective
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function can be written as
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
[
Pt(j)
(
Pt(j)
Pt+s
)−
Yt+s −mct+s
(
Pt(j)
Pt+s
)−
Yt+sPt+s
]
.
where the discount factor Qt,t+s is given by βs
(
Ct
Ct+s
)σ
Pt
Pt+s
, and mct+s is the marginal
cost of production.
Let P ∗t be the optimal price chosen by all firms able to reset their price at time t.
The first order condition for the optimal choice of P ∗t is,
P ∗t
Pt
=
(

− 1
)
Kpt
F pt
(3.15)
where
Kpt = C
−σ
t mctYt + θβEt
[(
Pt+1
Pt
)
Kpt+1
]
F pt = C
−σ
t Yt + θβEt
[(
Pt+1
Pt
)−1
F pt+1
]
.
The price index evolves according to
1 = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1−
+ θ(Πt)
−1 with Πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1
. (3.16)
and price dispersion is described by
∆t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
dj = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
∆t−1. (3.17)
3.2.3 Aggregate Conditions
Under Rotemberg pricing, as all the firms will employ the same amount of labour, the
aggregate production function is simply given by
Yt = AtNt.
and the aggregate resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct +
φ
2
(Πt − 1)2 Yt.
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Note that the Rotemberg adjustment cost creates an inefficiency wedge ψRt between
output and consumption
Ct =
(
1− ψRt
)
Yt =
(
1− ψRt
)
AtNt (3.18)
where ψRt =
φ
2
(Πt − 1)2.
In the case of Calvo pricing, firms changing prices in different periods will generally
have different prices. Thus, the model features price dispersion. When firms have
different relative prices, there are distortions that create a wedge between the aggregate
output measured in terms of production factor inputs and aggregate demand measured
in terms of the composite goods. Specifically,
Nt(j) =
Yt(j)
At
=
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Yt
At
which yields,
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(j)dj =
Yt
At
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
dj =
Yt∆t
At
after integrating across firms. ∆t ≥ 1 implies that price dispersion is always costly
in terms of aggregate output: the higher ∆t, the more labour is needed to produce a
given level of output. Moreover, under Calvo different firms with different prices will
employ different amounts of labor. This explains why higher price dispersion acts as
a negative productivity shift in the aggregate production function: Yt = (At/∆t)Nt.
In addition, price dispersion is a backward-looking variable, and introduces an inertial
component into the model.
Under Calvo, the aggregate resource constraint is simply given by
Yt = Ct.
Hence, defining ψct = ∆t − 1 as an inefficiency wedge under Calvo, then
Ct = Yt =
AtNt
(1 + ψct )
(3.19)
Comparing (3.18) and (3.19), it is illuminating to note that the Rotemberg adjustment
cost creates a wedge ψRt between aggregate consumption and aggregate output, while
the Calvo price dispersion creates a wedge ψct between aggregate hours and aggregate
output. In addition, both wedges are non-linear functions of inflation, and they are
minimized at one when steady-state net inflation equals zero (Π = 1), and both wedges
increase as trend inflation moves away from zero. See Ascari and Rossi (2012) for a
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discussion.
Appendix 3.A.1 summarizes the models under Rotemberg and Calvo pricing.
3.3 Optimal Policy Problem Under Discretion
Under discretion, the monetary authority solves a sequential or period-by-period opti-
mization problem, which maximizes the representative household’s expected discounted
utility subject to the optimality conditions from market participants, the aggregate
conditions, and the law of motion for the state variables. Therefore, under optimal dis-
cretion, the policymaker cannot commit to a plan in the hope of influencing economic
agents’ expectations.
3.3.1 Rotemberg Pricing
Let V (At) represents the value function at period t in the Bellman equation for the
optimal policy problem. The optimal monetary policy then solves the following opti-
mization problem:
V (At) = max{Ct,Yt,Πt}
{
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (At+1)]
}
(3.20)
subject to,
Ct =
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt (3.21)
and,
(1− ) + YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1 − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0
(3.22)
Defining an auxilliary function,
M(At+1) ≡ C−σt+1Yt+1Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
we can rewrite the Phillips curve (4.12) as,
(1− ) + YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1 − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβCσt Y −1t Et [M(At+1)] = 0
which captures the fact that the policy maker recognizes that any change in the state
variable will affect expectations, but cannot promise to behave in a particular way
114
Optimal Policy Problem Under Discretion
tomorrow in order to influence expectations today. The optimal policy problem can
then be formulated as the following Lagrangian,
L = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (At+1)] + λ1t
{[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt − Ct
}
+ λ2t
{
(1− ) + YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1 − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβCσt Y −1t Et [M(At+1)]
}
where λ1t and λ2t are the Lagrange multipliers. The first order conditions and comple-
mentary slackness conditions are given as follows,
C−σt = λ1t − λ2t
{
σYt
ϕCσ−1t At
−ϕ−1 + σφβCσ−1t Y
−1
t Et [M(At+1)]
}
,
Yt
ϕAt
−1−ϕ = λ1t
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
+ λ2t
{
ϕYt
ϕ−1Cσt At
−ϕ−1 − φβCσt Y −2t Et [M(At+1)]
}
,
λ1tφ (1− Πt)Yt = λ2tφ (2Πt − 1) ,
Ct =
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt,
0 = (1− ) + YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1 − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβCσt Y −1t Et [M(At+1)] .
Note that consumption Euler equation is non-binding from the point of view of maxi-
mizing utility, because Rt (a variable of no direct interest in utility) can effectively be
chosen to achieve the desired level of consumption.
The fully nonlinear problem is then to find five policy functions which relate the
three choice variables {Yt, Ct, Πt} and two Lagrange multipliers {λ1t, λ2t} to the state
variable At, that is, Yt = Y (At), Ct = C(At), Πt = Π(At), λ1t = λ1(At), and λ2t =
λ2(At). We will use the Chebyshev collocation method to approximate these five time
invariant rules.
3.3.2 Calvo Pricing
Let V (∆t−1, At) denote the value function at period t in the Bellman equation for the
optimal policy problem. The optimal monetary policy under discretion then can be
described as a set of decision rules for {Ct, Yt,Πt, P
∗
t
Pt
, Kpt , F
p
t ,∆t} which maximize,
V (∆t−1, At) = max
{
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(∆tYt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (∆t, At+1)]
}
subject to the following constraints,
Resource constraint:
Yt = Ct
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Phillips curve:
P ∗t
Pt
=
(

− 1
)
Kpt
F pt
with
Kpt = (∆tYt)
ϕAt
−ϕ−1Yt + θβEt [M(∆t, At+1)]
F pt = YtC
−σ
t + θβEt [L(∆t, At+1)] ,
where we have utilized two auxilliary functions,
M(∆t, At+1) = (Πt+1)
Kpt+1
and
L(∆t, At+1) = (Πt+1)
−1 F pt+1,
which again captures the highlights the fact that the policy maker recognizes that any
change in the state variable will affect expectations, but cannot make credible promises
about their future behavior. Inflation:
1 = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1−
+ θ(Πt)
−1
Price dispersion:
∆t = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ (Πt)
 ∆t−1.
As before, the policy problem can be written in Lagrangian form as follows:
L = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
(∆tYt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (∆t, At+1)]
+ λ1t[Yt − Ct]
+ λ2t
[
P ∗t
Pt
−
(

− 1
)
Kpt
F pt
]
+ λ3t
{
Kpt − (∆tYt)ϕAt−ϕ−1Yt − θβEt [M(∆t, At+1)]
}
+ λ4t
{
F pt − YtC−σt − θβEt [L(∆t, At+1)]
}
+ λ5t
[
1− (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1−
− θ(Πt)−1
]
+ λ6t
[
∆t − (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
− θ (Πt) ∆t−1
]
where λjt (j = 1, .., 6) are the Lagrange multipliers. The first order conditions are given
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as follows: for consumption,
C−σt − λ1t + σYtC−σ−1t λ4t = 0
output,
−(∆t/At)1+ϕY ϕt + λ1t − (1 + ϕ)(∆tYt)ϕAt−ϕ−1λ3t − C−σt λ4t = 0
optimal price,
λ2t + (1− θ)(− 1)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
λ5t + (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−−1
λ6t = 0
inflation,
−(− 1)θλ5t − θ∆t−1Πtλ6t = 0
numerator of optimal price Kpt ,
−
(

− 1
)
1
F pt
λ2t + λ3t = 0
denominator of optimal price F pt ,(

− 1
)
Kpt
(F pt )
2
λ2t + λ4t = 0
and price dispersion,
0 = −(Yt/At)1+ϕ∆ϕt + β
∂Et [V (∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
− ϕ(∆t)ϕ−1At−ϕ−1Y ϕ+1t λ3t
− θβ ∂Et [M(∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
λ3t − θβ ∂Et [L(∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
λ4t + λ6t
Note that the envelope theorem yields
∂V (∆t−1, At)
∂∆t−1
= −θ (Πt) λ6t
which allows us to rewrite the first order condition for price dispersion as,
0 = −(Yt/At)1+ϕ(∆t)ϕ − θβEt [(Πt+1) λ6t+1]− ϕ(∆t)ϕ−1At−ϕ−1Y ϕ+1t λ3t
− θβ ∂Et [M(∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
λ3t − θβ ∂Et [L(∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
λ4t + λ6t
We can solve the nonlinear system consisting of these seven first order conditions
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and the six constraints to yield the time-consistent optimal policy under Calvo pricing.
Specifically, without commitment, we need to find these thirteen time-invariant policy
rules which are functions of the two state variables {∆t−1, At}. That is, we need to
find policy functions such as F Pt = F P (∆t−1, At), KPt = KP (∆t−1, At), and Πt =
Π (∆t−1, At). Similar to the Rotemberg case, the Chebyshev collocation method will
be used to approximate these policy functions.
3.4 Numerical Analysis
3.4.1 Solution Method
We use the Chebyshev collocation method to globally approximate the policy func-
tions.19 In contrast to the linear-quadratic approximation method, this projection
method can capture the extent to which the two approaches to modelling price stick-
iness differ, due to the non-linearities inherent in the New Keynesian models. First,
we discretize the state space into a set of collocation nodes. In the Rotemberg model,
there is one state variable (At), while in the Calvo model there are two state variables
(∆t−1, At). Accordingly, the space of the approximating functions for the Rotemberg
pricing consists of one-dimensional Chebyshev polynomials. In comparison, the space
of approximating functions for the Calvo pricing is two-dimensional, and is, given by
the tensor products of two sets of Chebyshev polynomials. Then we define the residual
functions based on the equilibrium conditions. Gaussian-Hermite quadrature is used
to approximate expectation terms. Under Calvo pricing, the partial derivatives with
respect to price dispersion, are approximated by differentiating the Chebyshev polyno-
mials. Finally, we solve the resultant system of nonlinear equations consisting of the
residual functions evaluated over all the collocation nodes.20 See appendix 3.A.2 for
details.
3.4.2 Numerical Results
Benchmark Parameters and Solution Accuracy
The benchmark parameters for Calvo pricing are taken from Anderson et al. (2010)
and are standard. We conduct a sensitivity analysis below. To make the results from
19Judd (1992) and Judd (1998) are good references.
20We also tried the time iteration method. That is, a smaller system of nonlinear equations,
composed of the residual functions evaluated at each collocation node, is solved repeatedly. For the
benchmark case in this chapter, both methods find identical solutions. However, the time iteration
method will be used for other cases since it is generally faster and more robust.
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Rotemberg pricing comparable, the value of price adjustment cost is calibrated so that
the linear quadratic approximation for both cases are equivalent21. This implies an
equivalence between the two forms of pricing provided the steady-state is undistorted
with a rate of inflation of zero. Such an approach is typically adopted in the literature
even where authors are considering models where these conditions are not met. Table
3.1 summarizes the relevant parameter values.
Table 3.1: Parameterization
Parameter Value Definition
β 0.99 Quarterly discount factor
σ 1 Relative risk aversion coefficient
ϕ 1 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
 11 Elasticity of substitution between varieties
θ 0.75 Probability of fixing prices in each quarter
ρa 0.95 AR-coefficient of technology shock
σa 0.01 Standard deviation of technology shock
φ 116 Rotemberg adjustment cost
With this benchmark parameterization, we solve the fully nonlinear models via
the Chebyshev collocation method. Following Anderson et al. (2010) , the relative
price dispersion ∆t is bounded by [1, 1.02], and the logged productivity at takes values
from [−2σa/(1 − ρa), 2σa/(1 − ρa)] = [−0.4, 0.4]. For the Rotemberg case, the order
of approximation na is chosen to be 6, and the number of nodes for Gauss-Hermite
quadrature q = 12. This combination is quite accurate, since the maximum Euler
equation error is of the order of 10−8. For the Calvo case, the order of approximation
na and n∆ are both assigned to be 6, and q = 12 for Gauss-Hermite quadrature. The
maximum Euler equation error over the full range is of the order of 10−7. As suggested
by Judd (1998) , this order of accuracy is reasonable.
Steady State Inflation Bias
Figure 3.1 illustrates the solution of the discretionary equilibria for the Calvo case.
Similar to the results in Anderson et al. (2010) , the red dotted line plots the value
of ∆t as a function of ∆t−1 in a narrow interval of [1, 1.02]. The steady state relative
price dispersion is about 1.0026 which is the intersection point between the red line and
21That is, φ = (−1)θ(1−θ)(1−βθ) .
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the solid 45-degree line. At this fixed point, the value of optimal gross inflation Π (the
dashed line) is about 1.0054, implying an annualized inflation rate of 2.2%. In contrast,
the discretionary inflation rate for the Rotemberg case is 1.0047 or 1.89% per year. It
is well known that the optimal rate of inflation under commitment is zero, hence the
inflation bias is equal to the optimal rate of inflation under discretion. Therefore, the
inflation bias problem under Calvo pricing is more severe than that under Rotemberg
pricing for the benchmark parameters. We now turn to discuss this result, as well as
undertaking a sensitivity analysis.
1 1.005 1.01 1.015 1.02
1
1.005
1.01
1.015
1.02
Lagged price dispersion ∆t−1
 
 
Inflation Πt
Price Dispersion ∆t
45° Line
Figure 3.1: Relative price dispersion and inflation as functions of lagged relative price dispersion. This figure shows
how the relative price dispersion converges to its steady state.
To explore this difference further, we change the value of the monopolistic com-
petition distortion defined by /( − 1) by varying  and assessing its effect on the
equilibrium inflation bias. We interchangeably describe this measure of the monopo-
listic competition distortion as the flexible-price markup since it measures the markup
that would be observed under flexible prices. This approach is based on the fact that
the size of the inflation bias depends on the degree of monopolistic distortion, which
makes steady state (even flexible-price) output inefficient and generates the temptation
on the part of the policy maker to inflate the economy. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show how
the size of inflation bias changes as the markup is varied for the Calvo and Rotemberg
pricing, respectively. The benchmark  = 11 yields a gross flexible-price markup of 1.1.
When  decreases, the corresponding monopolistic competition distortion and inflation
bias increases. To illustrate the impact of the monopoly distortion on the non-linearity,
the inflation bias for both cases under the linear-quadratic approximation (LQ) are also
presented. The traditional linear-quadratic method becomes increasingly inaccurate for
larger distortions.
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Figure 3.2: This figure shows the effect of monopolistic distortion under Rotemberg pricing. The monopolistic
distortion is measured by markup at the deterministic steady state with zero inflation rate. The results from LQ and
projection method are compared.
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Figure 3.3: This figure shows the effect of monopolistic distortion under Calvo pricing. The monopolistic distortion
is measured by markup at the deterministic steady state with zero inflation rate. The results from LQ and projection
method are compared.
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Table 3.2: Sensitivity analysis for Calvo pricing
Parameter Values Numerical results
θ σ ϕ  Price dispersion Nonlinear solution LQ solution
θ 0.05 1 1 11 1.0000 1.71 1.66
0.3 1 1 11 1.0001 1.78 1.66
0.5 1 1 11 1.0003 1.84 1.66
0.75 1 1 11 1.0026 2.18 1.65
0.85 1 1 11 1.0275 3.01 1.64
0.90 1 1 11 1.0726 2.55 1.60
σ 0.75 0.3 1 11 1.0308 5.64 2.54
0.75 1 1 11 1.0026 2.18 1.65
0.75 5 1 11 1.0002 0.60 0.56
ϕ 0.75 1 0.36 11 1.0139 4.31 2.42
0.75 1 1 11 1.0026 2.18 1.65
0.75 1 4.75 11 1.0002 0.60 0.56
Note: the last two columns contain the annualized inflation rate in percentage solved by the projection method
and the LQ method, respectively. The numbers are rounded up.
Table 3.3: Sensitivity analysis for Rotemberg pricing
Parameter Values Annualized Inflation rate (%)
θ σ ϕ  Nonlinear solution LQ solution
θ 0.05 1 1 1 1.94 1.83
0.3 1 1 1 1.94 1.83
0.5 1 1 11 1.93 1.83
0.75 1 1 11 1.90 1.82
0.85 1 1 11 1.83 1.80
0.90 1 1 11 1.72 1.76
σ 0.75 0.3 1 11 2.95 2.54
0.75 1 1 11 1.90 1.82
0.75 5 1 11 0.64 0.56
ϕ 0.75 1 0.36 11 2.83 2.42
0.75 1 1 11 1.90 1.82
0.75 1 4.75 11 0.64 0.56
Note: for comparison, θ, which affects φ, is included. The numbers are rounded up.
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Finally, we do some comparative statics with the model under both pricing ap-
proaches, in order to explore how other parameters affect the severity of the inflation
bias problem and the sensitivity of the results obtained from the linear-quadratic ap-
proach. Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 summarize the robustness outcomes for the Calvo and
Rotemberg pricing, respectively. In general, the inflation bias problem is much worse
under Calvo pricing.
3.4.3 Discussion
The Average Markup and Inflation Bias
We find that the inflationary bias problem is significantly greater under Calvo, es-
pecially as the monopolistic competition distortion is increased. At the same time,
consumption falls by more, and hours worked by less under Calvo as we increase this
distortion, and the average markup rises above the flexible price markup under Calvo,
while decreases under Rotemberg, as a result of the non-linear effects of the inflation
bias. See Figures 3.2 and 3.3.
In understanding the results, it is helpful to consider the effects of inflation on the
two models. Ascari and Rossi (2012) discuss how inflation affects both models through
a ‘wedge’ effect as well as an average markup effect. We shall consider the wedge effect
first, before turning to the average markup effects, which will turn out to be key. Under
both forms of nominal inertia, the ‘wedge’ implies that the representative household’s
aggregate consumption will be lower for a given level of labour input as inflation rises.
Under Calvo, this is because the dispersion of prices means that they need to consume
relatively more of the cheaper goods to compensate for the expensive goods, given
diminishing marginal utility in the consumption of each good. As Damjanovic and
Nolan (2010b) note, this is akin to a negative productivity shock, where we can combine
the resource and aggregate production function to yield,
Ct =
At
(1 + ψct )
Nt
where the inefficient wedge under Calvo, ψct = ∆t − 1, captures the extent to which
price dispersion has been raised above one.
Under Rotemberg, the micro-foundation of the wedge is different - adjusting prices
uses up consumption goods directly. However, we can similarly combine the aggre-
gate production function and resource constraint to obtain a similar expression under
Rotemberg,
Ct = At(1− ψRt )Nt
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where the Rotemberg wedge, ψRt =
φ
2
(Πt − 1)2 reflects the costs per unit of output
of changing prices. Therefore, in both cases the labour costs of attaining a particular
level of aggregate consumption are higher, ceteris paribus, as inflation rises.
In order to assess how this affects the inflation bias problem facing the policy maker,
it is helpful to imagine how a social planner would respond to the existence of such
wedges, were he to imagine them to be exogenously given in the manner of a technology
shock. Given the form of household utility, the social planner would choose an optimal
level of labour input of
Nt
σ+ϕ =
(
At
(1 + ψct )
)1−σ
under Calvo, and
Nt
σ+ϕ =
(
At(1− ψRt )
)1−σ
under Rotemberg. Therefore, for our benchmark calibration of σ = 1 the social planner
would not seek to adjust the labour input into the production process as a result of
increases in either of the wedges, but would simply allow consumption to fall. In other
words, for our benchmark calibration the efficiencies implied by these wedges do not
give the policy maker a further desire to generate a surprise inflation, ceteris paribus.
While if σ > 1 the social planner would seek to reduce the labour input as either of
these inefficiency wedges increased. That is, in this case the wedges would reduce the
desire to encourage firms to employ more workers, ceteris paribus. We can see this
from Tables 3.2 and 3.3 where raising the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, σ, reduces the inflation bias under both pricing models. Therefore, the
different inefficiency wedges under Calvo and Rotemberg are not responsible for the
observed inflation biases.
Instead the differences in inflation bias across the two models are generated by their
average mark-up behavior, which is fundamentally different. Consider the steady-state
of the average markup (equal to the inverse of real marginal cost) under Rotemberg,
which is obtained by rearranging the deterministic steady state of the new Keynesian
Phillips curve (NKPC) as,
mc−1 =
[
− 1

+
(1− β)

φ(Π− 1)Π
]−1
The second term within the square brackets exists as a combination of steady-state
inflation and discounting on the part of firms (on behalf of their owners, the represen-
tative household). Essentially, as the firm discounts future profits, they also discount
future price adjustment costs. As a result, in the face of ongoing inflation, they will
opt to partially delay the required price adjustment, such that the average mark-up is
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decreasing in inflation.
The effect of inflation on the average mark-up under Calvo is,
mc−1 =

− 1
(
1− θβΠ−1
1− θβΠ
)(
1− θΠ−1
1− θ
) 1
−1
In this case the effects of inflation on the average markup are ambiguous. However,
following King and Wolman (1996), this can be decomposed into two elements - the
marginal markup,
P ∗
MC
=

− 1
(
1− θβΠ−1
1− θβΠ
)
and the price adjustment gap,
P
P ∗
=
(
1− θΠ−1
1− θ
) 1
−1
.
Here we can see that higher inflation raises the marginal markup. Firms facing the
possibility of being stuck with the current price for a prolonged period will tend to
raise their reset price, when that price is likely to be eroded by inflation throughout
the life of that contract. The effect of inflation on the price adjustment gap will tend
to reduce this element of the average markup. However, except at very low rates of
inflation, the effects of inflation on the average markup through the marginal mark-up
effect are positive.
Therefore, we would expect to see average markups rise with inflation under Calvo,
but fall under Rotemberg. This, in turn, implies that the inflationary bias problem is
worsened under Calvo as the rising markups increase the policy makers incentives to
introduce a surprise inflation, ceteris paribus, at the same time, as it is mitigated under
Rotemberg. As a result, the inflation bias problem is significantly higher under Calvo
where consumption falls by more and hours by less than it does under Rotemberg.
Sensitivity Analysis
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 consider the robustness of our results across various parameters for
Calvo and Rotemberg pricing, respectively. The first three rows of each Table increase
the degree of nominal inertia (where the Rotemberg price adjustment parameter is
adjusted in line with the changes in the Calvo parameter such that the linearized NKPC
is equivalent across both forms of nominal inertia). As we increase the degree of nominal
inertia, we find that the inflation bias rises under Calvo, but falls under Rotemberg.
This is for the reasons discussed above. Under Calvo greater price stickiness means
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that firms are likely to be stuck with their current price for longer, meaning that
they aggressively raise prices when given the opportunity to do so. This will tend
to raise average markups and worsen the inflationary bias problem.22 In contrast,
under Rotemberg, higher price adjustment costs result in firms wishing to delay price
adjustment which reduces average markups and reduces the inflation bias problem.
The next piece of sensitivity analysis looks at various parameterization of the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ. As noted above, at the benchmark
value of σ = 1, the social planner would not wish to expand employment as either of
the efficiency wedges due to the two forms of nominal inertia increase. While if σ < (>)
1 then they would wish to increase (decrease) the labour input as either efficient wedge
increased. Therefore, we see the inflationary bias falling as σ increases across both
forms of nominal inertia. Finally, we consider an increase in the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labour supply, ϕ, which serves to reduce the inflationary bias problem
across both types of price stickiness. As labour supply becomes less elastic, there is
less desire to use costly inflation surprises to achieve only marginal increases in the
level of output, and hence the inflation bias falls.
Relevance of Results
In order to assess the implications of our calculated levels of inflation bias under the
Rotemberg and Calvo forms of nominal inertia, we contrast our inflation rates with
both the empirical estimates of trend inflation and the critical values of trend inflation
at which the standard model develops non-standard properties.
Empirical Estimates of Trend Inflation Cogley and Sargent (2002) ’s estimates
of trend inflation in a Bayesian VAR with time varying coefficient suggests that a large
part of the movements in inflation in the post-war period (its rise in the 1970s to its fall
in the 1980s) was due to the evolution of trend inflation rather than fluctuations around
that trend. Similarly, Cogley and Sbordone (2008) find that there is no inertia in price-
setting behavior due to indexation-type behavior, but that the inertia in the data can
be described by the evolution of trend-inflation in a generalized NKPC. Meanwhile,
Ireland (2007) finds that changes in the Fed’s inflation target can help explain inflation
dynamics, where that target rose from 1.25% in 1959 to over 8% in the late 1970s,
before falling back to 2.5% in 2004. Therefore, to the extent that observed inflation
reflects movements in an underlying trend, it would suggest that the empirical measures
22At extremely high levels of price stickiness (θ = 0.9, or an average price contract duration of two
and a half years) the steady state rate of inflation begins to fall as the costs of price dispersion begin
to overturn the average markup effect.
127
Numerical Analysis
of trend inflation could easily be consistent with our measures of the inflationary bias
without having to resort to implausibly high monopolistic competition distortions.
Moreover, when we augment the model with an estimated process for mark-up shocks
(see below), the magnitude of the resultant inflation volatility can easily account for
the observed volatility of inflation around its time-varying trend.
Trend Inflation and Determinacy In order to further assess the implications of
our calculated levels of inflation bias under the Rotemberg and Calvo forms of nominal
inertia, we contrast our inflation rates with the key values of trend inflation at which
the standard model develops issues with interest rate determinacy. We could, of course,
have looked at other features highlighted in the trend inflation literature such as the
learnability of the model as trend inflation rises or its impulse responses to monetary
policy shocks and so on, but since the bifurcation in determinacy conditions reflects a
common underlying non-linearity which drives all the phenomena in the trend inflation
literature, we choose to focus on this as a straight-forward way of assessing whether
or not our calculations suggest the concerns raised by the trend inflation literature
are significant or not. We find that our model with the common parameterizations
adopted in the literature can easily imply trend inflation rates which generate the
issues highlighted by the trend-inflation literature (see Ascari and Sbordone (2014) for
a comprehensive survey of this literature).
Accordingly, we follow Ascari and Rossi (2012) and linearise our two economies
around a deterministic steady-state with an arbitrary rate of steady-state inflation
(details of the linearised models are provided in the Appendix 3.A.4). We then assume
a standard parameterisation of a Taylor rule for monetary policy, Rt = 1.5pit + 0.5yt,
and for a range of values of the mark-up, /( − 1), we compute the steady-state rate
of inflation at which the standard Taylor rule flips from being determinate to being
indeterminate. We then plot this determinacy frontier in markup-inflation space along
side our inflation bias estimates, see Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. We find that at low
levels of the mark-up the inflationary bias number lies below the determinacy frontier
- in other words the standard Taylor rule would remain determinate at the rates of
inflation implied by our inflationary bias calculations. However, as the markup is
increased the inflation bias estimates cross the determinacy frontier implying that at
the rates of inflation implied by the inflation bias estimates a standard Taylor rule would
be indeterminate in a log-linearised representation of the model. This is particularly
true in the case of Calvo where a markup of just over 11%, which is well within the
range of standard parameterisations in the literature. In contrast, under Rotemberg
the markup needs to be double that push us beyond the determinacy frontier.
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Figure 3.4: The threshhold of inflation rate for indeterminacy under Calvo pricing
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Figure 3.5: The threshhold of inflation rate for indeterminacy under Rotemberg pricing
3.5 The Effects of Cost-push Shocks
In the analysis above we have focussed on the stochastic steady state of the non-linear
policy problem to reveal the extent of the inflation bias. However, the response to
shocks can also be markedly different across the two forms of nominal inertia. In order
to explore the effect of cost-push shocks23 on policy trade-offs under discretion in our
fully nonlinear model, we, adopt the estimated shock process from Chen et al. (2014)
23The technology shocks already present in our model do not create meaningful policy trade-offs
under our benchmark calibration largely resulting in offsetting interest rate movements regardless of
the form of nominal inertia.
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which is modelled as a revenue tax rate fluctuating around a steady state value of zero,
ln (1− τpt) = (1− ρτp) ln (1− τp) + ρτp ln (1− τpt−1)− eτt
where eτt ∼ N(0, 0.004862) and ρτp = 0.939. In a log-linearized model this is equivalent
to allowing for fluctuations in a desired mark-up through variations in . However, in
our non-linear model allowing  to be time varying has a direct impact on the measure
of price dispersion in a way which would not normally be considered to be an inherent
part of a cost push shock. Therefore, we focus on variations in a revenue tax a means
of generating an autocorrelated cost push shock which is consistent with the data. The
complete model with the time-varying revenue tax rate is presented in appendix 3.A.5.
We present two sets of results. In the first we consider the impact of an inflationary
cost push shock with our benchmark parameterization, but with θ = 0.625, and φ
= 57.3684. These respective measure of price stickiness imply an identical steady-state
rate of inflation of 1.95%. Figure 3.6 reveals that even at this relatively modest degree
of inflation bias, there are non trivial differences in the impulse responses to an identical
cost push shock. These are driven by the same economic mechanisms observed in the
steady state analysis above, as average markups rise under Calvo exacerbating the
effects of the cost push shock.
It should be noted that the conventional way of parameterizing the Rotemberg
price adjustment cost parameter such that the slopes of the linearized Phillips curves
are identical would have implied a far lower value of φ = 43.7. In fact, given the
significant differences in the inflation bias across the two forms of price-stickiness, it
is generally not possible to calibrate the Rotemberg parameter by seeking to mimic
the steady-state rate of inflation observed under Calvo, ceteris paribus. Therefore, in a
second exercise we ensure a common steady-state rate of inflation of 2.54% by adopting
the following set of parameters,  = 11, θ = 0.8 under Calvo, and  = 9.7076, φ =
57.3684 under Rotemberg. This calibration ensures that both forms of nominal inertia
generate identical steady-state rates of inflation and levels of output. Despite sharing
a steady state in these dimensions, the response to the identical shock is markedly
different across Calvo and Rotemberg. In Figure 3.7, we can see that inflation is 0.2%
higher on impact from an identical cost push shock under Calvo, while other variables,
particularly output and consumption, exhibit a hump-shaped response to the shock
due to the gradual evolution of price dispersion, which is not a feature of the response
to the shock under Rotemberg pricing.
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Figure 3.6: The impulse response functions to one percent positive tax-driven cost-push shock under Calvo and
Rotemberg pricing. Note that the two cases are calibrated so that the steady state inflation rate is equal.
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Figure 3.7: The impulse response functions to one percent positive tax-driven cost-push shock under Calvo and
Rotemberg pricing. Note that each model is calibrated so that the steady state output and inflation rates are equal
across both cases.
The above results focus on the response to a cost push shock under both forms
of nominal inertia, given that the economy is at its stochastic steady state. We can
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also explore how the state of the economy affects its response to shocks. We find
that conditioning on the state of the economy in terms of levels of productivity lying
significantly above or below their steady state value, the marginal impact of technology
or cost push shocks does not give rise to significant asymmetries. However, conditioning
on the level of price dispersion either being higher or lower than its steady state value,
can give rise to significant differences in the response to a given shock. We explore
this by plotting, in Figure 3.8 , the difference in the impulse response functions to
a positive cost-push shock when the economy begins at the 75th and 25th percentile
of the grid for price dispersion, respectively. In the presence of a high level of price
dispersion there is an ongoing reduction in inflation to reduce the distortion associated
with price dispersion, which also depresses output. When the cost push shock hits, this
raises inflation, the average markup and reduces output. These effects of a given cost
push shock are larger when the economy begins from a high rather than low level of
price dispersion as the policy maker faces a relatively stronger inflationary bias problem
as a result of the distortion caused by price dispersion. Therefore, even the simplest
New Keynesian model may imply significant state-dependent optimal policy responses
to shocks when the non-linearities inherent in the model are properly accounted for.
However, such effects depend on which state variable one conditions on, (in our model
they are not present when conditioning on the level of productivity, for example) which
may explain the mixed evidence on non-linearities in policy and responses to policy
found in the empirical literature24. Such effects would be lost in the standard linearized
version of the model.
24See, for example, Barnichon and Matthes (2014) for a discussion.
132
The Effects of Cost-push Shocks
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
t
Π
hi
gh
 p
ric
e 
di
sp
er
sio
n−
 
 
 
Π
lo
w
 p
ric
e 
di
sp
er
sio
n Annualized Inflation (%)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
x 10−4
t
Y
hi
gh
 p
ric
e 
di
sp
er
sio
n−
 
 
 
Y l
ow
 p
ric
e 
di
sp
er
sio
n Output
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−1
0
1
2
3
4
5
x 10−3
t1/
m
c h
ig
h 
pr
ic
e 
di
sp
er
sio
n−
 
 
 
1/
m
c lo
w
 p
ric
e 
di
sp
er
sio
n
Average markup
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−20
−15
−10
−5
0
5
x 10−4
t
N
hi
gh
 p
ric
e 
di
sp
er
sio
n−
 
 
 
N
lo
w
 p
ric
e 
di
sp
er
sio
n Labor
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
x 10−4
t
∆ h
ig
h 
pr
ic
e 
di
sp
er
sio
n−
 
 
 
∆ l
ow
 p
ric
e 
di
sp
er
sio
n Price dispersion
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
t
i hi
gh
 p
ric
e 
di
sp
er
sio
n−
 
 
 
i lo
w
 p
ric
e 
di
sp
er
sio
n Annualized nominal interest rate (%)
Figure 3.8: Difference between the impulse response functions to five percent positive tax-driven cost-push shock under
high and low price dispersion. Specifically, we first calculate the impulse response functions to the cost-push shock,
given initial price dispersion being high or low. Then, we calculate and plot the differences of the impulse response
functions between these two cases, as the labels on the vertical axis indicate. The reason for choosing a big shock is to
highlight the asymmetries.
To further highlight the differences in the stochastic properties of the model under
the two forms of pricing behavior, Table 3.4 computes the mean, variance and persis-
tence of inflation under the various calibrations used in our sensitivity analysis above.
It is important to note, that to a first order of approximation these statistics would be
identical across Calvo and Rotemberg pricing given the standard approach to calibra-
tion. However, the fact that they are significantly different across all these dimensions
highlights the fact that the choice of model of nominal inertia not only affects the
average inflation bias, but also the variance and (in the case of Calvo) persistence of
inflation in the face of an identical cost push shock process when the non-linearities
inherent in the model are properly accounted for.
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we have contrasted the properties of the Calvo and Rotemberg forms
of nominal inertia which are commonly used in New Keynesian analyses of macroeco-
nomic policy. They are often treated as being interchangeable, largely because they
generate equivalent NKPC and policy implications when linearized around an efficient
zero-inflation steady state. However, our non-linear solution of the discretionary pol-
icy problem reveals some striking differences across the two models of price stickiness,
which have significant implications for the importance of non-linearities in New Key-
nesian policy analyses more generally.
Firstly, the inflation bias problem is far greater under Calvo pricing than Rotemberg
pricing, despite the fact that the costs of inflation are significantly higher under the
former. The reason for this is that inflation raises the average markup under Calvo
pricing as firms seek to raise their prices more aggressively whenever they can to avoid
the erosion of their relative price due to inflation. This increase in average markups
worsens the inflationary bias problem. In contrast, under Rotemberg pricing firms can
adjust prices in every period, and will moderate their average markups as inflation rises
as they attempt to delay some of the costs of price adjustment due to the discounting
inherent in their objective function.
Secondly, for empirically reasonable levels of monopoly power the inflation bias that
emerges from both models implies that the rates of inflation identified as being ‘trend’
inflation in empirical studies are reasonable. Moreover, the rates of inflation implied
by the model are sufficient for the non-linearities inherent in the model to place the
economy in the zone where the effects of trend inflation are found, in studies which
approximate the economy around a non-zero rate of steady-state inflation, to have
profound implications for the determinacy properties of rules, the learnability of the
rational expectations equilibrium and the transmission of monetary policy. That is, the
degree of inflation bias generated by the model implies that the non-linearities inherent
in the model and the choice of form of nominal inertia matter.
Thirdly, we extended the model to consider the stabilization of the economy in the
face of mark-up shocks. Here we find that the non-linearities that generate radically
different degrees of inflation bias in the steady state also imply profound differences in
the monetary policy response to the same shock both across models, with the inflation
response to a cost-push shock being significantly greater under Calvo, while possibly
also being associated with a hump-shaped output/consumption response as a result of
the evolution of price dispersion which is absent from the Rotemberg model and typi-
cally ignored in the linearized New Keynesian model. As a result, the implied stochastic
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properties for inflation can differ substantially across the two forms of nominal inertia,
ceteris paribus, even when they would be identical under a linear approximation.
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3.A Technical Appendix
3.A.1 Summary of Models
Households’ Utility Maximization Problem
The Lagrangian function for the utility maximization problem is
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
+
∞∑
t=0
βtλt [Ξt +Dt +WtNt − Tt − PtCt − Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1}]
where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier. The FOCs are given as follows:
∂L
∂Ct
= C−σt − Ptλt = 0
∂L
∂Nt
= −Nϕt + λtWt = 0
∂L
∂Dt+1
= −λtEt {Qt,t+1}+ βEt{λt+1} = 0
These conditions can be simplified further into
−C
−σ
t
Pt
Et {Qt,t+1}+ βEt
{
C−σt+1
Pt+1
}
= 0⇒ Et {Qt,t+1} = βEt
{
C−σt+1
C−σt
Pt
Pt+1
}
Nϕt
Wt
=
C−σt
Pt
⇒
(
Wt
Pt
)
= Nϕt C
σ
t .
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Firms’ Profit Maximization Under Calvo Pricing
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s [Pt(j)Yt+s(j)−mct+sYt+s(j)Pt+s]
= Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
[
Pt(j)
(
Pt(j)
Pt+s
)−
Yt+s −mct+s
(
Pt(j)
Pt+s
)−
Yt+sPt+s
]
= Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
[(
1
Pt+s
)−
Pt(j)
1− −mct+s
(
1
Pt+s
)−−1
Pt(j)
−
]
Yt+s
Denoting the optimal price Pt(j) = P ∗t , the FOC is
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
[
(1− )
(
1
Pt+s
)−
(P ∗t )
− + mct+s
(
1
Pt+s
)−−1
(P ∗t )
−−1
]
Yt+s = 0
that is,
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
[
(1− )
(
P ∗t
Pt+s
)−
+ mct+s
(
P ∗t
Pt+s
)−−1]
Yt+s = 0.
Using Qt,t+s = βs
(
Ct
Ct+s
)σ
Pt
Pt+s
and rearranging gives:
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsβs
(
Ct
Ct+s
)σ
Pt
Pt+s
[
(1− )
(
P ∗t
Pt+s
)−
+ mct+s
(
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∞∑
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θsβs
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Ct
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)σ
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Yt+smct+s
(
P ∗t
Pt+s
)−−1
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1
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PtYt+s(P
∗
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(
Ct
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)σ (
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⇒ (1− )Et
∞∑
s=0
θsβs
(
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)σ (
1
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PtYt+s
= −Et
∞∑
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Note that if there is no price-stickiness, so that θ = 0, then P ∗t =

−1Ptmct =

−1MCt.
That is, each firm sets its price P ∗t equal to a markup η ≡ −1 > 1 over its nominal
marginal cost. This is the standard result in a model of monopolistic competition.
Because price exceeds marginal cost, output will be inefficiently low.
Note that we can have
P ∗t
Pt
=

− 1
Kpt
F pt
via defining two recursive equations
Kpt = Et
∞∑
s=0
θsβsC−σt+s
(
Pt
Pt+s
)−
Yt+smct+s
F pt = Et
∞∑
s=0
θsβsC−σt+s
(
Pt
Pt+s
)1−
Yt+s
We can prove this relationship as follows: using Law of Iterated Expectations,
Kpt = Et
∞∑
s=0
θsβsC−σt+s
(
Pt
Pt+s
)−
Yt+smct+s
= C−σt Ytmct + Et
∞∑
s=1
θsβsC−σt+s
(
Pt
Pt+s
)−
Yt+smct+s
and
Et
∞∑
s=1
θsβsC−σt+s
(
Pt
Pt+s
)−
Yt+smct+s
= θβEt
∞∑
s=1
θs−1βs−1sC−σt+s
(
Pt
Pt+s
)−
Yt+smct+s
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= θβEt
∞∑
s∗=0
θs
∗
βs
∗
C−σt+s∗+1
(
Pt
Pt+s∗+1
)−
Yt+s∗+1mct+s∗+1
= θβEt
[(
Pt
Pt+1
)− ∞∑
s∗=0
θs
∗
βs
∗
C−σt+s∗+1
(
Pt+1
Pt+s∗+1
)−
Yt+s∗+1mct+s∗+1
]
= θβEt
[(
Pt
Pt+1
)−
Kpt+1
]
,
since
Kpt+1 = Et+1
∞∑
s=0
θsβsC−σt+1+s
(
Pt+1
Pt+1+s
)−
Yt+1+smct+1+s
Hence,
Kpt = C
−σ
t Ytmct + θβEt
[(
Pt
Pt+1
)−
Kpt+1
]
Similarly,
F pt = C
−σ
t Yt + Et
∞∑
s=1
θsβsC−σt+s
(
Pt
Pt+s
)1−
Yt+s
= C−σt Yt + θβEt
∞∑
s=1
θs−1βs−1C−σt+s
(
Pt
Pt+s
)1−
Yt+s
= C−σt Yt + θβEt
∞∑
s∗=0
θs
∗
βs
∗
C−σt+s∗+1
(
Pt
Pt+s∗+1
)1−
Yt+s∗+1
= C−σt Yt + θβEt
[(
Pt
Pt+1
)1− ∞∑
s∗=0
θs
∗
βs
∗
C−σt+s∗+1
(
Pt+1
Pt+s∗+1
)1−
Yt+s∗+1
]
= C−σt Yt + θβEt
[(
Pt
Pt+1
)1−
F pt+1
]
Firms’ Profit Maximization Under Rotemberg Pricing
max
{Pt(j)}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
s=0
Qt,t+s
 Pt+s(j)
1−P t+sYt+s −mct+sPt+s(j)−P 1+t+s Yt+s
−φ
2
(
Pt+s(j)
Pt+s−1(j)
− 1
)2
Yt+sPt+s

= max
{Pt(j)}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
(
Ct
Ct+s
)σ
Pt
Pt+s
 Pt+s(j)
1−P t+sYt+s −mct+sPt+s(j)−P 1+t+s Yt+s
−φ
2
(
Pt+s(j)
Pt+s−1(j)
− 1
)2
Yt+sPt+s

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The FOC is
βt
{
(1− )Pt(j)−P t Yt + mctPt(j)−−1P 1+t Yt −
φ
Pt−1(j)
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)
YtPt
}
+ Etβ
t+1
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Pt
Pt+1
{
φ
Pt+1(j)
Pt(j)2
(
Pt+1(j)
Pt(j)
− 1
)
Yt+1Pt+1
}
= 0
For the symmetric equilibrium, we have
(1− )Yt + mctYt − φ
Pt−1
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)
YtPt
+ βEt
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Pt
Pt+1
{
φ
Pt+1
Pt2
(
Pt+1
Pt
− 1
)
Yt+1Pt+1
}
= 0
that is,
(1− ) + mct − φ Pt
Pt−1
(
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
)
+ βEt
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
φ
(
Pt+1
Pt
− 1
)
Yt+1Pt+1
YtPt
= 0.
Define Πt ≡ PtPt−1 , then we get
(1− ) + mct − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0.
This is the Phillips curve under Rotemberg pricing.
The equilibrium conditions of the cases are summarized below.
Rotemberg Pricing
The equilibrium conditions are given as follows:
Consumption Euler equation:
βRtEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1
Labor supply: (
Wt
Pt
)
= Nϕt C
σ
t
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Resource constraint: [
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt = Ct
Phillips curve:
(1− ) + mct − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0
Technology:
Yt = AtNt
Marginal costs:
mct =
Wt
PtAt
=
Nϕt C
σ
t
At
=
(Yt/At)
ϕCσt
At
= Yt
ϕCσt At
−ϕ−1
We can simplify these equilibrium conditions by eliminating the interest rate and
labour supply from the constraints, so that consumption can be considered as the
monetary policy instrument. Specifically,
Resource constraint: [
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt = Ct
Phillips curve:
(1− ) + YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1 − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0
while the objective function is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
Note that the state variables are productivity (and any other exogenous shock
processes we choose to add).
Calvo Pricing
The equilibrium conditions are given below:
Consumption Euler equation:
βRtEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1
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Labor supply: (
Wt
Pt
)
= Nϕt C
σ
t
Resource constraint:
Yt = Ct =
AtNt
∆t
Phillips curve:
P ∗t
Pt
=
(

− 1
)
Kpt
F pt
Inflation:
1 = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1−
+ θ(Πt)
−1
Price dispersion:
∆t = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
∆t−1
= (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ (Πt)
 ∆t−1
Marginal costs:
mct =
Wt
PtAt
=
Nϕt C
σ
t
At
= (Yt∆t)
ϕCσt At
−ϕ−1
Note that the state variables are not just productivity, but also price dispersion.
3.A.2 The Chebyshev Collocation Method
Algorithm for Rotemberg Pricing
In the following, let st denote the state of the economy at time t. There are five
functional equations associated with five endogenous variables {Ct, Yt,Πt, λ1t, λ2t}.
The state is st = at ≡ lnAt, which evolves according to the following motion
equation:
at+1 = ρaat + eat
where 0 ≤ ρa < 1 and technology innovation eat is an i.i.d. normal random variable,
which has a zero mean and a finite standard deviation σa.
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Let’s define a new function X : R→ R5, in order to collect the policy functions of
endogenous variables as follows:
X(st) = (Ct(st), Yt(st),Πt(st), λ1t(st), λ2t(st))
Given the specification of the function X, the equilibrium conditions can be written
more compactly as,
Γ(st, X(st), Et [Z (X(st+1))]) = 0
where Γ : R1+5+1 → R5 summarizes the full set of dynamic equilibrium relationship,
and Z (X(st+1)) = M(At+1). Then the problem is to find a vector-valued function X
that Γ maps to the zero function. Projection methods, hence, can be used.
The Chebyshev collocation method which we use to approximate policy functions
under Rotemberg pricing can be described as follows:
1. Choose an order of approximation na, compute the na+1 roots of the Chebychev
polynomial of order na + 1 as
zia = cos
(
(2i− 1)pi
2(na + 1)
)
for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1, and formulate initial guesses for θy and θΠ.
2. Compute collocation points
ai =
a+ a
2
+
a− a
2
zia =
a− a
2
(
zia + 1
)
+ a
for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1, where a = log(A) is logged technology shock. Note that
the number of collocation nodes is na + 1.
3. Formulate the approximating policy functions. Let Ti(z) = cos(i cos−1(z)) denote
the Chebyshev polynomial of order i, z ∈ [−1, 1], and let ξ denote a linear
function mapping the domain of x ∈ [x, x] into [−1, 1]. In this way, Ti(ξ(x)) are
Chebyshev polynomials adapted to x ∈ [x, x] for i = 0, 1, .... Apparently, ξ(x) =
2 (x− x) / (x− x)− 1. Then, a degree na Chebyshev polynomial approximation
for the five decision rules at each nodes ai can be written as in vector form
X(ai) = T (ξ(ai))ΘX
where ΘX = [θy, θc, θpi, θλ1 , θλ2 ] is a (1 + na)× 5 matrix comprised of the Cheby-
shev collocation coefficients, and T (ξ(ai)) is a 1×(1 + na) matrix of the Chebyshev
polynomials evaluated at node ai.
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4. At each collocation point ai, calculate the values of the five residual functions
defined by the five equilibrium conditions as follows: assuming a Gaussian distri-
bution for the shock eat ∼ N(0, σ2a), To compute the integral part, we make the
following change of variables: z = ea/
√
2σ2a ∼ N(0, 1/2), then
Et [M (st+1)]
=
1
σa
√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
C−σt+1Yt+1Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1) exp
(
−e
2
at+1
2σ2a
)
deat+1
=
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
C−σt+1Yt+1Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1) exp
(−z2) dz
where we employ a Gauss-Hermite quadrature to approximate the integral. We
compute the nodes zj and weights ωj for the quadrature such that
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
C−σt+1Yt+1Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1) exp
(−z2) dz
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
j=1
 ωjĈ (ρaai + zj√2σ2a; θy, θpi)σ Ŷ (ρaai + zj√2σ2a; θy)×
Π̂
(
ρaai + zj
√
2σ2a; θpi
)(
Π̂
(
ρaai + zj
√
2σ2a; θpi
)
− 1
) 
≡ Ψ (ai; θy, θpi, q)
for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1.
Then, the residual functions can be written as
R1 = Ĉ(ai; θc)
−σ−λ̂1(ai; θλ1)+λ̂2(ai; θλ2)
[
σŶ (ai; θy)
ϕĈ(ai; θc)
σ−1 exp (ai) −ϕ−1
+σφβĈ(ai; θc)
σ−1Ŷ (ai; θy)−1Ψ (ai; θy, θpi, q)
]
R2 = Ŷ (ai; θy)
ϕ exp (ai)
−ϕ−1 −
[
1− φ
2
(
Π̂(ai; θpi)− 1
)2]
λ̂1(ai; θλ1)
− λ̂2(ai; θλ2)
[
ϕŶ (ai; θy)
ϕ−1Ĉ(ai; θc)σ exp (ai) −ϕ−1
−φβĈ(ai; θc)σŶ (ai; θy)−2Ψ (ai; θy, θpi, q)
]
R3 = λ̂1(ai; θλ1)
(
1− Π̂(ai; θpi)
)
Ŷ (ai; θy)− λ̂2(ai; θλ2)
(
2Π̂(ai; θpi)− 1
)
R4 = Ĉ(ai; θc)−
[
1− φ
2
(
Π̂(ai; θpi)− 1
)2]
Ŷ (ai; θy)
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R5 = (1− ) + Ŷ (ai; θy)ϕĈ(ai; θc)σ exp (ai) −ϕ−1
− φΠ̂(ai; θpi)
(
Π̂(ai)− 1
)
+ φβĈ(ai; θc)
σŶ (ai; θy)
−1Ψ (ai; θy, θpi, q)
where the hat symbol indicates the corresponding approximate policy functions.
5. If all residuals are close enough to zero then stop, else update {θy, θc, θpi, θλ1 ,
θλ2}, and go back to step 3.
The last step uses Christopher A. Sims’ csolve25 to solve the system of nonlinear
equations, Rj = 0 for j = 1, ..., 5. When implementing the above algorithm, we first
use lower order Chebyshev polynomials where steady states can be good initial guesses.
Then, we increase the order of approximation and take as starting value the solution
from the previous lower order approximation. This informal homotopy continuation
method follows the advice from Anderson et al. (2010).
Algorithm for Calvo Pricing
Now the state space is st = (∆t−1, At), where price dispersion ∆t−1 is endogenous and
technology At is exogenous and respectively, with the following law of motion:
∆t = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ (Πt)
 ∆t−1
at = ρaat−1 + eat
There are 7 endogenous variables and 6 Lagrangian multipliers, hence 13 functional
equations. Similar to Rotemberg pricing, we can rewrite this nonlinear system a more
compact form,
Γ (st, X(st), Et [Z (X(st+1))] , Et [Z∆ (X(st+1))]) = 0
where Γ : R2+13+3+3 → R13 summarizing the equilibrium relationship,
X(st) =
(
Ct(st), Yt(st),Πt(st),
P∗t (st)
Pt(st)
, K
p
t (st), F
p
t (st),∆t(st), λ1t(st), λ2t(st), λ3t(st), λ4t(st), λ5t(st), λ6t(st)
)
collecting the policy functions we need to solve, with X : R2 → R13, and
25The solver can be found at http://dge.repec.org/codes/sims/optimize/csolve.m.
146
Technical Appendix
Z (X(st+1)) =
 Z1 (X(st+1))Z2 (X(st+1))
Z3 (X(st+1))
 =
 M(∆t, at+1)L(∆t, at+1)
(Πt+1)
 λ6t+1

and
Z∆ (X(st+1)) =

∂Z1(X(st+1))
∂∆t
∂Z2(X(st+1))
∂∆t
∂Z3(X(st+1))
∂∆t
 =

∂M(∆t,at+1)
∂∆t
∂L(∆t,at+1)
∂∆t
∂[(Πt+1)
λ6t+1]
∂∆t

=
  (Πt+1)
−1Kpt+1
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
 ∂K
p
t+1
∂∆t
(− 1) (Πt+1)−2 F pt+1 ∂Πt+1∂∆t + (Πt+1)
−1 ∂F pt+1
∂∆t
 (Πt+1)
−1 λ6t+1
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
 ∂λ6t+1
∂∆t

Note we are assuming Et [Z∆ (X(st+1))] = ∂Et [Z (X(st+1))] /∆t, which is normally
valid using the Interchange of Integration and Differentiation Theorem.
The Chebyshev collocation method which we use to solve this nonlinear system can
be described as follows:
1. Choose an order of approximation n∆ and na for each dimension of the state
space st = (∆t−1, at), then there are Ns = (n∆ + 1)× (na + 1) nodes in the state
space.
2. Compute the n∆ +1 and na+1 roots of the Chebychev polynomial of order n∆ +1
and na + 1 as
zi∆ = cos
(
(2i− 1)pi
2(n∆ + 1)
)
, for i = 1, 2, ..., n∆ + 1.
zia = cos
(
(2i− 1)pi
2(na + 1)
)
, for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1.
and formulate initial guesses for the approximating coefficients.
3. Compute collocation points ai as
ai =
a+ a
2
+
a− a
2
zia =
a− a
2
(
zia + 1
)
+ a
for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1, where a = log(A) is logged technology shock. Note that
the number of collocation nodes is na + 1. Similarly, compute collocation points
∆i as
∆i =
∆ + ∆
2
+
∆−∆
2
zi∆ =
∆−∆
2
(
zi∆ + 1
)
+ ∆
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for i = 1, 2, ..., n∆ + 1, which map [−1, 1] into [∆,∆].
4. At each node (∆i, aj), for i = 1, 2, ..., n∆ + 1 and j = 1, 2, ..., na + 1, compute
X(st), that is,
X(∆i, aj) = Ω(∆i, aj)ΘX
where Ω(∆i, aj) ≡ [Tj∆(ξ(∆i)Tja(ξ (aj))], j∆ = 0, ..., n∆, and ja = 0, ..., na, is
a 1 × Ns matrix of two-dimensional Chebyshev polynomials evaluated at node
(∆i, aj), and
ΘX =
[
θc, θy, θpi, θp, θk, θf , θ∆, θλ1 , θλ2 , θλ3 , θλ4 , θλ5 , θλ6
]
is a Ns × 13 matrix of the collocation coefficients.
5. At each node (∆i, aj), for i = 1, 2, ..., n∆ + 1 and j = 1, 2, ..., na + 1, compute the
possible values of future policy functions X(st+1) for k = 1, ..., q. That is,
Xt+1(∆i, aj) = Ωt+1(∆i, aj)ΘX
where q is the number of quadrature nodes, and the subscript t+1 indicates next
period values. Note that
Ωt+1(∆i, aj) ≡
[
Tj∆(ξ(∆̂(∆i, aj; θ
∆)))Tja(ξ(ρaaj + zk
√
2σ2a))
]
with j∆ = 0, ..., n∆, and ja = 0, ..., na, is a q×Ns matrix of Chebyshev polynomials
evaluated at t+1 nodes (∆t, at+1), and the hat symbol indicates the corresponding
approximate policy functions.
The two auxilliary functions can be calculated as follows:
M(st+1) ≈
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)
K̂(st+1; θ
k)
and,
L(st+1) ≈
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)−1
F̂ (st+1; θ
f ).
6. Calculate the expectation terms at each node (∆i, aj). Let z = ea/
√
2σ2a, and we
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have
Et [M(st+1)] =
1
σa
√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
(Πt+1)
Kpt+1 exp
(
−e
2
at+1
2σ2a
)
deat+1
=
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
(Πt+1)
Kpt+1 exp
(−z2) dz
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)
K̂(st+1; θ
k)
≡ Ψ (∆i, aj, q) ,
Et [L(st+1)] =
1
σa
√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
(Πt+1)
−1 F pt+1 exp
(
−e
2
at+1
2σ2a
)
deat+1
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)−1
F̂ (st+1; θ
f )
≡ Θ (∆i, aj, q) ,
and
Et [(Πt+1)
 λ6t+1] =
1
σa
√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
(Πt+1)
 λ6t+1 exp
(
−e
2
at+1
2σ2a
)
deat+1
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)−1
λ̂6(st+1; θ
λ6)
≡ Λ (∆i, aj, q) .
7. Calculate the two partial derivatives under expectation, that is,
∂Et [M(st+1)]
∂∆t
= Et
[
∂M(st+1)
∂∆t
]
= Et
[
 (Πt+1)
−1Kpt+1
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
 ∂K
p
t+1
∂∆t
]
∂Et [L(st+1)]
∂∆t
= Et
[
∂L(st+1)
∂∆t
]
= Et
[
(− 1) (Πt+1)−2 F pt+1
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
−1 ∂F
p
t+1
∂∆t
]
.
Hence, we only need to compute ∂Πt+1/∂∆t, ∂Kpt+1/∂∆t and ∂F
p
t+1/∂∆t. Note
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that
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
≈
n∆∑
j∆=0
na∑
ja=0
2θpij∆ja
∆−∆T
′
j∆
(ξ(∆i))Tja(ξ(aj)) ≡ Π̂∆
∂Kpt+1
∂∆t
≈
n∆∑
j∆=0
na∑
ja=0
2θkj∆ja
∆−∆T
′
j∆
(ξ(∆t))Tja(ξ(at+1)) ≡ K̂∆
∂F pt+1
∂∆t
≈
n∆∑
j∆=0
na∑
ja=0
2θfj∆ja
∆−∆T
′
j∆
(ξ(∆t))Tja(ξ(at+1)) ≡ F̂∆
Now, we can calculate
∂Et [M(st+1)]
∂∆t
=
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
[
 (Πt+1)
−1Kpt+1
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
 ∂K
p
t+1
∂∆t
]
exp
(−z2) dz
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
[

(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)−1
K̂(st+1; θ
k)Π̂∆ +
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)
K̂∆
]
≡ M̂ (∆i, aj, q) ,
∂Et [L(st+1)]
∂∆t
=
1√
pi
∫ +∞
−∞
[
(− 1) (Πt+1)−2 F pt+1 ∂Πt+1∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
−1 ∂F pt+1
∂∆t
]
exp
(−z2) dz
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
[
(− 1)
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)−2
F̂ (st+1; θ
f )Π̂∆ +
(
Π̂(st+1; θ
pi)
)−1
F̂∆
]
≡ L̂ (∆i, aj, q) .
8. At each collocation point (∆i, aj), calculate the values of the thirteen residual
functions defined by the equilibrium conditions as follows:
R1 = Ŷ (∆i, aj; θ
y)− Ĉ(∆i, aj; θc)
R2 = p̂(∆i, aj; θ
p)−
(

− 1
)
K̂(∆i, aj; θ
k)
F̂ (∆i, aj; θf )
R3 = K̂(∆i, aj; θ
k)− (∆̂(∆i, aj; θ∆)Ŷ (∆i, aj; θy))ϕ exp(aj)−ϕ−1Ŷ (∆i, aj; θy)
− θβΨ (∆i, aj, q)
R4 = F̂ (∆i, aj; θ
f )− Ŷ (∆i, aj; θy)Ĉ(∆i, aj; θc)−σ + θβΘ (∆i, aj, q)
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R5 = 1− (1− θ)p̂(∆i, aj; θp)1− − θΠ̂(∆i, aj; θpi)−1
R6 = ∆̂(∆i, aj; θ
∆)− (1− θ)p̂(∆i, aj; θp)− − θΠ̂(∆i, aj; θpi)∆i
R7 = Ĉ(∆i, aj; θ
c)−σ−λ̂1(∆i, aj; θλ1)+σŶ (∆i, aj; θy)Ĉ(∆i, aj; θc)−σ−1λ̂4(∆i, aj; θλ4)
R8 = −∆̂(∆i, aj; θ∆)1+ϕŶ (∆i, aj; θy)ϕ exp(aj)−1−ϕ + λ̂1(∆i, aj; θλ1)
− (1 + ϕ)(∆̂(∆i, aj; θ∆)Ŷ (∆i, aj; θy))ϕ exp(aj)−1−ϕλ̂3(∆i, aj; θλ3)
− Ĉ(∆i, aj; θc)−σλ̂4(∆i, aj; θλ4)
R9 = λ̂2(∆i, aj; θ
λ2) + (1− θ)(− 1)p̂(∆i, aj; θp)−λ̂5(∆i, aj; θλ5)
+ (1− θ)p̂(∆i, aj; θp)−−1λ̂6(∆i, aj; θλ6)
R10 = −(− 1)θλ̂5(∆i, aj; θλ5)− θΠ̂(∆i, aj; θpi)λ̂6(∆i, aj; θλ6)∆i
R11 = −
(

− 1
)
F̂ (∆i, aj; θ
f )−1λ̂2(∆i, aj; θλ2) + λ̂3(∆i, aj; θλ3)
R12 =
(

− 1
)
K̂(∆i, aj; θ
k)
F̂ (∆i, aj; θf )2
λ̂2(∆i, aj; θ
λ2) + λ̂4(∆i, aj; θ
λ4)
R13 = −Ŷ (∆i, aj; θy)1+ϕ∆̂(∆i, aj; θ∆)ϕ exp(aj)−1−ϕ − θβΛ (∆i, aj, q)
− ϕ∆̂(∆i, aj; θ∆)ϕ−1Ŷ (∆i, aj; θy)1+ϕλ̂3(∆i, aj; θλ3) exp(aj)−1−ϕ
− θβM̂ (∆i, aj, q) λ̂3(∆i, aj; θλ3)− θβL̂ (∆i, aj, q) λ̂4(∆i, aj; θλ4) + λ̂6(∆i, aj; θλ6)
9. Finally, check the stopping rules. If all residuals are close enough to zero then
stop, else update the approximation coefficients and go back to step 4.
The equation solver csolve written by Christopher A. Sims is employed to solve the
resulted system of nonlinear equations. When implementing the above algorithm, we
start from lower order Chebyshev polynomials and formulate the initial guesses based
on the results in Anderson et al. (2010). Then, we increase the order of approximation
and take as starting value the solution from the previous lower order approximation.
This informal homotopy continuation idea ensures us to find the solution.
3.A.3 Welfare Comparison
In order to compare the social welfare under Calvo and Rotemberg pricing in a fully
nonlinear model, we first describe the second-order approximation to welfare. Then
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we transform the welfare as the fraction of the consumption path under the Ramsey
allocation that must be given up in order to equalize welfare under the Ramsey policy
and discretionary policy.
The Quadratic Approximation to Welfare
Individual utility in period t is
Ut ≡ U(Ct, Nt) = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
Let X̂t ≡ log
(
Xt/X
)
denote the log-deviation of variable Xt from its steady state X.
In addition, let X˜t = Xt −X denote the linear deviation of Xt around its steady state
value. Then using a second-order Taylor approximation,
Xt −X
X
=
X˜t
X
= X̂t +
1
2
X̂2t + o(2) (3.23)
where o(2) represents terms that are of order higher than 2 in the bound on the am-
plitude of the relevant shocks. We will repeatedly use (3.23) to derive a second-order
approximation to the social welfare.
Now consider the second-order approximation to per period utility,
Ut = U + C
1−σ
[
Ĉt +
1− σ
2
Ĉ2t
]
−N1+ϕ
[
N̂t +
1 + ϕ
2
N̂2t
]
+ o(2)
where
U =
C
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
N
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
Rotemberg Pricing The second-order approximation to market clearing condition,
Ct =
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt, is
Ĉt +
1
2
Ĉ2t = Ŷt +
1
2
Ŷ 2t −
φ
2
Π̂2t + o(2)
such that,
Ut = U − (σ + ϕ)C
1−σ
2
[
(xt − x∗)2 + φ
ϕ+ σ
Π̂2t
]
+ C
1−σ
 Φ22(ϕ+σ) − (1−σ)(1−Φ)−(1+ϕ)1+ϕ Ŷ ft
+ (1−σ)(σ+ϕ)
2(1+ϕ)
(
Ŷ ft
)2
+ o(2) (3.24)
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where Ŷ ft = log
(
Y ft /Y
f
)
denote the log-deviation of output from its steady state under
flexible price, xt ≡ Ŷt−Ŷ ft is the output gap, x∗ ≡ lnY−lnY f = − ln (1− Φ) / (σ + ϕ) ≈
Φ/ (σ + ϕ) is a measure of the distortion created by the presence of monopolistic compe-
tition alone, t.i.p. are terms independent of policy, and terms like Φ
(
Ŷ ft
)2
and ΦŶtŶ ft
are omitted26. In addition, the fact that N1+ϕ = (1− −1)C1−σ ≡ (1− Φ)C1−σ, and
Ât = (ϕ+ σ) / (1 + ϕ) Ŷ
f
t is used in deriving (3.24).
Hence,
WR ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUt =
U
1− β −
(σ + ϕ)C
1−σ
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(xt − x∗)2 + φ
σ + ϕ
Π̂2t
]
+
[
Φ2C
1−σ
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) −
(1− σ) (1 + ϕ)C1−σσ2a
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) (1− ρa)
]
+ o(2)
=
U
1− β − ΩRE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λR (xt − x∗)2 + Π̂2t
]
(3.25)
+
[
Φ2C
1−σ
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) −
(1− σ) (1 + ϕ)C1−σσ2a
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) (1− ρa)
]
+ o(2)
where
ΩR ≡ φC
1−σ
2
λR ≡ σ + ϕ
φ
Note that we derive the LQ welfare function explicitly retaining the relevant t.i.p in
order to make a legitimate comparison with the social welfare obtained from the fully
nonlinear model.
In order to calculate the inflation bias under LQ method, we write down the log-
linearized IS equation and NKPC below. The IS curve is,
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(
R̂t − EtΠ̂t+1
)
+
1 + ϕ
ϕ+ σ
(ρa − 1) Ât
and the NKPC is,
Π̂t = βEtΠ̂t+1 +
(− 1) (ϕ+ σ)
φ
xt
26When Φ = 1/ is so small that the product of Φ with a second-order term can be ignored as
negligible.
153
Technical Appendix
Calvo Pricing The second-order approximation to market clearing condition is
Ĉt +
1
2
Ĉ2t = Ŷt +
1
2
Ŷ 2t + o(2)
and it can be shown (see Woodford, 2003, chap 6) that,
N̂t =
(
Ŷt − Ât
)
+

2
varj
(
P̂t(j)
)
+ o(2)
Hence, similar to the Rotemberg case,
Ut = U − (ϕ+ σ)C
1−σ
2
[
(xt − x∗)2 + 
ϕ+ σ
varj
(
P̂t(j)
)]
+C
1−σ
[
Φ2
2 (ϕ+ σ)
− (1− σ) (1− Φ)− (1 + ϕ)
(1 + ϕ)
Ŷ ft +
(1− σ) (σ + ϕ)
2 (1 + ϕ)
(
Ŷ ft
)2]
+ o(2)
The next step is to relate price dispersion ∆t ≡ varj
(
P̂t(j)
)
to the average inflation
rate across all firms. Walsh (2003, p.554) shows that
∆t ≈ θ∆t−1 +
(
θ
1− θ
)
pi2t
which implies
∞∑
t=0
βt∆t =
θ
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
∞∑
t=0
βtpi
2
t
Therefore,
WC =
U
1− β − ΩCE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λC (xt − x∗)2 + pi2t
]
+
[
Φ2C
1−σ
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) −
(1− σ) (1 + ϕ)C1−σσ2a
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) (1− ρa)\
]
+ o(2)
where
ΩC ≡ (σ + ϕ)C
1−σ
2

κ
λC ≡ κ/
κ ≡ (1− θ) (1− θβ) (σ + ϕ)
θ
The log-linearized IS equation and NKPC are given, respectively, as follows:
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(
R̂t − EtΠ̂t+1
)
+
1 + ϕ
ϕ+ σ
(ρa − 1) Ât
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Π̂t = βEtΠ̂t+1 + κxt
Note that when
φ =
(− 1) θ
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
the NKPC under both Rotemberg pricing and Calvo pricing are the same. Also note
that λR =
(

−1
)
λC , and ΩR =
(
−1

)
ΩC . The inflation weights λR and λC differ only
marginally, since  usually takes values between 7 and 10 in the applied literature.
Inflation Bias Under LQ Method
We can rewrite the above LQ model as follows, using pit = Πt−1 ≈ ln (Πt)−ln
(
Π
)
= Π̂t
and it = Rt − 1 ≈ ln (Rt)− ln
(
R
)
= R̂t:
max
{xt,pit}
−ΩjE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λj (xt − x∗)2 + pi2t
]
subject to
pit = βEtpit+1 + κxt (3.26)
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1) + 1 + ϕ
ϕ+ σ
(ρa − 1) Ât
where j = R,C. Woodford (2003, p.471) shows that the equilibrium inflation under
optimal discretion is
pit =
λj
λj + κ2
(βEtpit+1 + κx
∗)
hence the steady state pi under rational expectation satisfies
pi =
λj
λj + κ2
(βpi + κx∗)
that is,
pi =
λjκ
(1− β)λj + κ2x
∗ =
λjκ
(1− β)λj + κ2
Φ
(σ + ϕ)
with j = R,C. pi is the so-called inflation bias, relative to the targeted zero rate of
inflation which is optimal under perfect commitment.
Relative Welfare Cost
The welfare under discretion from the LQ method is calculated as follows. Unless
stated otherwise, the superscript d denotes the discretion case, and subscripts R and C
represent the Rotemberg and Calvo pricing, respectively. From (4.18), x = (1− β) pi/κ,
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then using the log-linearized model we can solve for steady state values for deviations
Ĉt and N̂t, denoted as Ĉ and N̂ , respectively. It is straightforward to show that
Ĉ = N̂ = Ŷ = x. Finally, the steady state values for levels Ct and Nt, are
C
d
j = C
r
eĈ ≈ Cr
(
1 + Ĉ
)
= C
r
(1 + x)
N
d
j = N
r
eN̂ ≈ N r
(
1 + N̂
)
= N
r
(1 + x)
where j = R,C, and
C
r
= N
r
=
(
− 1

)1/(σ+ϕ)
are the Ramsey steady states around which we log-linearize the model. Therefore,
Wj =
1
1− β

(
C
d
j
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ −
(
N
d
j
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
− Ωj
1− β
[
λj
(
(1− β) pi
κ
− Φ
(ϕ+ σ)
)2
+ pi2
]
+
(
C
d
j
)1−σ
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β)
[
Φ2 − (1− σ) (1 + ϕ)σ
2
a
(1− ρa)
]
where j = R,C.
For the fully nonlinear method, the welfare under discretion is calculated by adding
corresponding policy functions into optimal policy problem and then approximated by
the Chebyshev collocation method. That is,
W dR,t = W
d
R (At) =
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt
[
W dR(At+1)
]
W dC,t = W
d
C (∆t−1, At) =
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(∆tYt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt
[
W dC(∆t, At+1)
]
and the steady state welfare, denoted as W dR and W dC for ease of notation, can be
correspondingly found.
Note thatWR, W dR andWC , W dC which represent the conditional expectation of life-
time utility, are absolute welfare measures under Rotemberg pricing and Calvo pricing,
respectively. However, the utility function is ordinal, so a welfare measure based on
the value function is not very revealing. Hence, we calculate the relative welfare cost in
terms of the consumption equivalent units under the Ramsey allocation. Specifically,
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we want to find ξ such that
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cdt , N
d
t ) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU((1− ξ)Crt , N rt )
where the r superscript denotes the Ramsey allocation (under full commitment), and
the d superscript stands for the allocation under discretion. Given the utility function
adopted, the expression for ξ in percentage terms is
ξ =
{
1− exp [(1− β) (W d −W r)]}× 100 (3.27)
where
W d ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
lnCdt −
(
Ndt
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
represents the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility in the economy under dis-
cretion, and
W r ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
lnCrt −
(N rt )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
=
1
1− β
[
lnC
r −
(
N
r)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
is the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility associated with the economy under
full commitment. Recall that σ = 1 is the benchmark case here.
Hence, under the Rotemberg case,
ξR =
{
{1− exp [(1− β) (WR −W r)]} × 100 , using LQ method{
1− exp [(1− β) (W dR −W r)]}× 100 , using projection method
and under the Calvo case,
ξC =
{
{1− exp [(1− β) (WC −W r)]} × 100 , using LQ method{
1− exp [(1− β) (W dC −W r)]}× 100 , using projection method
3.A.4 Trend Inflation
In this section we explore the determinacy properties of our simple New Keynesian
models at the levels of steady-state inflation implied by our non-linear optimal policy
exercise.
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The Rotemberg Case
Following Ascari and Rossi (2012) the linearised version of our New Keyensian model
under Rotemberg pricing can be shown to be,
pit = γfβEtpit+1 + γyβ(1− σ)∆Etyt+1 + γmcmct
mct = (σ + ϕ)yt − ζcσpit − (1 + ϕ)at
yt = Etyt+1 − ζc∆Etpit+1 − 1
σ
Et(Rt − pit+1)
where
ζc =
φ(pi − 1)pi
1− φ
2
(pi − 1)2
C
Y
= 1− φ
2
(pi − 1)2
ρ = (2pi2 − pi)C/Y + β[(pi − 1)pi]2σφ
γf =
(2pi2 − pi)C/Y + [(pi − 1)pi]2σφ
ρ
γy =
(pi2 − pi)C/Y
ρ
γmc =
(ε− 1 + φ(pi2 − pi)(1− β))C/Y
φρ
This can be written in matrix algebra form as,
A0

pit
yt
it
Etpit+1
Etyt+1
 = A1

pit−1
yt−1
it−1
pit
yt

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where
A0 =

1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
−αpi −αy 1 0 0
−γmcζcσ −γyβ(1− σ) + γmc(σ + ϕ) 0 γfβ γyβ(1− σ)
ζc 0 − 1σ −ζc + 1σ 1

A1 =

0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1

The Calvo Case
pit = [βpi + η(θ − 1)]Etpit+1 + κyt + λϕst + ηEtψt+1
ψt = (1− σ)(1− θβpiε−1)yt + θβpiε−1[(ε− 1)Etpit+1 + Etψt+1]
st = ξpit + θpi
εst−1
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
Et(Rt − pit+1)
where
λ =
(1− θpiε−1)(1− θβpiε)
θpiε−1
η = β(pi − 1)(1− θpiε−1)
κ = λ(σ + ϕ) + η(1− σ)
ξ =
εθpiε−1(pi − 1)
1− θpiε−1
B0

pit
yt
it
st
Etpit+1
Etyt+1
Etψt+1

= B1

pit−1
yt−1
it−1
st−1
pit
yt
ψt

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where
B0 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0
−αpi −αy 1 0 0 0 0
−ξ 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 κ 0 λϕ βpi + η(θ − 1) 0 η
0 0 − 1
σ
0 1
σ
1 0
0 (1− σ)(1− θβpiε−1) 0 0 θβpiε−1(ε− 1) 0 θβpiε−1

B1 =

0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 θpiε 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1

This enables us to assess the determinacy properties of the underlying dynamic systems
by considering the eigenvalues of the transition matrices, A0−1A1 and B0−1B1, in the
cases of Rotemberg and Calvo, respectively, We require two roots with modulus in
excess of one to ensure determinacy in the case of Rotemberg, and three under Calvo.
Notice that when pi = 1, the linearised systems reduce to.
pit = βEtpit+1 +
ε− 1
φ
[(σ + ϕ)yt − (1 + ϕ)at]
under Rotemberg, and,
pit = βEtpit+1 +
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
[(σ + ϕ)yt − (1 + ϕ)at]
under Calvo, with both representations sharing the same Euler equation,
yt = Etyt+1 − 1
σ
Et(Rt − pit+1)
Therefore, linearised around a zero inflation steady-state the two systems are identical
provided,
ε− 1
φ
=
(1− θ)(1− βθ)
θ
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3.A.5 The Model With Time-Varying Tax Rate
To indirectly introduce cost push shock, we consider the revenue tax τpt which is as-
sumed to follow the following autoregressive process,
ln (1− τpt) = (1− ρτp) ln (1− τp) + ρτp ln (1− τpt−1)− eτt
eτt
i.i.d∼ N (0, σ2τ)
With revenue tax τpt, the expected discounted sum of nominal profits under Rotem-
berg pricing is given by
Et
∞∑
s=0
Qt,t+s
[
(1− τpt)Pt(j)Yt(j)−mctYt(j)Pt − φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
YtPt
]
and under Calvo it can be written as
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s [(1− τpt)Pt(j)Yt+s(j)−mct+sYt+s(j)Pt+s]
Based on the derivation of the benchmark model, it is quite straightforward to
write down the complete system of non-linear equations describing the discretionary
equilibrium. We will use Chebyshev collocation with time iteration method to solve
the models with time-varying tax for optimal policy functions.
The Rotemberg Pricing
Since we want to focus on the effect of tax rate, then the technology shock can be shut
down by setting At ≡ 1. This, in fact, can simplify numerical computation.
The Lagrangian is
L = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (τpt+1)] + λ1t
{[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Nt − Ct
}
+ λ2t
{
(1− )(1− τpt) + Cσt Nϕt − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβCσt Y −1t Et [M(τpt+1)]
}
where λjt (j = 1, 2) are the Lagrange multipliers, and
M(τpt+1) ≡ C−σt+1Nt+1Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
The equilibrium conditions for time-consistent policy are,
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C−σt = λ1t − λ2t
{
σCσ−1t N
ϕ
t + σφβC
σ−1
t N
−1
t Et [M(τpt+1)]
}
Nt
ϕ = λ1t
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
+ λ2t
{
ϕNt
ϕ−1Cσt
−φβCσt N−2t Et [M(τpt+1)]
}
λ1tφ (1− Πt)Nt = λ2tφ (2Πt − 1)
Ct =
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Nt
0 = (1− )(1− τpt) + Cσt Nϕt − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβ
Cσt
Nt
Et [M(τpt+1)] .
The Calvo Pricing
Similar to the Rotemberg case, we solve a simpler question by shutting down the
technology shock. Then, there are two state variables, τpt and ∆t−1. The Lagrangian
is given as follow:
L = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (∆t, τpt+1)]
+ λ1t[Nt/∆t − Ct]
+ λ2t
[
(1− τpt) Nt
∆tCσt
+ θβEt [L(∆t, τpt+1)]− Ft
]
+ λ3t
[
Nϕ+1t
(1− −1)∆t + θβEt [M(∆t, τpt+1)]− St
]
+ λ4t
[
(1− θ)
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 
−1
+ θΠt∆t−1 −∆t
]
+ λ5t
[
Ft
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
1−
− St
]
where λjt (j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) are the Lagrange multipliers, and
L(∆t, τpt+1) ≡ Π−1t+1Ft+1
M(∆t, τpt+1) ≡ Πt+1St+1
The equilibrium conditions for time-consistent policy are,
Ct = Nt/∆t
Ft = (1− τpt)C1−σt + θβEt
[
Π−1t+1Ft+1
]
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St =
Nϕ+1t
(1− −1)∆t + θβEt
[
Πt+1St+1
]
∆t = (1− θ)
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 
−1
+ θΠt∆t−1
St = Ft
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
1−
0 = 1− λ1tCσt − σ(1− τpt)λ2t
0 = ∆tC
σ
t Nt
ϕ − Cσt λ1t − (1− τpt)λ2t −
(ϕ+ 1)Cσt N
ϕ
t λ3t
(1− −1)
0 = λ2t − λ5t
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
1−
0 = λ3t + λ5t
0 = 
((
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
−1
−∆t−1Πt
)
λ4t
− 1
1− θ
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 
1−
λ5tFt
0 =
Ct
∆t
λ1t + (1− τpt)C
1−σ
t
∆t
λ2t +
Nϕt Ct
(1− −1)∆tλ3t
+ λ4t − θβλ2tEt [L1(∆t, τpt+1)]− θβλ3tEt [M1(∆t, τpt+1)]− θβEt
[
Πt+1λ4t+1
]
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4 | Optimal Time-Consistent Monetary, Fiscal and
Debt Maturity Policy∗
We develop a New Keynesian model with bonds of mixed maturity and
solve for optimal time-consistent policy using global solution techniques.
This reveals several ignored non-linearities in LQ models with one-period
debt. Firstly, the steady-state balances an inflation and debt stabilization
bias to generate a small negative debt value with a slight undershooting
of the inflation target. This falls far short of the first-best asset levels.
Secondly, starting from debt levels consistent with currently observed debt-
GDP ratios, the optimal policy will gradually reduce that debt, but the
policy mix changes radically along the transition path. At high debt levels,
there is a reliance on a relaxation of monetary policy to reduce debt through
an expanded tax base and reduced debt service costs, while tax rates are
used to moderate the increases in inflation. However, as debt levels fall,
the use of monetary policy in this way diminishes and the authority turns
to fiscal policy to continue debt reduction. This endogenous switch from
passive to active monetary policy, possibly accompanied by an active to
passive fiscal policy, occurs at higher debt levels the longer the average
debt maturity. This is largely because policy makers are tempted to use
surprise inflation to erode the real value of debt. This temptation is severe
when debt is of shorter maturity, since the inflationary effects of raising
taxes to reduce debt become increasingly costly as debt levels rise. Finally,
we consider how to optimally vary debt maturity in response to shocks and
across varying levels of debt and show that variations in maturity are largely
used to support variations in the underlying time-consistent policy mix.
∗A working paper version of this chapter, Leeper et al. (2015), was presented at the 21st Annual
Conference on Computing in Economics and Finance at Taipei, and the 30th Annual Congress of the
European Economic Association at the University of Mannheim. We are grateful for comments from
Fabrice Collard and Wouter Den Haan, and the participants in these conferences.
Introduction
4.1 Introduction
The recent global financial crisis has led to unprecedented buildups of government
debt especially in advanced economies. Figure 4.1 shows that the debt-GDP ratios
in advanced economies steadily increased from 73% in 2007 to 105.4% in 2015. This
development has prompted an interest from both policymakers and researchers in re-
thinking the appropriate relationship among monetary policy, fiscal policy and debt
management policy. The conventional policy assignment calls upon monetary authori-
ties to determine the level of short-term interest rates in order to control demand and
inflation, while the fiscal authorities choose the level of the budget deficit to ensure fiscal
sustainability and a debt management office undertakes the technical issue of choosing
the maturity and form in which federal debt is issued. With the onset of the 2007/2008
financial crisis and the subsequent easing of monetary policy, the clean lines between
these domains have blurred. With short-term interest rates at the zero lower bound,
conventional monetary policies have lost their impact. As a result, central banks have
resorted to quantitative easing (QE) policies to support aggregate demand. Because
QE shortens the maturity structure of debt instruments that private investors have
to hold, central banks have effectively entered the domain of debt management policy.
For example, the series of open market operations by the Federal Reserve between 2008
and 2014 and the expansion in excess reserves reduced the average duration of U.S.
government liabilities by over 20%, from 4.6 years to 3.6 years (Corhay et al., 2014).27
At the same time, fiscal authorities’ debt management offices have been extending the
average maturity of the debt to mitigate fiscal risks associated with the government’s
growing debt burden. These fiscal actions have operated as a kind of reverse quantita-
tive easing, replacing money-like short-term debt with longer-term debt. For instance,
the stock of US government debt with a maturity over 5 years that is held by the public
(excluding the holdings by the Federal Reserve) has risen from 8 percent of GDP at
the end of 2007 to 15 percent at the middle of 2014 (Greenwood et al., 2014) . The
observation that monetary and fiscal policies with regard to government debt have been
pushing in opposite directions suggests the need to reconsider the principles underlying
government debt management policy.
27The Fed has been paying interest on reserves since 2008, so that reserves are effectively the same
as short maturity treasuries (e.g., Cochrane, 2014).
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Note: AEs = advanced economies; CAD = cyclically adjusted deﬁcit; FM = Fiscal Monitor. Data labels in the ﬁgure use International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) country codes. 
1 Data for members of the European Union have been revised following the adoption of the new European System of National and Regional 
Accounts (ESA 2010). 
2 The more negative the output gap, the larger the demand support needed. 
3 The higher the level of debt and the higher the cost of ﬁnancing, the lower the ﬁscal space. 
4  For Cyprus: ﬁve-year government bond yield. 
5 For the United States and Canada, the 2014 budget target for the general government corresponds to IMF staff estimates as reported in the April 
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economies. CAD = cyclically adjusted deficit. Source: IMF Fiscal Monitor, 2015.
Against this background, this chapter studies the jointly optimal monetary and
fiscal policy when the policymakers can issue a portfolio of bonds of multiple maturities,
but cannot commit. A major focus of the chapter is on how debt maturity affects
the optimal time-consistent policy mix and equilibrium outcomes in the presence of
distortionary taxes and sticky prices. From this normative analysis, we can draw some
implications on questions like whether surprise inflation and interest rates other than
taxes and government spending should be used to reduce and stabilize debt. Given
the magnitude of the required fiscal consolidation in so many advanced economies, the
issue as to the optimal policy mix in stabilizing the debt is highly relevant.
In sticky price New Keynesian models with one-period government debt, Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004a) show that even a mild degree of price stickiness implies
nearly constant inflation and near random walk behaviour in government debt and tax
rates when policymakers can commit to time-inconsistent monetary and fiscal policies,
in response to government spending disturbances. In other words, monetary policy
should not be used to stabilize debt. However, Sims (2013) questions the robustness
of this result when government can issue long-term nominal bonds. With only short
term government debt, unexpected current inflation or deflation is the only way to
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change its market value in cushioning fiscal shocks. In contrast, if debt is long term,
large changes in the value of debt can be produced by sustained changes in the nominal
interest rate (or asset prices), with much smaller changes in current inflation. Based on
these considerations, Sims sketches out a theoretical argument for using nominal debt
- of which the real value can be altered with surprise changes in inflation and interest
rates - as a cushion against fiscal disturbances to substitute for large movements in
distorting taxes. This mechanism is explored further in Leeper and Leith (2017).
Our chapter contributes to the literature along at least three dimensions. Firstly,
we take both non-state-contingent short-term and long-term nominal bonds into ac-
count. The consideration of long-term debt and the maturity structure is motivated by
Sims’ theoretical insights as well as the empirical facts. Figure 4.2 (right panel) shows
the average debt maturity in a selection of advanced countries is between 2 and 14
years. Secondly, we focus on the time-consistent policy problem which is less studied
in the literature. In a linear-quadratic approximation to the policy problem, Leith and
Wren-Lewis (2013) show that the time inconsistency inherent in commitment policy
means that the optimal time-consistent discretionary policy for debt is quite differ-
ent. The random walk result, typically, no longer holds, and instead debt returns to
its steady-state level following shocks. In addition, time-consistent policy regime is
arguably the more appropriate description of policymaking around the world. While
the Ramsey policy implies it is optimal to induce a random walk in steady state debt
as a result of standard tax smoothing argument, ex ante fiscal authorities typically
want to adopt fiscal rules which are actually quite aggressive in stabilising debt. They
then typically abandon these rules in the face of adverse shocks. There is therefore a
clear failure to adopt fiscal rules which mimic commitment policy. Understanding how
optimal time-consistent discretionary policy differs from its time-inconsistent counter-
part, in particular the implications for debt, has particular empirical relevance today as
governments assess the extent to which they need to reverse the large increases in debt
caused by the severe recession, in a context where fiscal policy commitments are often
far from credible. Finally, we solve the model non-linearly using the global solution
methods which enable us to analyze episodes with sharp increases in debt-GDP ratios
as observed in many countries during the global recession. Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013)
adopt traditional linear-quadratic (LQ) methods, that is, using some artificial devices
to ensure the steady-state being efficient and then linearizing the model around this
steady state, while Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) adopt log-linear approximation
and second-order approximation to the first-order conditions of the Ramsey problem.28
28In LQ models with long-term debt, Leeper and Zhou (2013) ask some similar questions and
they solve the optimal monetary and fiscal policies from the timeless perspective, while Bhattarai
et al. (2014) study optimal time consistent monetary and fiscal policies, taking the zero lower bound
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In contrast, we are not imposing any kind of approximation around a steady-state so
that we can fully explore the effects of non-linearities inherent in the New Keynesian
model.29 In fact, the results under discretion in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013) suggest
that there are massive nonlinearities - for example, there is an overshooting in the debt
correction in a single period at higher steady state debt levels, but a more gradual debt
reduction following shocks at lower ones. This implies that the optimal speed of debt
stabilization is likely to be highly state dependent.
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Figure 1: Size and maturity composition of debt. The gure shows the evolution of
debt-to-GDP ratios and average maturity of debt for a selected group of countries. The debt-
to-GDP time series is measured as net nancial liabilities as a percentage of nominal GDP;
the average maturity of debt is measured as the average term to maturity of total outstanding
government debt. The data source is the OECD database.
as a very stringent assumption.3
Consider a exible-price endowment economy with long-term government debt. Mone-
tary and scal policy are specied by simple rules. The monetary rule prescribes that the
short-term nominal rate responds more than proportionally to ination, while the scal rule
adjusts lump-sum taxes more than proportionally to changes in government debt. Under
rational expectations this policy framework induces a Ricardian equilibrium. Fiscal policy
has no monetary consequences. Now suppose agents have imperfect knowledge, modeled as
uncertainty about the long-term equilibrium level of ination and taxes. Interpret this as
either fundamental uncertainty about the policy regime, or imperfect credibility about policy
objectives. Following Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001), to learn
about the long-run objectives of policy, agents employ a simple linear econometric model
with an unobserved drift, estimated each period as new data become available. Estimates of
average ination and taxes are updated in response to past forecast errors. This is an intu-
itive model of expectations formation supported by empirical evidence.4 This kind of belief
3See Davig and Leeper (2006) and Bianchi (2010).
4See Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2012), Adam, Beutel, and Marcet (2013), Eusepi and Preston (2011),
Milani (2007) and Slobodyan and Wouters (2012).
2
Figure 4.2: This figure shows the evolution of debt-to-GDP ratios and average maturity of debt for a selected group
of countries. The debt-to-GDP time series is measured as net financial liabilities as a percentage of nominal GDP; the
average maturity of debt is measured as the average term to maturity of total outstanding government debt. Taken
from Eusepi and Preston (2013).
To address these non-linearities and the time inconsistency problem which depends
on the incentives to induce inflation surprises to deflate debt, we develop a New Key-
nesian DSGE model augmented with fiscal policy and a portfolio of mixed maturity
bonds and solve the optimal time-consistent policy problem using global non-linear so-
lution techniques. In particular, we study how the change in nominal government debt
maturity affects optimal monetary and fiscal policy decisions and equilibrium outcomes
in the presence of distortionary taxes and sticky prices. In the model, the government
cannot commit, and would like to use unexpected inflation erode the real value of
nominal debt. In this way, the government can minimize the need to vary distortionary
income taxes over the business cycle. Anticipating this, economic agents raise their in-
flationary expectations such that high debt levels deliver a state-dependent inflationary
bias problem which is particularly costly, due to nominal rigidities. As debt levels fall,
the efficacy of surprise inflation as a means of reducing the debt burden also falls,
constraint on nominal interest rate into consideration.
29There are some recent papers using global solution techniques which co sider optimal discre-
tionary monetary policy with trivial fiscal policy in the New Keynesian models, see Anderson et al.
(2010), Van Zandweghe and Wolman (2011), Nakata (2013), Leith and Liu (2014), Ngo (2014) and
among others.
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reducing the induced inflationary bias problem and influencing the optimal policy mix.
We find the following key results. Firstly, the steady-state balances the inflation
and debt stabilization bias to generate a small negative long-run optimal value for debt,
which implies a slight undershooting of the inflation target in steady state. This falls
far short of the accumulated level of assets that would be needed to finance government
consumption and eliminate tax and other distortions. Secondly, starting from levels
of debt consistent with currently observed debt-GDP ratios, the optimal policy will
gradually reduce that debt, but with radical changes in the policy mix along the tran-
sition path. At high debt levels, there is a reliance on a relaxation of monetary policy
to reduce debt through an expansion in the tax base and reduced debt service costs,
while tax rates are used to moderate the increases in inflation. However, as debt levels
fall, the use of monetary policy in this way is diminished and the policy maker turns to
fiscal policy to continue the reduction in debt. This is akin to a switch from an active
to passive fiscal policy in rule based descriptions of policy, which occurs endogenously
under the optimal policy as debt levels fall. It can also be accompanied by a switch
from passive to active monetary policy. This switch in the policy mix occurs at higher
debt levels the longer the average maturity of government debt. This is largely because
high debt levels induce an inflationary bias problem as policy makers face the temp-
tation to use surprise inflation to erode the real value of that debt. This temptation
is then more acute when debt is of shorter maturity, since the inflationary effects of
raising taxes to reduce debt become increasingly costly as debt levels rise. Finally, we
consider how to optimally vary debt maturity in response to shocks and across varying
levels of debt. We show that variations in the maturity structure are optimally used to
support alterations in the time-consistent policy mix rather than support significantly
different speeds of fiscal correction.
Related Literature. This chapter is related to several strands of the optimal
fiscal policy literature. We will discuss those that are most closely related in terms of
topics and numerical methods.
Our contribution is most closely related to the literature that studies optimal fiscal
and monetary policy in sticky price New Keynesian models using non-linear solution
techniques. Following the work of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) and Siu (2004),
Faraglia et al. (2013) solve a Ramsey problem using global solution methods to examine
the implications for optimal inflation of changes in the level and maturity of govern-
ment debt. We study the discretionary equivalent of this policy, which is radically
different. Niemann and Pichler (2011) globally solve for optimal fiscal and monetary
policies under both commitment and discretion in an economy exposed to large adverse
shocks. Using the same method, Niemann et al. (2013) study time consistent policy in
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the model of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) and identify a simple mechanism that
generates inflation persistence. Government spending is exogenous in the latter two
papers which also do not consider long-term debt. Similarly, abstracting from long-
term debt, Matveev (2014) compares the efficacy of discretionary government spending
and labor income taxes for the purpose of fiscal stimulus at the liquidity trap. The
value function iteration method is adopted to deal with the zero lower bound problem.
In contrast to these papers, debt of different maturities, time-consistent optimal pol-
icy making and endogenous government expenditure are all essential elements in our
model.
Aside from the relatively small literature exploring optimal monetary and fiscal
policy in non-linear New Keynesian models, there is a vast literature on Ramsey fiscal
and monetary policy in the tradition of Lucas and Stokey (1983) which tends to focus
on real or flexible price economies. In flexible-price environments, the government’s
problem consists in financing an exogenous stream of public spending by choosing
the least disruptive combination of inflation and distortionary income taxes. In an
incomplete-markets version of Lucas and Stokey (1983), Aiyagari et al. (2002) simulate
the model globally and show that the level of welfare in Ramsey economies with and
without real state-contingent debt is virtually the same. In addition, they reaffirm
the random-walk results of debt and taxes from Barro (1979). Angeletos et al. (2013)
introduce collateral constraints and a liquidity role for government bonds into Aiyagari
et al. (2002). They use the value function iteration method to globally solve the
modified model and find that the steady-state level of debt is no longer indeterminate,
when government bonds can serve as collateral. Cao (2014) extends Angeletos et al.
(2013) with long-term debt and studies how the cost of inflation to commercial banks
affects the design of fiscal and monetary policy. Likewise, Faraglia et al. (2014) use
global solution methods solve a Ramsey problem with incomplete markets and long-
term bonds. They show that many features of optimal policy are sensitive to the
introduction of long bonds, in particular tax variability and long run behaviour of
debt. Our findings convey the same message that maturity lengths like those observed
in actual economies can substantially alter the nature of optimal policies, but the policy
problem in our sticky price economy where the policy maker is unable to commit is
fundamentally different.
There is also a literature on optimal time consistent fiscal and monetary policy in
real models. This literature typically focuses on Markov-perfect policy, where house-
holds’ and the government’s policy rules are functions of payoff-relevant variables only.
Local approximations around a non-stochastic steady state are typically infeasible for
these models, since optimal behaviour is characterized by generalized Euler equations
173
Introduction
that involve the derivatives of some equilibrium decision rules, and thus it is impossible
to compute the steady state independent of these rules. Hence, as in our contribution,
global solution methods are required. Klein and Rios-Rull (2003) compare the stochas-
tic properties of optimal fiscal policy without commitment with those properties under
a full-commitment policy in a neoclassical growth model with a balanced government
budget, see also Krusell et al. (2006) and Klein et al. (2008). Ortigueira (2006) stud-
ies Markov-perfect optimal taxation under a balanced-budget rule, while Ortigueira
et al. (2012) deal with the case of unbalanced budgets. In a version of Lucas and
Stokey (1983) model with endogenous government expenditure, Debortoli and Nunes
(2013) find that when governments cannot commit, debt is no longer indeterminate
and often converges to a steady-state with no debt accumulation at all. This is a quite
striking difference in the behaviour of debt between the full commitment and the no-
commitment cases. Similarly, Grechyna (2013) also considers endogenous government
spending in the environment of Lucas and Stokey (1983) with only one-period debt
and shows that around the steady state, the properties of the fiscal variables are very
similar, regardless of commitment assumptions. More recently, Debortoli et al. (2015)
consider a Lucas and Stokey (1983) economy without state-contingent bonds and com-
mitment, and show that the government actively manages its debt positions and can
approximate optimal policy by confining its debt instruments to consols. Our chapter
shares the same technical problem due to the presence of generalized Euler equations,
but nominal rigidities make our model setup quite different from these papers.
Finally, there is also a literature on optimal fiscal and monetary policy in mone-
tary models, which do not contain nominal interia, but which may contain a cost to
inflation. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004b) study Ramsey policy in a flexible-price
model with cash-in-advance constraint, which essentially extends the model of Lucas
and Stokey (1983) to an imperfectly competitive environment. A global numerical
method is used to characterize the dynamic properties of the Ramsey allocation. In a
cash-in advance model, Martin (2009) studies the time consistency problems that arise
from the interaction between debt and monetary policy, since inflation reduces the real
value of nominal liabilities. He uses global solution methods to deal with the general-
ized Euler equations, see also Martin (2011), Martin (2013) and Martin (2014) where
time consistent policies are studied in variants of the monetary search model of Lagos
and Wright (2005). In contrast, we abstract from monetary frictions and emphasize
nominal price stickiness which is the conventional approach to generating real effects
from monetary policy.
Roadmap. The chapter proceeds as follows. We describe the benchmark model in
section 4.2. The first best allocations are characterized in 4.3. We study the optimal
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time consistent policy problem in section 4.4. In section 4.5, we describe the solution
method and present the numerical results. In section 4.6 we conclude.
4.2 The Model
Our model is a standard New Keynesian model, but augmented to include the gov-
ernment’s budget constraint where government spending is financed by distortionary
taxation and/or borrowing. This basic set-up is similar to that in Benigno and Wood-
ford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004a) but with some differences. Firstly,
we allow the government to optimally vary government spending in the face of shocks,
rather than simply treating government spending as an exogenous flow which must be
financed. This is a necessary modification to answer questions like the relative effective-
ness of government spending cuts and tax increases in debt stabilization.30 Secondly,
our nominal debt is not of single-period maturity, but consists of a portfolio of bonds of
mixed maturities. In reality, most countries issue long-term nominal debt in overwhelm-
ing proportions of total debt. This is an important consideration in highly indebted
economies, since even modest surprise changes in inflation and interest rates can have
substantial effects on the market value of debt, and hence become a sizeable source of
fiscal revenue.31 This fact suggests that the maturity structure of debt is an essential
element in characterizing the joint optimal monetary and fiscal policy. Thirdly, we not
only take the average debt maturity as exogenously given, but also allow it to optimally
vary over the business cycle, see section 4.A.4 in the appendix.
4.2.1 Households
There are a continuum of households of size one. Households appreciate private con-
sumption as well as the provision of public goods and dislike labor. We shall assume
complete asset markets, such that, through risk sharing, they will face the same bud-
get constraint. As a result the typical household will seek to maximise the following
objective function
30International Monetary Fund (2012) reports that current fiscal consolidation efforts rely heavily
on government spending cuts. In addition, Bi et al. (2013) introduce ex ante uncertainty over the
composition of the fiscal consolidation, either tax based or spending based, and show that the macroe-
conomic consequences of spending cuts can be quite different from tax increases, even if the direct
fiscal consequences are similar.
31See Hall and Sargent (2011) and Sims (2013) for the empirical findings on the contribution of
this kind of fiscal financing to the decline in the U.S. debt-GDP ratio from 1945 to 1974.
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E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (Ct, Nt, Gt) (4.1)
where C, G and N are a consumption aggregate, a public goods aggregate, and labour
supply respectively.
The consumption aggregate is defined as
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
(4.2)
where j denotes the good’s type or variety and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between varieties. The public goods aggregate takes the same form
Gt =
(∫ 1
0
Gt(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
(4.3)
The budget constraint at time t is given by∫ 1
0
Pt(j)Ct(j)dj + P
S
t B
S
t + P
M
t B
M
t ≤ Ξt + (1 + ρPMt )BMt−1 +BSt−1 +WtNt(1− τt)
where Pt(j) is the price of variety j , Ξ is the representative household’s share of profits
in the imperfectly competitive firms, W are wages, and τ is an wage income tax rate32.
Households hold two basic forms of government bond. The first is the familiar one
period debt, BSt which has the price equal to the inverse of the gross nominal interest
rate, P St = R
−1
t . The second type of bond is actually a protfolio of many bonds which,
following Woodford (2001) pay a declining coupon of ρj dollars j+ 1 periods after they
were issued where 0 < ρ ≤ β−1. The duration of the bond (1− βρ)−1, which allows
us to vary ρ as a means of changing the implicit maturity structure of government
debt. By using such a simple structure we need only price a single bond, since any
existing bond issued j periods ago is worth ρj new bonds. In the special case where
ρ = 1 these bonds become infinitely lived consols. When introducing steady state gross
inflation of Π∗ we assume that the nominal payments on the bonds decline at rate ρ˜Π∗,
such that the real rate of coupon decline is ρ˜, and the duration of the bond without
price suprises is, (1− βρ˜)−1. This enables us to vary the steady state rate of inflation
32Since fiscal policy is one important element of this chapter, we do not assume any kind of lump-
sum-tax-financed subsidy to offset the distortion arising from monopolistic competition, which is a
typical assumption in the optimal fiscal and monetary policy literature using New Keynesian models.
Thus, the steady-state of the model economy is not efficient. In addition, in the presence of the zero
lower bound constraint, policy functions have kinks, therefore an accurate evaluation of optimal policy
and welfare requires a global solution method.
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without altering the implict maturity structure of government debt.33
Households must first decide how to allocate a given level of expenditure across the
various goods that are available. They do so by adjusting the share of a particular good
in their consumption bundle to exploit any relative price differences - this minimises
the costs of consumption. Optimisation of expenditure for any individual good implies
the demand function given below,
Ct(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Ct
where we have price indices given by
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−dj
) 1
1−
The budget constraint can therefore be rewritten as
P St B
S
t + P
M
t B
M
t ≤ Ξt + (1 + ρPMt )BMt−1 +BSt−1 +WtNt(1− τt)− PtCt (4.4)
where
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)Ct(j)dj = PtCt. Pt is the current price level. The constraint says that
total financial wealth in period t can be worth no more than the value of financial
wealth brought into the period plus nonfinancial income during the period net of taxes
and the value of consumption spending.
For much of the analysis the one period government bond BSt is in zero net supply
with beginning-of-period price P St , while the general portfolio of government bond
BMt is in non-zero net supply with beginning-of-period price PMt . Higher ρ raises the
maturity of the bond portfolio. In extreme case ρ = 0, the debt portfolio collapses to
one-period debt and if ρ = 1, it becomes a consol. We cannot allow the rate of decay
on bonds to become time varying without either implictly allowing the government
to renege on existing bond contracts or tracking the distribution of bond of different
maturities that have been issued in the past. Therefore in order to allow the policy
maker to tractably vary the maturity structure we shall consider the case where both
BSt and BMt are potentially in non-zero net supply so that the policy maker can vary
the overall maturity of the outstanding debt stock by varying the relative proportion
of short and longer-term bonds in that portfolio.
Similarly, the allocation of government spending across goods is determined by
minimising total costs,
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)Gt(j)dj. Given the form of the basket of public goods
33This way of modeling long-term debt is quite elegant, since it allows us to study long-duration
bonds without increasing the dimensionality of the state space, and it is commonly adopted in the
literature (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; Eusepi and Preston, 2012).
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this implies,
Gt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Gt
Households’ Intertemporal Consumption Problem
The first of the households intertemporal problems involves allocating consumption
expenditure across time. For tractability assume that (4.1) takes the specific form
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
G
1−σg
t
1− σg −
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
(4.5)
Note that the assumption of a separable utility function is standard in models with
political disagreement, such that the provisions of public good does not affect private
decisions.
We can then maximise utility subject to the budget constraint (4.4) to obtain the
optimal allocation of consumption across time, based on the pricing of one period
bonds,
βRtEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1 (4.6)
and the declining payoff consols,
βEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)(
1 + ρPMt+1
)}
= PMt (4.7)
Combining (4.6) and (4.7) yields the no-arbitrage condition between one-period and
long-term bonds,
PMt = Et
[
P St
(
1 + ρPMt+1
)]
(4.8)
where P St = R
−1
t is used. Notice that when these reduce to single period bonds, ρ = 0,
the price of these bonds is also given by PMt = R
−1
t . However, outside of this special
case the longer term bonds introduce the term structure of interest rates to the model.
It is convenient to define the stochastic discount factor (for nominal payoffs) for later
use,
β
(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)
= Qt,t+1
The second FOC relates to their labour supply decision and is given by,
(1− τt)
(
Wt
Pt
)
= Nϕt C
σ
t
That is, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure equals
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the after-tax wage rate. Besides these FOCs, necessary and sufficient conditions for
household optimization also require the household’s budget constraints to bind with
equality. In addition, there is an associated no-Ponzi-game condition derived as follows.
Define household wealth brought into period t as,
Dt = (1 + ρP
M
t )B
M
t−1 +B
S
t−1
the no-Ponzi-game condition can be written as,
lim
T→∞
Et
[
1
Rt,T
DT
PT
]
≥ 0 (4.9)
where
Rt,T =
T−1∏
s=t
(
1 + ρPMs+1
PMs
Ps
Ps+1
)
for T ≥ 1 and Rt,t = 1, also see Eusepi and Preston (2011). The no-Ponzi-game says
that the present discounted value of household’s real wealth at infinity is non-negative,
that is, there is no overaccumulation of debt. In equilibrium, the equality holds.
4.2.2 Firms
The production function is linear, so for firm j
Yt(j) = AtNt(j) (4.10)
where at = ln(At) is AR(1) such that at = ρaat−1 + eat, with 0 ≤ ρa < 1 and eat i.i.d∼
N(0, σ2a). The real marginal costs of production is defined as mct = Wt/ (PtAt). The
demand curve they face is given by,
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Yt
where Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
−1
 dj
] 
−1 . Firms are also subject to quadratic adjustment costs in
changing prices, as in Rotemberg (1982).
We define the Rotemberg price adjustment costs for a monopolistic firm j as,
vt (j) =
φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Π∗Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
Yt (4.11)
where φ ≥ 0 measures the degree of nominal price rigidity. The adjustment cost, which
accounts for the negative effects of price changes on the customer–firm relationship,
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increases in magnitude with the size of the price change and with the overall scale of
economic activity Yt. Π∗ is the targeted rate of inflation.
The problem facing firm j is to maximise the discounted value of profits,
max
Pt(j)
Et
∞∑
z=0
Qt,t+zΞt+z (j)
where profits are defined as,
Ξt(j) = Pt(j)Yt(j)−mctYt(j)Pt − φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Π∗Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
PtYt
= Pt(j)
1−P t Yt −mctPt(j)−P 1+t Yt −
φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Π∗Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
PtYt
So that, in a symmetric equilibrium where Pt(j) = Pt the first order conditions are
given by,
0 = (1− ) + mct − φΠt
Π∗
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)
(4.12)
+ φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1
Π∗
(
Πt+1
Π∗
− 1
)]
which is the Rotemberg version of the Phillips curve relationship.
Goods market clearing requires, for each good j,
Yt(j) = Ct(j) +Gt(j) + vt(j)
which allows us to write,
Yt = Ct +Gt + vt
with vt =
∫ 1
0
vt (j) dj. In a symmetrical equilibrium,
Yt
[
1− φ
2
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)2]
= Ct +Gt
There is also market clearing in the bonds market where we assume the one period
bonds are in zero net supply, BSt = 0 and the remaining longer term portfolio evolves
according to the government’s budget constraint which we will now describe.
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4.2.3 Government Budget Constraint
The government consists of two authorities. First, there is a monetary authority which
controls the nominal interest rates on short-term nominal bonds. Second, there is a
fiscal authority deciding on the level of government expenditures, labor income taxes
and on debt policy. Government expenditures consist of spending for the provision of
public goods and for interest payments on outstanding debt. The level of public goods
provision is a choice variable of the government. We assume that monetary and fiscal
policy is coordinated by a benevolent policymaker who seeks to maximize household
welfare, and the government can credibly commit to repay its debt.
The government expenditures Gt are financed by levying labor income taxes at the
rate τt, and by issuing one-period, risk free (non-contingent), nominal obligations BSt ,
and long term bonds BMt . The government’s sequential budget constraint is then given
by
PMt B
M
t + P
S
t B
S
t + τtWtNt = PtGt +B
S
t−1 + (1 + ρP
M
t )B
M
t−1
Note that the one-period bond is assumed in zero net supply, that is, BSt = 0, hence
the flow budget constraint of the government is simplified into
PMt B
M
t = (1 + ρP
M
t )B
M
t−1 −WtNtτt + PtGt (4.13)
Note that (1+ρPMt )BMt−1 is outstanding government liabilities in period t. Distortionary
taxation and spending adjustments are required to service government debt as well as
stabilize the economy. Rewriting in real terms
PMt bt = (1 + ρP
M
t )
bt−1
Πt
− Wt
Pt
Ntτt +Gt (4.14)
where real debt is defined as, bt ≡ BMt /Pt.
Given the nominal nature of debt, monetary policy decisions affect the govern-
ment budget through two channels: first, the nominal interest rate policy of monetary
authority influences directly the nominal return the government has to offer on its in-
struments; second, nominal interest rate decisions also affect the price level and thereby
the real value of outstanding government debt.
In particular, the role of the maturity of government debt can be seen clearly
from the government budget constraint. In (4.14), the amount of outstanding real
government debt is PMt bt, and the period real return on holding government debt is
(1 + ρPMt )/
(
ΠtP
M
t−1
)
. If ρ = 0, government debt bt is reduced into one-period debt,
and then the only way to adjust real return on bonds ex post is through inflation in
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the current period Πt. Large fluctuations in prices can be very costly in the presence
of nominal rigidities. However, if government debt has a longer maturity, 0 < ρ < 1,
adjustments in the ex post real return can be engineered via changes in the bond price
PMt , which depends on inflation in future periods. This means that changes in the real
debt return can be produced by a small, but sustained inflation, which is less costly
than equivalent large fluctuations in inflation. As a result, long-term debt helps the
policy maker achieve the desired adjustment in the ex post real return at a smaller
cost.
That completes the description of our model which contains the usual resource
constraint, consumption Euler equation and New Keynesian Phillips curve as well as
the government’s budget constraint and the bond pricing equation for longer-term
bonds. These equations and the debt-dependent steady state are described in the
Appendix 4.A.2.
4.3 First-Best Allocation
In some analyses of of optimal fiscal policy (e.g., Aiyagari et al., 2002), it is desirable for
the policy maker to accumulate a ’war chest’ which pays for government consumption
and/or fiscal subsidies to correct for other market imperfections. In order to assess
to what extent our optimal, but time-consistent policy attempts to do so it is help-
ful to define the level of government accumulated assets that would be necessary to
mimic the social planner’s allocation under the decentralised solution. The first step in
doing so is defining the first-best allocation that would be implemented by the social
planner. The social planner ignores the nominal inertia and all other inefficiencies and
chooses real allocations that maximize the representative consumer’s utility subject to
the aggregate resource constraint and the aggregate production function. That is, the
first-best allocation {C∗t , N∗t , G∗t} is the one that maximizes utility (4.38), subject to
the technology constraint (4.37), and aggregate resource constraint Yt = Ct +Gt.
The Lagrangian is
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{(
(C∗t )
1−σ
1− σ + χ
(G∗t )
1−σg
1− σg −
(Nt
∗)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
+ λt [AtNt
∗ − C∗t −G∗t ]
}
The first order conditions imply that
(C∗t )
−σ = χ (G∗t )
−σg = (Nt∗)
ϕ /At = (Yt
∗)ϕA−(1+ϕ)t
That is, given the resource constraints, it is optimal to equate the marginal utility of
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private and public consumption to the marginal disutility of labor effort.
The optimal share of government consumption in output is
G∗t
Y ∗t
= χ
1
σg
(
Yt
∗
At
)−ϕ+σg
σg
A
1−σg
σg
t
In steady state (technology level A normalized to unity),
G∗
Y ∗
= χ
1
σg (Y ∗)−
ϕ+σg
σg
where Y ∗ can be solved from the aggregate resource constraint
(Y ∗)−
ϕ
σ + χ
1
σg (Y ∗)−
ϕ
σg = Y ∗.
In particular, when σ = σg,
Y ∗ =
(
1 + χ
1
σ
) σ
σ+ϕ
and hence,
G∗
Y ∗
=
(
1 + χ−
1
σ
)−1
It is illuminating to contrast the allocation achieved in the steady state of the
decentralized equilibrium with the first best allocation. We do this by finding policies
and prices that make the first-best allocation and the decentralized equilibrium collide.
Note that
(Y ∗)ϕ+σ
(
1− G
∗
Y ∗
)σ
= 1 (4.15)
Comparing (4.39) and (4.15), and assuming the steady state share of government con-
sumption is the same, then the two allocations will be identical when the labor income
tax rate is set optimally to be,
τ ∗ = 1− 
− 1 =
−1
− 1 (4.16)
Notice that the optimal tax rate is negative, that is, it is effectively a subsidy which off-
sets the monopolistic competition distortion. This in turn, implies that the government
accumulate a stock of assets which imply,
b∗ =
Π∗ − βρ
1− β
[−1

−
(
1 + χ−
1
σ
)−1](
1 + χ
1
σ
) σ
σ+ϕ
and
PM∗b∗
4Y ∗
=
β
4 (1− β)
[−1

−
(
1 + χ−
1
σ
)−1]
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Using our benchmark calibration below this would imply b∗ = −2.47. That is, a stock
of assets of 843.75% of GDP would be required to generate sufficient income to pay for
government consumption and a labor income subsidy which undoes the effects of the
monopolistic competition distortion. We shall see that the steady-state level of debt in
our optimal policy problem while negative, falls far short of this ’war chest’ value.
4.4 Optimal Policy Under Discretion
We assume that the policymaker cannot credibly commit to particular future policy
actions. Instead, the policymaker reassesses his policy response each period, that is,
this policy is time-consistent. In our model, the presence of government debt makes
the optimal time-consistent policy history dependent, that is, the future path of the
policy instruments depends on today’s level of government debt.
The policy under discretion can be described as a set of decision rules for
{Ct, Yt,Πt, bt, τt, Gt}
which maximise,
V (bt−1, At) = max
{
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
G
1−σg
t
1− σg −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (bt, At+1)]
}
subject to (4.34), (4.35), and
βEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)(
1 + ρPMt+1
)}
bt (4.17)
=
(
1 + ρβEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)(
1 + ρPMt+1
)}) bt−1
Πt
−
(
τt
1− τt
)(
Yt
At
)1+ϕ
Cσt +Gt
where we have used the bond pricing equation (4.33) to eliminate the current value of
the bond in (4.36).
Defining auxilliary functions,
M(bt, At+1) = (Ct+1)
−σ Yt+1
Πt+1
Π∗
(
Πt+1
Π∗
− 1
)
L(bt, At+1) = (Ct+1)
−σ(Πt+1)−1(1 + ρPMt+1)
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we can write the constraints (4.35) and (4.17) facing the policy maker as,
(1−)+(1−τt)−1Y ϕt Cσt A−1−ϕt −φ
Πt
Π∗
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)
+φβCσt Y
−1
t Et [M(bt, At+1)] = 0 (4.18)
0 = βbtC
σ
t Et [L(bt, At+1)]−
bt−1
Πt
(1 + ρβCσt Et [L(bt, At+1)]) (4.19)
+
(
τt
1− τt
)(
Yt
At
)1+ϕ
Cσt −Gt
By using the auxiliary functions in this way, we take account of the fact that the policy
maker recognises the impact their actions have on the endogenous state, but that they
cannot commit to future policy actions beyond that i.e. we have a time-consistent
policy. Therefore the Lagrangian for the policy problem can be written as,
L =
{
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
G
1−σg
t
1− σg −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt[V (bt, At+1)]
}
+ λ1t
[
Yt
(
1− φ
2
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)2)
− Ct −Gt
]
+ λ2t
[
(1− ) + (1− τt)−1Y ϕt Cσt A−1−ϕt − φΠtΠ∗
(
Πt
Π∗ − 1
)
+φβCσt Y
−1
t Et [M(bt, At+1)]
]
+ λ3t
 βbtCσt Et [L(bt, At+1)]− bt−1Πt (1 + ρβCσt Et [L(bt, At+1)])
+
(
τt
1−τt
)(
Yt
At
)1+ϕ
Cσt −Gt

We can write the first order conditions for the policy problem as follows:
Consumption,
C−σt − λ1t + λ2t
[
σ(1− τt)−1Y ϕt Cσ−1t A−1−ϕt + σφβCσ−1t Y −1t Et [M(bt, At+1)]
]
+ λ3t
 σβbtCσ−1t Et [L(bt, At+1)]− ρσβ bt−1Πt Cσ−1t Et [L(bt, At+1)]
+σ
(
τt
1−τt
)(
Yt
At
)1+ϕ
Cσ−1t
 = 0 (4.20)
which says that higher consumption increases utility, tightens the resource constraint
(λ1t ≥ 0), has adverse effects on the inflation-output tradeoffs at time t (λ2t ≤ 0), and
relaxes the government budget constraint (λ3t ≥ 0);
Government spending,
χG
−σg
t − λ1t − λ3t = 0 (4.21)
which says that higher government spending increases utility, tightens the resource
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constraint (λ1t ≥ 0), and tightens the government budget constraint (λ3t ≥ 0);
Output,
−Y ϕt A−1−ϕt + λ1t
[
1− φ
2
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)2]
+λ2t
[
ϕ(1− τt)−1Y ϕ−1t Cσt A−1−ϕt − φβCσt Y −2t Et [M(bt, At+1)]
]
+ λ3t
[
(1 + ϕ)Y ϕt C
σ
t
(
τt
1− τt
)
A−1−ϕt
]
= 0 (4.22)
which says that higher output (requiring higher labor) decreases utility, relaxes the
resource constraint (λ1t ≥ 0), has adverse effects on the inflation-output tradeoffs at
time t (λ2t ≤ 0), and relaxes the government budget constraint (λ3t ≥ 0);
Taxation,
λ2t
[
(1− τt)−2Y ϕt Cσt A−1−ϕt
]
+ λ3t
[
Y 1+ϕt C
σ
t (1− τt)−2A−1−ϕt
]
= 0
simplifying,
λ2t + λ3tYt = 0 (4.23)
which says that higher tax rate has adverse effects on the inflation-output tradeoffs at
time t (λ2t ≤ 0), and relaxes the government budget constraint (λ3t ≥ 0);
Inflation,
−λ1t
[
Yt
φ
Π∗
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)]
− λ2t
[
φ
Π∗
(
2Πt
Π∗
− 1
)]
+ λ3t
[
bt−1
Π2t
(1 + ρβCσt Et [L(bt, At+1)])
]
= 0 (4.24)
which says that higher inflation rate tightens the resource constraint (λ1t ≥ 0), has
positive effects on the inflation-output tradeoffs at time t (λ2t ≤ 0), and relaxes the
government budget constraint (λ3t ≥ 0);
Government debt,
βEt[V1(bt, At+1)] + λ2t
[
φβCσt Y
−1
t Et [M1(bt, At+1)]
]
+βλ3t
[
Cσt Et [L(bt, At+1)] + btC
σ
t Et [L1(bt, At+1)]− ρ
bt−1
Πt
Cσt Et [L1(bt, At+1)]
]
= 0
where
V1(bt, At+1) ≡ ∂V (bt, At+1)/∂bt
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L1(bt, At+1) ≡ ∂L(bt, At+1)/∂bt
M1(bt, At+1) ≡ ∂M(bt, At+1)/∂bt
Note that by the envelope theorem,
V1(bt−1, At) = −λ3t 1
Πt
(1 + ρβCσt Et [L(bt, At+1)])
we can write the FOC for government debt as,
λ2t
[
φβCσt Y
−1
t Et [M1(bt, At+1)]
]
+ βλ3t
[
Cσt Et [L(bt, At+1)] + btC
σ
t Et [L1(bt, At+1)]
−ρ bt−1
Πt
Cσt Et [L1(bt, At+1)]
]
− βEt
[
λ3t+1
1
Πt+1
(1 + ρβCσt+1Et+1 [L(bt+1, At+2)])
]
= 0 (4.25)
which says that higher stock of debt bt has adverse effects on the inflation-output
tradeoffs at time t (λ2t ≤ 0), tightens the time t government budget constraint (λ3t ≥ 0),
while relaxes the government budget constraint at time t+ 1 (λ3t+1 ≥ 0).
The discretionary equilibrium is determined by the system given by the FOCs,
(4.20), (4.21), (4.22), (4.23), (4.24), (4.25), and the constraints, (4.34), (4.18) and
(4.19), and finally the exogenous process for the technology shock,
at = ρaat−1 + eat
where at = lnAt, and eat
i.i.d∼ N(0, σ2a).
Note there is a two period ahead expectation implicit in (4.25), related to the
forward pricing of future longer term bonds. This can be simplified as,
βλ3tC
σ
t Et [L(bt, At+1)]− βEt
[
λ3t+1
Πt+1
(1 + ρPMt+1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
tradeoff between current and future distortions
+λ2tφβC
σ
t Y
−1
t Et [M1(bt, At+1)] + βλ3t
[
btC
σ
t Et [L1(bt, At+1)]− ρ
bt−1
Πt
Cσt Et [L1(bt, At+1)]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
additional terms due to lack of commitment
= 0
(4.26)
since (4.7) implies that
PMt = βC
σ
t Et [L(bt, At+1)] (4.27)
Note that (4.26) is a generalized Euler equation, which involves the derivatives of
187
Numerical Analysis
the equilibrium policy rules with respect to the state variable, inherited debt stock.
The standard tradeoff between current and future distortions, reflecting in the wedge
between λ3t and λ3t+1, leads to the tax-smoothing argument as in Barro (1979). The
presence of partial derivative of debt is due to a time-consistency problem which is
caused by the fact that future government will not internalize how its policy affects
current actions. This tradeoff between tax-smoothing and the time-consistency problem
determines the equilibrium level of debt.
We can solve the nonlinear system consisting of these six first order conditions, the
three constraints and (4.27) to yield the time-consistent optimal policy. Specifically,
we need to find these ten time-invariant Markov-perfect equilibrium policy rules which
are functions of the two state variables {bt−1, At}. That is, we need to find policy
functions such as bt = b (bt−1, At), τt = τ (bt−1, At), and Πt = Π (bt−1, At).
4.5 Numerical Analysis
4.5.1 Solution Method and Calibration
For the model described in the previous section, the equilibrium policy functions can-
not be computed in closed form. We thus resort to computational methods and derive
numerical approximations to the policy rules. Local approximation methods are not
applicable for this purpose because the model’s steady state around which local dynam-
ics should be approximated is endogenously determined as part of the model solution
and thus a priori unknown. In light of this difficulty, we resort to a global solution
method. Specifically, We use the Chebyshev collocation with time iteration method to
solve the model.34 The detailed algorithm is presented in section 4.A.3 in the appendix.
In general, optimal discretionary policy problems can be characterized as a dynamic
game between the private sector and successive governments. Multiplicity of equilibria
is a common problem in dynamic games. One strategy has been to focus on equilibria
with continuous strategies, see Judd (2004) for a discussion. Since we use polynomial
approximations, we are searching only for continuous Markov-perfect equilibria where
agents condition their strategies only on payoff-relevant state variables.
Before solving the model numerically, the benchmark values of structural parame-
ters must be specified. The calibration of parameters is summarized in Table 4.1. We
set β = (1/1.02)1/4 = 0.995, which is a standard value for models with quarterly data
and implies 2% annual real interest rate. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution
34See Judd (1998) for a textbook treatment.
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is set to one half (σ = σg = 2) which is in the middle of the parameter range typically
considered in the literature. Labor supply elasticity is set to ϕ−1 = 1/3. The elas-
ticity of substitution between intermediate goods is chosen as  = 21, which implies a
monopolistic markup of approximately 5%, similar to Siu (2004). The decaying param-
eter of coupon rate ρ = 0.95, corresponds to 4 ∼ 5 years of debt maturity, consistent
with US data. The scaling parameter χ = 0.055 ensures that the share of government
spending in output is about 19%. The technology parameters are set to ρa = 0.95
and σa = 0.01. The price adjustment cost parameter φ = 32.5 - implying that on
average firms re-optimize prices every four to six months - is well in line with empirical
evidence. Finally, annual rate of inflation target is chosen to be 2%, which is current
target adopted by most of the inflation targeting economies.
With this benchmark parameterization, we solve the fully nonlinear models via the
Chebyshev collocation method. The maximum Euler equation error over the full range
of the grid is of the order of 10−6. As suggested by Judd (1998), this order of accuracy
is reasonable.
Table 4.1: Parameterization
Parameter Value Definition
β 0.995 Quarterly discount factor
σ 2 Relative risk aversion coefficient
σg 2 Relative risk aversion coefficient for government spending
ϕ 3 Inverse Frish elasticity of labor supply
 21 Elasticity of substitution between varieties
ρ 0.95 Debt maturity structure
χ 0.055 Scaling parameter associated with government spending
ρa 0.95 AR-coefficient of technology shock
σa 0.01 Standard deviation of technology shock
φ 32.5 Rotemberg adjustment cost coefficient
Π∗ 2% Annual inflation rate target
4.5.2 Numerical Results
In this section we explore the properties of the equilibrium under the optimal time-
consistent policy. We begin by considering the steady-state under our benchmark
calibration, before turning to the transitional dynamics that drive the economy to that
steady-state which highlights the state-dependent nature of the optimal policy mix.
We then turn to consider the role of debt maturity in these results, focusing on the
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impact of debt maturity on the inflationary bias problem and the sensitivity of the
policy to the level of government debt. We conclude by allowing the policy making to
issue both short and longer-term bonds and show that this enables the policy maker to
import some of the policy mix associated with short-term debt even though the bulk
of its debt portfolio is longer-term debt.
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Figure 4.3: Under the benchmark parameters, the policy rules as functions of lagged debt, when the grid for technology
is fixed at A=1.
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Table 4.2: The steady state under the benchmark parameterization
Variable Steady State Value Definition
b −0.1523 real long term debt
Y 1.0352 output
C 0.8330 consumption
PMb/ (4Y )× 100 −63.34% debt-GDP ratio in terms of annual output
G 21 government spending
(Π4 − 1)× 100 1.2455 annualized inflation rate
τ 0.1918 income tax rate
PM 17.2146 long-term bond price
i 3.2441% annualized nominal interest rate
r 1.9741% annualized real interest rate
Steady State
We begin by plotting the policy functions for our benchmark calibration in order to
assess the steady-state of our optimal policy problem. Figure 4.3 plots policy rules
against lagged debt, with the grid for At fixed at 1. The first subplot illustrates how to
find the steady state debt associated with the time consistent equilibrium. We should
note that the long-run debt under the benchmark parameters is negative (−0.1523)
which is bigger than the first best value (−2.47) implying a stock of assets of 63.34% of
GDP rather than the ’war chest’ value of 843.75% of GDP. The interaction of inflation
and debt stabilization bias generate a small negative long-run optimal value for debt,
which falls far short of the accumulated level of assets that would be needed to finance
government consumption and eliminate tax and other distortions. In addition, the
annualized inflation rate in the steady state is 1.25% less than the target of 2%. That
is, there is a slight undershooting of the inflation target in steady state. Table 4.2
summarizes the steady state values.
In standard analysis of the inflationary bias problem the magnitude of the bias is
determined by the exogenously given degree of monopolistic competition which implies
that the equilibrium level of output is inefficiently low. In the presence of debt and
distortionary taxation, at higher debt/tax levels the inefficiency is more pronounced
and the desire to generate a surprise inflation is greater, ceteris paribus. At the same
time, any surprise inflation reduces the real value of government debt and mitigates
the costs of distortionary taxation and the associated inflationary bias in the future -
we follow Leith and Wren-Lewis (2013) in labelling this the "debt stabilization bias".
As a result, the policy maker will seek to reduce debt levels to mitigate the costs of
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distortionary taxation and the endogenous inflationary bias problem. However, once
debt turns negative, the policy maker faces a trade-off. Any surprise inflation will
boost output, moving it closer to the efficient level. However, any surprise inflation
when the government is holding a net stock of nominal assets rather than liabilities
will reduce the real value of those assets and thereby worsen the future inefficiencies in
the economy. The steady-state then balances these opposing forces, such that there is
a small stock of positive government assets and a mild deflationary bias beyond which
the government is not tempted to induce further deflationary surprises, as this would
worsen output levels in the short-run, even though they would lead to a greater stock
of assets in the longer run.
In addition, Table 4.3 shows that debt maturity has a nonlinear effect on the steady
state debt-GDP ratio and inflation rate. The time-consistent level of accumulated assets
held by the government first decreases, and then increases, as the average maturity
of debt lengthens. Correspondingly, the undershooting of inflation target becomes
less severe initially, while deteriorates afterwards. The intuition can be understood as
follows. As noted above, the policy maker essentially faces two biases - the conventional
inflation bias where the policy maker wishes to induce a surprise inflation to boost
activity in a sub-optimally small economy, and a debt stabilization bias where the
policy maker wishes to use surprise inflation to reduce the value of debt or increase the
real value of its nominal assets. At low maturity levels, in steady state the inflationary
bias dominates such that inflation lies above its target value. As maturity levels rise
slightly, the inflationary bias falls, the government accumulates a larger stock of assets
which support lower tax rates, even though government consumption as a share of GDP
rises slightly. As maturity rises more, the debt stabilization bias starts to outweigh the
inflation bias and steady state inflation lies below target, due to the stock of nominal
assets the government has accumulated. These nominal asset stocks, along with falls in
government consumption relative to GDP help support the reduced tax rates. It should
be noted that the movements in debt to GDP ratios, tax rates and the share of public
consumption in output are not entirely monotonic as maturity levels change, reflecting
the balancing of the two forms of bias and their associated impact on the policy mix
differences emphasised elsewhere in the chapter. However, the overwhelming tendency
is for the debt stabilization bias to prevent the policy maker accumulating a war chest
of nominal assets sufficient to finance all government activities, and this is particularly
the case when debt is of a shorter maturity.
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Transition Dynamics and the Policy Mix
Before plotting the transition dynamics, it is helpful to consider the non-linearities
implied by the policy functions plotted in Figure 4.3. Here we can see that inflation
is rising steeply with the level of debt, as the endogenous inflationary bias problem
worsens with rising debt levels. We can also see how the policy response varies with
debt levels - as debt levels rise we see reduced government consumption, higher tax
rates and as higher debt levels raise inflation, a rise in real interest rates. However,
once debt levels rise sufficiently we can see that the rise in labor income tax rates slows
and real interest rates start to fall. This suggests that we may start to see a change in
the policy mix as we transition from high levels of debt towards the steady state.
Figure 4.4 plots the transition dynamics starting from a high level of debt given
the benchmark calibration. Here we can see the non-linearities implicit in the policy
functions plotted in Figure 4.3. At vary high initial levels of debt, we have a massive
inflationary bias problem (with annualized inflation in excess of 40%), and as a result,
the policy maker is acting to reduce the level of debt fairly rapidly. To do so, they cut
government spending and raise labor income tax rates. As as result of the high inflation,
they also raise real interest rates. This is in line with the conventional monetary and
fiscal policy assignment - fiscal policy is stabilising debt and monetary policy is raising
real interest rates to reduce aggregate demand and, thereby, inflation. However, looking
closely at the start of the transition when debt levels are particularly high, we see a
different policy mix - real interest rates are rising in the first few periods as inflation
and debt fall. Essentially in the first few periods debt levels are so high that monetary
policy is slightly moderated to mitigate the effects of raised debt service costs. We shall
now show that these changes in the policy mix are highly dependent on the maturity
structure.
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Figure 4.4: Under the benchmark parameters, this figure plots the transition paths of policy variables when debt
starts from levels consistent with currently observed debt-GDP ratios, and technology is fixed at A=1. The red lines
indicate steady states.
The Role of Debt Maturity
To illustrate the importance of the maturity structure on the optimal policy mix, we
plot the policy functions for inflation, real interest rates, the labor income tax and
government spending as a function of debt levels for the conventional single period
debt (ρ = 0) and longer maturity debt (ρ = 0.7588, 0.9598, 0.9786), as shown in Figure
4.5. In the case of single period debt, we obtain a large endogenous inflationary bias
problem, but find that even when inflation is high as a result, real interest rates fall
at higher debt levels. Moreover, although tax rates initially rise with the level of debt,
they start to fall once the debt to GDP ratio passes 30%. Therefore, we find that real
interests are lower as debt levels rise, since monetary policy seeks to reduce debt service
costs and expand the tax base. This would look like a passive monetary policy, if one
was to estimate a standard policy rule. At the same time, tax policy looks conventional
at low to moderate debt levels, but once debt levels rise above 30% of GDP higher debt
is associated with lower tax rates - an apparently active fiscal policy.
When we turn to the longer maturity debt (ρ = 0.9598 as an example), we have
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Figure 4.5: This figure illustrates the relationship between policy mix and the debt-GDP ratio under alternative
maturities.
conventional policies in place for a wider range of debt to GDP ratios. As debt levels
rise, we have a worsening of the inflationary bias problem, although not as pronounced
as in the case of shorter maturity debt. However, unlike the case of single period debt,
monetary policy raises real interest rates in response to this rise in inflation until debt
to GDP ratios exceed 175% of GDP at which point they start falling sharply as debt
levels rise further. At the same point, labor income tax rates start falling with rising
debt levels too. Therefore, we have a policy mix which looks like the conventional
policy assignment at lower debt levels - real interest rates rise to fight inflation and tax
rates rise and government consumption fall to stabilize debt - but at higher debt levels
we observe a reversal in the policy mix - monetary policy reduces real interest rates to
stabilize debt and fiscal policy moderates the increases in tax rates to mitigate the rise
in inflation.
We can then see the role of debt maturity on the transition dynamics by plotting
the transition paths for four cases of ρ: ρ = 0 (single periood debt), ρ = 0.7588 (1
year debt maturity), ρ = 0.9598 (5 year debt maturity), and ρ = 0.9786 (8 year debt
maturity) where we begin from the same debt to GDP ratio, as shown in Figure 4.6.
Here we can see the radically higher inflationay bias problem when debt maturity is low,
and the unconventional policy mix this engenders - real interest rates are cut to help
reduce debt when debt is single period, tax increases and moderated and government
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consumption is markedly reduced. As debt maturity is increased, we both reduce the
inflationary bias problem and the conventional policy mix is applied a lower debt to
GDP ratios.
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Figure 4.6: This figure plots the transition paths under different maturities, when the debt-GDP ratio starts from the
same level.
Endogenizing Debt Maturity
Up until this point, we have held the level of debt maturity fixed by controlling ρ.
We now allow the policy maker to have some control over the maturity structure by
allowing them to issue a mixture of single period and longer-maturity debt of a given ρ.
By varying the relative proportions of these two types of bonds, the policy maker can
influence the average maturity of the outstanding stock of debt. We plot the transition
dynamics for the benchmark calibration in Figure 4.7 where we start from the same
initial overall debt to GDP ratio. Here it is important to stress that despite the high
overall debt to GDP ratio, the quantity of short-term debt issued is very low. We
do not observe the extreme portfolios made up of issuing long-term debt to purchase
short-term assets which have been used as hedging devices when policy makers can
commit (see Debortoli et al. (2015) and Leeper and Leith (2017)). Instead, there is an
extremely modest issuance of short-term debt when overall debt levels are very high,
which serves to support small changes in the time-consistent policy mix. Specifically,
we do not observe significant changes in the paths for inflation or overall indebtedness,
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Figure 4.7: This figure compares the transition paths under the benchmark case with and without short-term debt,
when the debt-GDP ratio starts from the same level.
suggesting that the availability of short-term debt is not used to radically alter the
speed of fiscal correction. Instead, the policy mix underpinning those dynamics does
change - real interest rates, government consumption and tax rates are lower when the
policy maker can issue short-term debt and overall debt levels are high. In other words,
the issuance of short-term debt tilts the policy mix towards the unconventional policies
pursued at lower maturity levels with more adjustment being borne by monetary policy
and cuts in government spending and less in tax increases. This tilting in the policy
mix produces a very modest welfare gain (equivalent to 1.5% of one-period’s steady
state consumption). If we turn to a lower maturity structure (an average medium-term
debt maturity of two years) then the effects are qualitatively similar, but quantitatively
much smaller - see Figure 4.8.
198
Conclusions
t
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Π
t
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Annualized Inflation (%)
t
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Y
t
1.005
1.01
1.015
1.02
1.025
1.03
1.035
Output
t
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
C t
0.81
0.815
0.82
0.825
0.83
Consumption
t
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
P
M t
b
t
+
P
S t
b
S t
4
Y
t
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
Overall debt-GDP ratio (%)
t
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
G
t
0.192
0.194
0.196
0.198
0.2
0.202
Government spending
t
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
P
M t
b
t
4
Y
t
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
Long-term debt-GDP ratio (%)
t
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
τ
t
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
Labor income tax
t
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
P
S t
b
S t
4
Y
t
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Short-term debt-GDP ratio (%)
t
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
r t
2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
Annualized real interest rate (%)
With short-term debt
Without short-term debt
Figure 4.8: This figure compares the transition paths under the case with debt maturity of two years, with and without
short-term debt, when the debt-GDP ratio starts from the same level.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have considered the optimal monetary and fiscal policy mix in a
New Keynesian economy with long-term debt. The existence of nominal debt induces a
substantial endogenous inflation bias problem as the policy maker faces the temptation
to reduce the real value of debt through inflation surprises - a debt stabilization bias.
In fact, this temptation results in a steady state where the government accumulates a
small stock of assets (falling well short of the ’war chest’ needed to finance all of the
government’s activities without recourse to taxation) and suffers a mild deflationary
undershooting of the inflation target. Moreover, we find that the policy equilibrium
is highly non-linear depending crucially on both the level of debt and the maturity
structure of that debt. Adopting single period debt implies a policy mix which can look
quite unconventional, especially as debt levels rise. Specifically, monetary policy will
seek to stabilize debt through lower debt interest payments while tax policy attempts
to stabilize inflation. With longer debt maturities, optimal policy looks more like
the conventional policy assignment - monetary policy raises real interest rates to fight
inflation, while taxes are raised to stabilize debt, unless debt level rise sufficiently high
that we reverse the policy assignment as in the case of single period debt. This policy
mix reversal occurs at far higher debt levels, as we move from single period debt to
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plausibly calibrated debt maturities.
Finally, we consider the role of endogenous maturity by allowing the policy maker
to issue both single-period and medium maturity debt. We find that this does little
to affect the underlying inflation bias problems and debt dynamics, but that a modest
issuance of short-term debt allows the policy maker to shift the policy mix to be
more like that of the single period debt case with lower real interest rates, government
consumption and tax rates. This is mildly welfare improving. It is also interesting to
note that the implicit government debt portfolio does not attempt to achieve any of the
hedging effects associated with some optimal policy exercises when the policy maker
can commit.
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4.A Technical Appendix
4.A.1 Derivation of Household’s FOCs
First, let’s clarify how to derive (4.4). one-period securities BSt purchased at time t
pay a nominal return Rt at time t + 1. Long-term bonds BMt cost PMt at time t and
pay an exponentially decaying coupon ρj at time t+ j + 1. By definition, the yield to
maturity is the discount rate that makes the current bond price equal to the present
value of the payments (coupon payments and maturity value). Then,
PMt =
1
Rmt
+
ρ
(Rmt )
2 +
ρ2
(Rmt )
3 + · · ·
=
1
Rmt − ρ
Equivalently, the gross yield to maturity at time t on the long-term bond is given by
Rmt =
1
PMt
+ ρ (4.28)
see Woodford (2001). Hence, the duration of this bond is
Rmt
(Rmt − ρ)2 PMt
=
Rmt
(Rmt − ρ)
see the proof below. Also note that the price of a bond issued j periods before is given
by
PMt (j) = ρ
jPMt (4.29)
which says that any existing bonds issued j periods ago is equivalent to ρj new bonds.
This enables us to write the household’s flow budget constraint as a function of the
stock of total long-term debt, BMt , instead of the current period’s purchases of long-
term debt.
Technical Appendix
The flow budget constraint of households is
PtCt + P
S
t B
S
t + P
M
t B
M
t ≤ Ξt +
∞∑
j=1
ρj−1BMt−j +B
S
t−1 +WtNt(1− τt) (4.30)
Using (4.29), we can rewrite (4.30) in a more convenient recursive formulation.
Imposing the no-arbitrage condition at time t− 1,
PMt−1B
M
t−1 =
∞∑
j=1
PMt (j)B
M
t−j =
∞∑
j=1
ρj−1PMt−1B
M
t−j
that is,
BMt−1 =
∞∑
j=1
ρj−1BMt−j
Using (4.28), at time t, BMt−1 is worth BMt−1
(
1 + ρPMt
)
= PMt R
m
t B
M
t−1. This gives us
(4.4). See Chen et al. (2012) for a similar model setup.
We can derive optimality conditions for the agent by writing the Lagrangian ex-
pression,
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt

(
C1−σt
1−σ + χ
G
1−σg
t
1−σg − Nt
1+ϕ
1+ϕ
)
+λt
[
Ξt + (1 + ρP
M
t )B
M
t−1 +B
S
t−1 +WtNt(1− τt)− PtCt − P St BSt − PMt BMt
]

where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier. The FOCs are given as follows:
∂L
∂Ct
= C−σt − Ptλt = 0
∂L
∂Nt
= −Nϕt + λt(1− τt)Wt = 0
∂L
∂BSt
= −λtP St + βEt (λt+1) = 0
∂L
∂BMt
= −λtPMt + βEt
[(
1 + ρPMt+1
)
λt+1
]
= 0
Note that, P St = R
−1
t , then these conditions can be simplified further into
βRtEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Pt
Pt+1
]
= 1
(1− τt)Wt
Pt
= Nϕt C
σ
t
202
Technical Appendix
βEt
[(
1 + ρPMt+1
)( Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Pt
Pt+1
]
= PMt
Using (4.28), the Euler equation for the long-term bond can also be written as,
βEt
[(
Rmt+1
Rmt+1 − ρ
)(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Pt
Pt+1
]
=
1
Rmt − ρ
that is,
β (Rmt − ρ)Et
[(
Rmt+1
Rmt+1 − ρ
)(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Pt
Pt+1
]
= 1
Combining the Euler equations for short- and long-term bonds yields the no-arbitrage
restriction between these two bonds
Rt = Et
(
1 + ρPMt+1
PMt
)
≡ Et
(
RMt+1
)
(4.31)
which means that the expected one-period returns from date t to t+1 on the two bonds
should be equal. Equivalently, the no-arbitrage condition between the two bonds can
be written as
Rt = Et
[
Rmt+1 (R
m
t − ρ)
Rmt+1 − ρ
]
Derivation of No-Ponzi-Game Condition
The no-Ponzi game constraint in our model is the same as the one in Eusepi and
Preston (2011). Define nominal household wealth brought into period t as,
Dt = (1 + ρP
M
t )B
M
t−1 +B
S
t−1
then the real beginning-of-period financial wealth in period t is
Dt
Pt
=
(1 + ρPMt )B
M
t−1 +B
S
t−1
Pt
and the no-Ponzi game condition is
lim
T→∞
Et
[
qt,T
DT
PT
]
= 0
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Note that qt,T =
T∏
s=t+1
qs−1,s =
T∏
s=t+1
(
β
(
Cs−1
Cs
)σ)
= βT−t
(
Ct
CT
)σ
, hence the no-Ponzi
game condition can also be written as
lim
T→∞
Et
[
βT−t
(
Ct
CT
)σ
DT
PT
]
= 0
Note that
λt =
C−σt
Pt
then, the no-Ponzi game condition can be rewritten as
lim
T→∞
E0
[
βTλTDT
]
= 0
which is the typical form used in the literature.
We can also get the same form of no-Ponzi game condition in Eusepi and Preston
(2011) as follows. The no-arbitrage condition between one-period and long-term bonds
PMt = Et
[
P St
(
1 + ρPMt+1
)]
implies that
PMt = Et
[
Qt,t+1
(
1 + ρPMt+1
)]
that is,
Et
[
Qt,t+1
(
1 + ρPMt+1
PMt
)]
= 1
As a result,
qt,T = qt,t+1qt+1,t+2 · · · qT−1,T = Qt,t+1
(
Pt+1
Pt
)
Qt+1,t+2
(
Pt+2
Pt+1
)
· · ·QT−1,T
(
PT
PT−1
)
=
(
PMt
1 + ρPMt+1
)(
Pt+1
Pt
)(
PMt+1
1 + ρPMt+2
)(
Pt+2
Pt+1
)
· · ·
(
PMT−1
1 + ρPMT
)(
PT
PT−1
)
=
T−1∏
s=t
(
PMs
1 + ρPMs+1
)(
Ps+1
Ps
)
=
T−1∏
s=t
1
Rs,s+1
=
1
Rt,T
where
Rs,s+1 =
(
1 + ρPMs+1
PMs
)(
Ps
Ps+1
)
is the realized one-period gross real return on long-term bonds. Hence, the no-Ponzi
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game condition can be rewritten as
lim
T→∞
Et
[
1
Rt,T
DT
PT
]
= 0
4.A.2 Summary of Model
The model can be summarized by the following equations:
Consumption Euler equation,
βRtEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1 (4.32)
Pricing of longer-term bonds,
βEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)(
1 + ρPMt+1
)}
= PMt (4.33)
Labour supply,
Nϕt C
σ
t = (1− τt)
(
Wt
Pt
)
≡ (1− τt)wt
Resource constraint,
Yt
[
1− φ
2
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)2]
= Ct +Gt (4.34)
Phillips curve,
0 = (1− ) + mct − φΠt
Π∗
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)
(4.35)
+ φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1
Π∗
(
Πt+1
Π∗
− 1
)]
Government budget constraint,
PMt bt = (1 + ρP
M
t )
bt−1
Πt
− Wt
Pt
Ntτt +Gt
= (1 + ρPMt )
bt−1
Πt
−
(
τt
1− τt
)
N1+ϕt C
σ
t +Gt
= (1 + ρPMt )
bt−1
Πt
−
(
τt
1− τt
)(
Yt
At
)1+ϕ
Cσt +Gt (4.36)
205
Technical Appendix
Technology,
Yt = AtNt (4.37)
Marginal costs,
mct = Wt/ (PtAt) = (1− τt)−1Y ϕt Cσt A−1−ϕt
The objective function for social welfare is given by,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
G
1−σg
t
1− σg −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
(4.38)
There are two state variables, real debt bt and productivity at = ln (At).
The Deterministic Steady State
Given the system of non-linear equations, the corresponding steady state system can
be written as follows:
A = 1
βR
Π
= 1
β
Π
(
1 + ρPM
)
= PM
(1− τ)w = NϕCσ
Y
[
1− φ
2
(
Π
Π∗
− 1
)2]
= C +G
(1− ) + mc+ φ (β − 1)
[
Π
Π∗
(
Π
Π∗
− 1
)]
= 0
PMb = (1 + ρPM)
b
Π
−
(
τ
1− τ
)
Y 1+ϕCσ +G
Y = N
mc = w = (1− τ)−1Y ϕCσ
Hence, when Π = Π∗,
PM =
β
Π∗ − βρ
mc = w =
− 1

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C
Y
=
[
(1− τ)
(
− 1

)]1/σ
Y −
ϕ+σ
σ
G
Y
= 1− C
Y
= 1−
[
(1− τ)
(
− 1

)]1/σ
Y −
ϕ+σ
σ
PMb =
β
1− β
[
τ
(
− 1

)
− G
Y
]
Y
Note that,
Y ϕ+σ
(
1− G
Y
)σ
= (1− τ)
(
− 1

)
(4.39)
which will be used to contrast with the allocation that would be chosen by a social
planner.
4.A.3 Numerical Algorithm
Let st = (bt−1, at) denote the state vector at time t, where real stock of debt bt−1
is endogenous and technology At = exp(at) is exogenous and respectively, with the
following law of motion:
PMt bt = (1 + ρP
M
t )
bt−1
Πt
− wtNtτt +Gt
at = ρaat−1 + eat
where 0 ≤ ρa < 1 and technology innovation eat is an i.i.d. normal random variable,
which has a zero mean and a finite standard deviation σa.
There are 7 endogenous variables and 3 Lagrangian multipliers. Correspondingly,
there are 10 functional equations associated with the 10 varaibles
{
Ct,Yt,Πt,bt,τt,PMt ,Gt,λ1t,λ2t,λ3t
}
. Let’s define a new function X : R2 → R10, in order to collect the policy functions of
endogenous variables as follows:
X(st) =
(
Ct(st), Yt(st),Πt(st), bt(st), τt(st), P
M
t (st), Gt(st), λ1t(st), λ2t(st), λ3t(st)
)
Given the specification of the function X, the equilibrium conditions can be written
more compactly as,
Γ (st, X(st), Et [Z (X(st+1))] , Et [Zb (X(st+1))]) = 0
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where Γ : R2+10+3+3 → R10 summarizes the full set of dynamic equilibrium relationship,
and
Z (X(st+1)) =
 Z1 (X(st+1))Z2 (X(st+1))
Z3 (X(st+1))
 ≡
 M(bt, At+1)L(bt, At+1)
(Πt+1)
−1 (1 + ρPMt+1)λ3t+1

with
M(bt, At+1) = (Ct+1)
−σ Yt+1
Πt+1
Π∗
(
Πt+1
Π∗
− 1
)
L(bt, At+1) = (Ct+1)
−σ(Πt+1)−1(1 + ρPMt+1)
and
Zb (X(st+1)) =

∂Z1(X(st+1))
∂bt
∂Z2(X(st+1))
∂bt
∂Z3(X(st+1))
∂bt
 ≡

∂M(bt,At+1)
∂bt
∂L(bt,At+1)
∂bt
∂[(Πt+1)−1(1+ρPMt+1)λ3t+1]
∂bt

More specifically,
L1(bt, At+1) =
∂
[
(Ct+1)
−σ(Πt+1)−1(1 + ρPMt+1)
]
∂bt
= −σ(Ct+1)−σ−1(Πt+1)−1(1 + ρPMt+1)
∂Ct+1
∂bt
− (Ct+1)−σ(Πt+1)−2(1 + ρPMt+1)
∂Πt+1
∂bt
+ ρ(Ct+1)
−σ(Πt+1)−1
∂PMt+1
∂bt
and
M1(bt, At+1) =
∂
[
(Ct+1)
−σ Yt+1
Πt+1
Π∗
(
Πt+1
Π∗ − 1
)]
∂bt
= −σ(Ct+1)−σ−1Yt+1 Πt+1
Π∗
(
Πt+1
Π∗
− 1
)
∂Ct+1
∂bt
+ (Ct+1)
−σ Πt+1
Π∗
(
Πt+1
Π∗
− 1
)
∂Yt+1
∂bt
+ (Ct+1)
−σ Yt+1
Π∗
(
Πt+1
Π∗
− 1
)
∂Πt+1
∂bt
+ (Ct+1)
−σ Yt+1
Π∗
Πt+1
Π∗
∂Πt+1
∂bt
= −σ(Ct+1)−σ−1Yt+1 Πt+1
Π∗
(
Πt+1
Π∗
− 1
)
∂Ct+1
∂bt
+ (Ct+1)
−σ Πt+1
Π∗
(
Πt+1
Π∗
− 1
)
∂Yt+1
∂bt
+ (Ct+1)
−σ Yt+1
Π∗
(
2Πt+1
Π∗
− 1
)
∂Πt+1
∂bt
Note we are assuming Et [Zb (X(st+1))] = ∂Et [Z (X(st+1))] /bt, which is normally valid
using the Interchange of Integration and Differentiation Theorem. Then the problem
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is to find a vector-valued function X that Γ maps to the zero function. Projection
methods, hence, can be used.
Following the notation convention in the literature, we simply use s = (b, a) to
denote the current state of the economy st = (bt−1, at), and s′ to represent next period
state that evolves according to the law of motion specified above. The Chebyshev
collocation method with time iteration which we use to solve this nonlinear system can
be described as follows:
1. Define the collocation nodes and the space of the approximating functions:
• Choose an order of approximation (i.e., the polynomial degrees) nb and
na for each dimension of the state space s = (b, a), then there are Ns =
(nb + 1)× (na + 1) nodes in the state space. Let S = (S1, S2, ..., SNs) denote
the set of collocation nodes.
• Compute the nb + 1 and na + 1 roots of the Chebychev polynomial of order
nb + 1 and na + 1 as
zib = cos
(
(2i− 1)pi
2(nb + 1)
)
, for i = 1, 2, ..., nb + 1.
zia = cos
(
(2i− 1)pi
2(na + 1)
)
, for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1.
• Compute collocation points ai as
ai =
a+ a
2
+
a− a
2
zia =
a− a
2
(
zia + 1
)
+ a
for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1. Note that the number of collocation nodes is na + 1.
Similarly, compute collocation points bi as
bi =
b+ b
2
+
b− b
2
zib =
b− b
2
(
zib + 1
)
+ b
for i = 1, 2, ..., nb + 1, which map [−1, 1] into [b, b]. Note that
S = {(bi, aj) | i = 1, 2, ..., nb + 1, j = 1, 2, ..., na + 1}
that is, the tensor grids, with S1 = (b1, a1), S2 = (b1, a2), ..., SNs =
(bnb+1, ana+1).
• The space of the approximating functions, denoted as Ω, is a matrix of
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two-dimensional Chebyshev polynomials. More specifically,
Ω (S) =

Ω (S1)
Ω (S2)
...
Ω (Sna+1)
...
Ω (SNs )

=
=

1 T0(ξ(b1)T1(ξ (a1)) T0(ξ(b1)T2(ξ (a1)) · · · Tnb (ξ(b1)Tna (ξ (a1))
1 T0(ξ(b1)T1(ξ (a2)) T0(ξ(b1)T2(ξ (a2)) · · · Tnb (ξ(b1)Tna (ξ (a2))
...
...
... · · ·
...
1 T0(ξ(b1)T1(ξ (ana+1)) T0(ξ(b1)T2(ξ (ana+1)) · · · T0(ξ(b1)Tna (ξ (ana+1))
...
...
... · · ·
...
1 T0(ξ(bnb+1)T1(ξ (ana+1)) T0(ξ(bnb+1)T2(ξ (ana+1)) · · · T0(ξ(bnb+1)Tna (ξ (ana+1))

Ns×Ns
where ξ(x) = 2 (x− x) / (x− x) − 1 maps the domain of x ∈ [x, x] into
[−1, 1].
• Then, at each node s ∈ S, policy functions X(s) are approximated by
X(s) = Ω(s)ΘX ,
where
ΘX =
[
θc, θy, θpi, θb, θτ , θp˜, θg, θλ1 , θλ2 , θλ3
]
is a Ns × 10 matrix of the approximating coefficients.
2. Formulate an initial guess for the approximating coefficients, Θ0X , and specify the
stopping rule tol, say, 10−6.
3. At each iteration j, we can get an updated ΘjX by implement the following time
iteration step:
• At each collocation node s ∈ S, compute the possible values of future policy
functions X(s′) for k = 1, ..., q. That is,
X(s′) = Ω(s′)Θj−1X
where q is the number of Gauss-Hermite quadrature nodes. Note that
Ω(s′) = Tjb(ξ(b
′))Tja (ξ(a
′))
is a q × Ns matrix, with b′ = b̂(s; θb), a′ = ρaa + zk
√
2σ2a, jb = 0, ..., nb,
and ja = 0, ..., na. The hat symbol indicates the corresponding approximate
policy functions, so b̂ is the approximate policy for real debt, for example.
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Similarly, the two auxilliary functions can be calculated as follows:
M(s′) ≈
(
Ĉ(s′; θc)
)−σ
Ŷ (s′; θy)
Π̂(s′; θpi)
Π∗
(
Π̂(s′; θpi)
Π∗
− 1
)
and,
L(s′) ≈
(
Ĉ(s′; θc)
)−σ (
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)−1(
1 +
ρP̂M
(
s′; θp˜
)
Π∗ − ρβ
)
Note that we use P˜Mt = (Π∗ − ρβ)PMt rather than PMt in numerical analysis,
since the former is far less sensitive to maturity structure variations.
• Now calculate the expectation terms E [Z (X(s′))] at each node s. Let ωk
denote the weights for the quadrature, then
E [M(s′)] ≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
(
Ĉ(s′; θc)
)−σ
Ŷ (s′; θy)
Π̂(s′; θpi)
Π∗
(
Π̂(s′; θpi)
Π∗
− 1
)
≡M (s′, q)
E [L(s′)] ≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
(
Ĉ(s′; θc)
)−σ (
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)−1(
1 +
ρP̂M
(
s′; θp˜
)
Π∗ − ρβ
)
≡ L (s′, q)
and
Et
[(
1 + ρPMt+1
Πt+1
)
λ3t+1
]
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
1 + ρP̂M(s′;θp˜)Π∗−ρβ
Π̂(s′; θpi)
 λ̂3(s′; θλ3) ≡ Λ (s′, q) .
Hence,
E [Z (X(s′))] ≈ E
[
Ẑ (X(s′))
]
=
 M (s
′, q)
L (s′, q)
Λ (s′, q)

• Next calculate the partial derivatives under expectation E [Zb (X(s′))].
• Note that we only need to compute ∂Ct+1/∂bt, ∂Yt+1/∂bt, ∂Πt+1/∂bt and ∂PMt+1/∂bt,
which are given as follows:
∂Ct+1
∂b
≈
nb∑
jb=0
na∑
ja=0
2θcjbja
b− b T
′
jb
(ξ(b′))Tja(ξ(a
′)) ≡ Ĉb (s′)
∂Yt+1
∂bt
≈
nb∑
jb=0
na∑
ja=0
2θyjbja
b− b T
′
jb
(ξ(b′))Tja(ξ(a
′)) ≡ Ŷb (s′)
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∂Πt+1
∂bt
≈
nb∑
jb=0
na∑
ja=0
2θpijbja
b− b T
′
jb
(ξ(b′))Tja(ξ(a
′)) ≡ Π̂b (s′)
∂PMt+1
∂bt
≈
nb∑
jb=0
na∑
ja=0
2θp˜jbja(
b− b) (Π∗ − ρβ)T ′jb(ξ(bi))Tja(ξ(aj)) ≡ P̂Mb (s′)
Hence, we can approximate the two partial derivatives under expectation
∂E [M(s′)]
∂b
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk

−σ
(
Ĉ(s′; θc)
)−σ−1
Ŷ (s′; θy) Π̂(s
′;θpi)
Π∗
(
Π̂(s′;θpi)
Π∗ − 1
)
Ĉb (s
′)
+
(
Ĉ(s′; θc)
)−σ
Π̂(s′;θpi)
Π∗
(
Π̂(s′;θpi)
Π∗ − 1
)
Ŷb (s
′)
+
(
Ĉ(s′; θc)
)−σ
Π̂(s′;θpi)
Π∗
(
2Π̂(s′;θpi)
Π∗ − 1
)
Π̂b (s
′)

≡ M̂b (s′, q) ,
∂E [L(s′)]
∂b
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk

−σ
(
Ĉ(s′; θc)
)−σ−1 (
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)−1
(1 +
ρP̂M(s′;θp˜)
Π∗−ρβ )Ĉb (s
′)
−
(
Ĉ(s′; θc)
)−σ (
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)−2
(1 +
ρP̂M(s′;θp˜)
Π∗−ρβ )Π̂b (s
′)
+ρ
(
Ĉ(s′; θc)
)−σ (
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)−1
P̂Mb (s
′)

≡ L̂b (s′, q) .
That is,
E [Zb (X(s
′))] ≈ E
[
Ẑb (X(s
′))
]
=
[
M̂b (s
′, q)
L̂b (s
′, q)
]
4. At each collocation node s, solve for X(s) such that
Γ
(
s,X(s), E
[
Ẑ (X(s′))
]
, E
[
Ẑb (X(s
′))
])
= 0
The equation solver csolve written by Christopher A. Sims is employed to solve
the resulted system of nonlinear equations. With X(s) at hand, we can get the
corresponding coeffcient
Θ̂jX =
(
Ω (S)T Ω (S)
)−1
Ω (S)T X(s)
5. Update the approximating coefficients, ΘjX = ηΘ̂
j
X +(1− η) Θj−1X , where 0 ≤ η ≤
1 is some dampening parameter used for improving convergence.
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6. Check the stopping rules. If
∥∥ΘjX −Θj−1X ∥∥ < tol, then stop, else update the
approximation coefficients and go back to step 3.
When implementing the above algorithm, we start from lower order Chebyshev
polynomials and some reasonable initial guess. Then, we increase the order of approx-
imation and take as starting value the solution from the previous lower order approxi-
mation. This informal homotopy continuation idea ensures us to find a solution.
Remark. Given the fact that the price PMt fluctuates significantly for larger ρ, in
numerical analysis, we scale rule for PMt by (Π∗− ρβ), that is, P˜Mt = (Π∗− ρβ)PMt . In
this way, the steady state of P˜Mt is very close to β, and P˜Mt does not differ hugely as
we change the maturity structure.
4.A.4 Optimal Policy Under DiscretionWith Endogenous Short-
Term Debt
In this case, the government is allowed to issue new bonds of a different maturity and
swap these for existing bonds, in a way which does not affect the wealth of the bond
holders at the time of the swap, such that the exchange is voluntary.
The policy under discretion in this case can be described as a set of decision rules
for {Ct, Yt,Πt, bt, τt, Gt, bSt } which maximise,
V (bt−1, At, bSt−1) = max
{
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
G
1−σg
t
1− σg −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt
[
V (bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]}
subject to the following constraints:
Yt
[
1− φ
2
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)2]
= Ct +Gt
0 = (1− ) + mct − φΠt
Π∗
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)
+ φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1
Π∗
(
Πt+1
Π∗
− 1
)]
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βEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)(
1 + ρPMt+1
)}
bt + βEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)}
bSt
=
(
1 + ρβEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)(
1 + ρPMt+1
)}) bt−1
Πt
+
bSt−1
Πt
−
(
τt
1− τt
)(
Yt
At
)1+ϕ
Cσt +Gt
where bSt is the level of real short-term debt.
Defining auxilliary functions,
M(bt, At+1, b
S
t ) = (Ct+1)
−σ Yt+1
Πt+1
Π∗
(
Πt+1
Π∗
− 1
)
L(bt, At+1, b
S
t ) = (Ct+1)
−σ(Πt+1)−1(1 + ρPMt+1)
K
(
bt, At+1, b
S
t
)
= C−σt+1Π
−1
t+1
we can rewrite the NKPC and government budget constraints as, respectively,
(1− ) + (1− τt)−1Y ϕt Cσt A−1−ϕt − φ
Πt
Π∗
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)
+ φβCσt Y
−1
t Et
[
M(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
= 0
0 = βbtC
σ
t Et
[
L(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
+ βbSt C
σ
t Et
[
K
(
bt, At+1, b
S
t
)]
−bt−1
Πt
(
1 + ρβCσt Et
[
L(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
])− bSt−1
Πt
+
(
τt
1− τt
)(
Yt
At
)1+ϕ
Cσt −Gt
The Lagrangian for the policy problem can be written as,
L =
{
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
G
1−σg
t
1− σg −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt[V (bt, At+1, b
S
t )]
}
+ λ1t
[
Yt
(
1− φ
2
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)2)
− Ct −Gt
]
+ λ2t
[
(1− ) + (1− τt)−1Y ϕt Cσt A−1−ϕt − φΠtΠ∗
(
Πt
Π∗ − 1
)
+φβCσt Y
−1
t Et
[
M(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
] ]
+ λ3t

βbtC
σ
t Et
[
L(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
+ βbSt C
σ
t Et
[
K
(
bt, At+1, b
S
t
)]
− bt−1
Πt
(
1 + ρβCσt Et
[
L(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
])
− bSt−1
Πt
+
(
τt
1−τt
)(
Yt
At
)1+ϕ
Cσt −Gt

We can write the first order conditions for the policy problem as follows:
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Consumption,
C−σt − λ1t + λ2t
[
σ(1− τt)−1Y ϕt Cσ−1t A−1−ϕt + σφβCσ−1t Y −1t Et
[
M(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]]
+λ3t
 σβbtCσ−1t Et [L(bt, At+1, bSt )]+ σβbSt Cσ−1t Et [K (bt, At+1, bSt )]
−ρσβ bt−1
Πt
Cσ−1t Et
[
L(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
+ σ
(
τt
1−τt
)(
Yt
At
)1+ϕ
Cσ−1t
 = 0
Government spending,
χG
−σg
t − λ1t − λ3t = 0
Output,
−Y ϕt A−1−ϕt + λ1t
[
1− φ
2
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)2]
+λ2t
[
ϕ(1− τt)−1Y ϕ−1t Cσt A−1−ϕt − φβCσt Y −2t Et
[
M(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]]
+λ3t
[
(1 + ϕ)Y ϕt C
σ
t
(
τt
1− τt
)
A−1−ϕt
]
= 0
Taxation,
λ2t + λ3tYt = 0
Inflation,
−λ1t
[
Yt
φ
Π∗
(
Πt
Π∗
− 1
)]
− λ2t
[
φ
Π∗
(
2Πt
Π∗
− 1
)]
+λ3t
[
bt−1
Π2t
(
1 + ρβCσt Et
[
L(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
])
+
bSt−1
Π2t
]
= 0
Government debt, bt,
βEt[V1(bt, At+1, b
S
t )] + λ2t
[
φβCσt Y
−1
t Et
[
M1(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]]
+βCσt λ3t
[
Et
[
L(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
+ btEt
[
L1(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
+ bSt Et
[
K1
(
bt, At+1, b
S
t
)]
−ρ bt−1
Πt
Et
[
L1(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
] ] = 0
where
V1(bt, At+1, b
S
t ) ≡ ∂V (bt, At+1, bSt )/∂bt
L1(bt, At+1, b
S
t ) ≡ ∂L(bt, At+1, bSt )/∂bt
M1(bt, At+1, b
S
t ) ≡ ∂M(bt, At+1, bSt )/∂bt
K1(bt, At+1, b
S
t ) ≡ ∂K(bt, At+1, bSt )/∂bt
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Short-term government debt, bSt ,
βEt[V3(bt, At+1, b
S
t )] + λ2t
[
φβCσt Y
−1
t Et
[
M3(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]]
+βCσt λ3t
[
btEt
[
L3(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
+ Et
[
K
(
bt, At+1, b
S
t
)]
+ bSt Et
[
K3
(
bt, At+1, b
S
t
)]
−ρ bt−1
Πt
Et
[
L3(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
] ] = 0
where
V3(bt, At+1, b
S
t ) ≡ ∂V (bt, At+1, bSt )/∂bSt
L3(bt, At+1, b
S
t ) ≡ ∂L(bt, At+1, bSt )/∂bSt
M3(bt, At+1, b
S
t ) ≡ ∂M(bt, At+1, bSt )/∂bSt
K3(bt, At+1, b
S
t ) ≡ ∂K(bt, At+1, bSt )/∂bSt
Note that by the envelope theorem,
V1(bt−1, At, bSt−1) = −
λ3t
Πt
(
1 + ρβCσt Et
[
L(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
])
= −λ3t
Πt
(
1 + ρPMt
)
V3(bt−1, At, bSt ) = −
λ3t
Πt
hence,
V1(bt, At+1, b
S
t ) =
λ3t+1
Πt+1
(
1 + ρPMt+1
)
V3(bt, At+1, b
S
t ) = −
λ3t+1
Πt+1
and the FOCs for government debt bt and bSt can be rewritten as, respectively,
−βEt
[
λ3t+1
Πt+1
(1 + ρPMt+1)
]
+ λ2tφβC
σ
t Y
−1
t Et
[
M1(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
+βCσt λ3t
[
Et
[
L(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
+ btEt
[
L1(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
+ bSt Et
[
K1
(
bt, At+1, b
S
t
)]
−ρ bt−1
Πt
Et
[
L1(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
] ] = 0
and
−βEt[λ3t+1
Πt+1
] + λ2tφβC
σ
t Y
−1
t Et
[
M3(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
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+βCσt λ3t
[
btEt
[
L3(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
+ Et
[
K
(
bt, At+1, b
S
t
)]
+ bSt Et
[
K3
(
bt, At+1, b
S
t
)]
−ρ bt−1
Πt
Et
[
L3(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
] ] = 0
A Note on Numerical Analysis
Given the solution from the case with exogenously given short-term debt, we can use
a penalty term to gradually get the solution for the case with endogenous short-term
debt. Specifically, we modify the period utility function into the following form,
C1−σt
1− σ + χ
G
1−σg
t
1− σg −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
− ζ
(
bSt − b
S
)2
where ζ is a scale parameter of penalty. Note that the modified period utility function
is reduced into the original form, when ζ = 0. This fact motivates a homotopy contin-
uation idea. Initially, we can set ζ large enough to make sure bSt close to b
S. Then, we
incrementally decrease ζ down to zero.
Now, the FOC for bSt becomes,
−2ζ
(
bSt − b
S
)
− βEt[λ3t+1
Πt+1
] + λ2t
[
φβCσt Y
−1
t Et
[
M3(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]]
+βCσt λ3t
[
btEt
[
L3(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
]
+ Et
[
K
(
bt, At+1, b
S
t
)]
+ bSt Et
[
K3
(
bt, At+1, b
S
t
)]
−ρ bt−1
Πt
Et
[
L3(bt, At+1, b
S
t )
] ] = 0
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